APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Wadie Michael Holifield, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a violent offender to serve eighteen years in the Department of Correction.  He appeals two issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the jury allegedly was tainted by overhearing courtroom conversations between the victim and her family. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the date of the offense as January 16, 2005, rather than February 4, 2005.

This is a breach of contract action for the recovery of a real estate brokerage commission. The trial court found that the parties did not enter into a binding buyer’s representation agreement because there was no meeting of the minds. Instead, the court awarded the plaintiff real estate broker damages in quantum meruit. On appeal, we find that the parties mutually assented to the terms of the buyer’s representation agreement and that the broker was entitled to its commission as stated in the contract. We vacate the award of damages in quantum meruit, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with the contract.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Linda Batts, was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. She was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction for the intent to deliver conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of eight years. Defendant now appeals the judgments of the trial court arguing (1) the trial judge failed to exercise his duty to act as thirteenth juror and overturn the jury’s verdict, (2) the jury selection process was tainted in violation of her constitutional rights; and (3) the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This administrative appeal arises out of the termination of Officers Mauricio Hearns’s (Officer Hearns), Henry Gray, Jr.’s (Officer Gray), Dorian Branch’s (Officer Branch), and Derick Jones’s (Officer Jones) (collectively “the officers”) employment with the City of Memphis Police Department (the Department) following their purchases of stolen Samsung televisions and digital video disc (DVD) players for their personal use. The Department terminated the officers’ employment after finding a violation of DR-104 Personal Conduct. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis (the Commission) ruled that the termination was unreasonable disciplinary action and reversed the City’s decision. The City appealed to Shelby County Chancery Court, where the chancellor reversed the Commission’s decision, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. We hold that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by substantial and material evidence and therefore arbitrary. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 54.75 percent of the scheduled member loss of hearing in both ears. On appeal, the employer contends that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred when it failed to allow counsel to read portions of the plaintiff’s deposition. The employer also appeals the award being based on a scheduled member as opposed to the body as a whole and contends that the award is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the employer contends that the trial court erred in its determination of the compensation rate. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the claim met the statute of limitations. We do find that the trial court erred in its ruling on the use of deposition testimony but find that error harmless. We find that the trial court erred in its determination of disability attributable to a scheduled member and we have modified that award. Finally, we find no error in the trial court’s determination of the compensation rate. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, modified in part and remanded.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee, James Bradley, alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit because his employer, Plus Mark, Inc., had actual notice of his injury or, in the alternative, the employee's failure to provide timely notice of his injury was excused. In addition, the employee asserts that the trial court erred when it found that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of his employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a medical malpractice action in which the jury found in favor of Defendant hospital. Plaintiff
asserts Defendant’s expert was not qualified under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115(a)(1), and that the matter accordingly should be remanded for a new trial. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for new trial, vacate the judgment on jury verdict, and remand for a new trial.

The appellant, Maron Donta Brown, pled guilty in the Bradley County Criminal Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of speeding.1 The appellant received a total sentence of fifteen years as a Range II multiple offender. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant properly reserved a certified question of law, challenging the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle during which the cocaine was discovered. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I believe Appellant in this case gave a valid consent for Trooper Hoppe to conduct a general search of Appellant’s car. I am also in agreement that in doing so Appellant consented for Hoppe to “at least touch items, including locked or sealed packages, contained within the vehicle.” However, the majority notes and rightfully so that this consent did not extend to tearing open a sealed package within the car. The majority sanctions Hoppe’s having done so on the basis of his testimony that he was trained in drug interdiction and that upon feeling a closed, heavily-taped cardboard or pasteboard box he was able to immediately recognize the contents as a “brick” of cocaine. With this last crucial bit of information along with the other circumstances of the stop, the majority concludes Hoppe had probable cause to open the package and discover the cocaine within.

This appeal involves the authority of the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners to review the medical records of a physician’s patients. After the Board requested access to his patients’  records in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117 (2004), the physician filed a declaratory judgment action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The physician asserted that the statutory procedure for gaining access to medical records amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure because it failed to provide him with pre-enforcement judicial review of the reasonableness of the Board’s request. He also claimed that the statute’s notice provisions violated due process. Both the physician and the Board filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the physician received adequate notice of the purpose of the request for medical records. It also determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117(a)(3), the portion of the statute authorizing disciplinary sanctions against physicians who willfully fail to produce requested records, was unconstitutional and awarded the physician $20,916 in attorney’s fees. The Board perfected this appeal. We concur with the trial court’s conclusion that the physician received adequate notice of the reasons for the request for medical records. However, we have determined that physicians in Tennessee have no reasonable expectation that they can shield their patients’ records from the Board’s regulatory oversight and that the Board may discipline physicians who willfully refuse to comply with lawful requests for patient records that comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117.

The defendant, Jacob Allen Reynolds, pled guilty to one count of vandalism (Class C felony) and, after a sentencing hearing, was ordered to serve four years of confinement in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $11,407.75. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to four years of confinement. After careful review, we hold that no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Trial court dismissed action by worker’s compensation lienholder against employee’s attorney seeking to hold employee’s Tennessee attorney liable for disbursement of proceeds from third party settlement made by another out-of-state attorney.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted aggravated robbery. He contends that his sentences are illegal and, therefore, that his judgments of conviction are void. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

Two former police officers sought several tangible benefits of retirement guaranteed by Metro ordinances and police department policies. The officers requested such benefits and were denied, the Deputy Chief of Police citing a lack of good standing, as required by the ordinances, as the reason. The officers filed a declaratory judgment action. Metro filed a motion to dismiss asserting that a common law writ of certiorari should have been filed instead. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand.

This case concerns an employment agreement entered into by employees of a company. The employment agreement contained provisions against solicitation and competition. Four employees who signed the agreement later left the company and went to work for one of its main competitors. The company leveled numerous allegations against the four employees and their new employer, including breach of the employment agreement, breach of duty of loyalty, unlawful inducement of breach of contract, and tortious interference with contractual relations and business relations. The trial court granted summary judgments in favor of the four employees and their new employer. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Prisoner filed Petition for a writ of certiorari. The Trial Court refused to issue the writ. We affirm.

The Defendant, Travis Young, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of intentionally evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) classified him as a Range II offender; (2) enhanced the Defendant’s sentences; and (3) imposed consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified, and we remand the case for entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.

In this consolidated appeal, the Appellants, Maurice Leonard and Kenneth Shondale Mason, appeal their convictions by a Bedford County jury. Following a joint trial, Leonard and Mason were convicted of aggravated burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and false imprisonment. As a result of these convictions, Leonard received an effective sentence of four years, as a Range I offender, and Mason received an effective sentence of sixteen years as a Range II offender. On appeal, Leonard and Mason each raise two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Following review, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

Employer and its insurer filed suit against employee for fraud in the procurement of workers' compensation benefits. Employee and his wife filed a counter-complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. retaliatory discharge and loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed the counter-complaint for failure to state a claim. Employee sought to amend the counter-complaint to add procurement of breach of employment contract and a tortious interference claim against the insurer. The trial court also denied these claims. Employee and his wife appeal. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

This is a Title IV-D child support case. The Appellant State of Tennessee ex rel. LaJuanta McNeil Dauda was granted an order legitimizing the minor child and setting Appellee/Father’s child support obligation going forward. Appellee/Father filed a petition to set aside paternity, which was denied. Appellee/Father’s child support arrears were determined and, thereafter, the child’s mother sought to have Appellee/Father’s support obligation suspended and any arrears forgiven. The trial court granted the motion and the State appeals. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner, Michael Henderson, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief and has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Indicted for rape of a child, the defendant, Eric Maxie, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery. He appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the record supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm the conviction.

Aggrieved of his robbery convictions, the petitioner, William H. Stitts, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Circuit Court of Madison County after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presses his claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that a trial exhibit, a videotape of one of the robberies, was included in the appellate record on direct appeal. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Robert W. Bible d/b/a Chalet Village Chalets (“Plaintiff”) sued Ted Mullikin and Ted Mullikin d/b/a Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that Defendant was in breach of a contract for the sale by Plaintiff to Defendant of Plaintiff’s chalet rental business. The case was triedwithout a jury, and the Trial Court granted Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for $21,931.35. Defendant appeals to this Court. We affirm.