APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Barry Sotherland, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner claims that his concurrent life sentences for aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping are illegal because he was convicted of these charges while on parole for another felony and the sentencing court failed to explicitly order that this new sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for the paroled offense. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Wayne County Circuit Court summarily dismissing the petition.

This case involves the protest of a bid made pursuant to an invitation to bid issued by the State for copy machines. Upon protest made by several of the bidders as to the bid made by the selected bidder, the board of standards, after review, awarded the contract to the selected bidder. The next qualified bidder filed suit in chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the decision of the board of standards and awarded the contract to the complaining bidder. The State-defendants and the selected bidder appeal. We reverse and remand.

The issue presented in this lease dispute is whether the landlord or the tenant is responsible for payment of the costs of ad valorem real estate taxes and premiums for fire and extended coverage insurance. We hold that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous agreement of the parties, the tenant is responsible for the costs at issue. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s order adopting the Report of the Special Master, dismissing her case, and authorizing foreclosure proceedings. We affirm.

The defendant, Jonathan P. Taylor, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eight years incarceration. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While an inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility, Anthony Bond was found guilty by the prison disciplinary board of assault on a visitor, placed in punitive segregation for 15 days, and ordered to pay a $5 fine. Mr. Bond challenged the conviction by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wayne County Chancery Court. The trial court, after granting the petition and reviewing a certified copy of the disciplinary record, found that Mr. Bond was not entitled to any relief and dismissed the case. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Stephen Cox, the defendant, appeals from a denial of his application for alternative sentencing. The defendant entered a best interest guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), to reckless aggravated assault (Class D felony) for a two-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial judge. After a hearing, alternative sentencing was denied and the defendant was ordered to serve two years of confinement as a Range I, standard offender. After review, we conclude that the denial of alternative sentencing was proper and affirm the sentence.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Prior to trial the parties settled the issue of permanent vocational impairment at 17% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, which was subsequently court-approved. The defendant, Parker Hannifin Corporation, originally contended that the court erred in holding the defendant liable for plaintiff's milage to and from her residence or workplace and that of her medical provider due to the fact that the trips did not involve travel 15 miles or more in radius. The plaintiff having conceded the court's error in doing so, that leaves remaining the defendant's second contention, that being that the court erred in holding defendant responsible for what plaintiff's claim of unauthorized medical expenses in the amount of $39,037.25. We hold the court was correct, and therefore we affirm the trial court's decision.

The defendant, Richard Odom, filed a motion to access closed files in the Shelby County District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, and the state opposed said motion. After two hearings on the matter, the trial court entered an order granting the defendant’s ex parte motion for the trial court to view the state’s file in camera for specific limited exculpatory material. We granted the state’s Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) application for extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s ex parte motion, requiring the state to relinquish its file for in camera inspection by the trial court. Upon our review of the record and due consideration of the issue, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order.

This dispute concerns annexation of property known as the Southwind area by the City of  Memphis. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to intervene in Plaintiffs’ quo warranto action challenging Memphis’ annexation ordinance, and entered a consent order agreed to by the parties following settlement negotiations. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered a compensable back injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Vivian Larose Johnson, sought workers’ compensation benefits for carpal tunnel injuries to both hands and a separate injury to her back. The trial court found the employee had sustained a work related injury and that she had sustained a sixty percent permzzanent partial disability to the body as a whole without specifying the validity of her separate claims. The employer, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (Coca-Cola), has appealed, alleging the trial court erred in finding Ms. Johnson’s claim for benefits for the injury to her back had been filed within the limitations period established by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a), and in awarding Ms. Johnson sixty percent permanent partial disability as a whole. We agree, reverse in part and remand the case to the trial court for determination of the remaining claims.

The appellant, James Michael Hanners, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of misdemeanor assault, a lesser-included offense of abuse of a child under six years of age, in September 2002. In January 2003, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days. In
August 2005, the appellant moved for expungement of any records relating to the charge of child abuse, which the trial court denied relying on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101, as amended May 22, 2003. On appeal, the appellant argues that the denial of his motion for expungement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Tennessee Constitution because he was entitled to expungement at the time of his conviction and sentencing. After our review of the parties’ briefs and the record as a whole, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an expungement order.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that she had failed to demonstrate that she had suffered a permanent injury to her back while in the course of employment for the defendant. We conclude the trial court was correct in its finding, however, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Pauline Lacey, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. The Defendant was indicted for four counts of aggravated assault, and she subsequently pled guilty as charged. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective four-year and six-month sentence, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail, followed by probation for the remainder of her sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Scotty Wayne Henry, pled guilty to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of felony reckless endangerment. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the search and seizure of evidence that led to his indictment and guilty plea were unconstitutional. We conclude that the search and seizure were constitutional, and the judgments of the trial court are therefore affirmed.

Defendant, Dennis Jarrett, was indicted on the following charges: count one, driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender; count two, driving under the influence of an intoxicant and/or drug; count three, driving under the influence, seventh offense; count four, felony reckless endangerment; count five, felony evading arrest; count six, possession of drug paraphernalia; count seven, violation of implied consent law; and count eight, failure to appear. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on counts one, four, five, six, seven, and eight. In a separate proceeding, Defendant entered pleas of guilty on counts two and three. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of six years for his convictions, the length and manner of service of which Defendant does not challenge on appeal. Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of felony reckless endangerment. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Antonio Hoyle, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Patty Grissom, was convicted of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-425, and she was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served in confinement. She appealed, arguing that she was improperly sentenced and that trial counsel was ineffective. We conclude that the record on appeal is insufficient for our review, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Teresa D. Sherlin (“Plaintiff”) sued Sandra G. Hall in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“Trial Court”) seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage sustained when a vehicle driven by Ms. Hall collided head-on with a vehicle being driven by Plaintiff while Plaintiff was acting in the course and scope of her employment. At the time of the accident, Ms. Hall did not have a driver’s license and was an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff’s uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”), answered Plaintiff’s complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Farmers summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, these workers’ compensation benefits exceeded the limits of liability of Plaintiff’s uninsured motorist policy, and because the limits of liability of the uninsured motorist policy are reduced by the amount of the workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to the insurance policy, Farmers had no liability to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This case involves the interpretation of a lease agreement as it pertains to ownership of an advertising sign structure. The trial court found that Defendant/Appellee, the Lessor under the lease, is the owner of the sign structure pursuant to the terms of the lease. Plaintiff/Appellant contends that the plain language of the lease indicates that it is the owner of the disputed sign. We affirm and remand.

Lessor/Appellee sued Lessee/Appellant for breach of contract due to Lessee/Appellant’s alleged failure to maintain the leased building as required under the lease. The trial court entered Judgment in favor of Lessor/Appellee, which Judgment included damages for repairs to the building, lost rent, and attorney fees. Lessee/Appellant appeals. On appeal, Lessor/Appellee asks for attorney fees in defending this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for a determination of appropriate appellate attorney fees.

A Carroll County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2006), possession of a handgun while under the influence of an intoxicant, see id. § 39-17-1321(a) (2006), and possession of marijuana, see id. § 39-17-418(a), all Class A misdemeanors. The jury acquitted the defendant of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, rolling papers, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1) (2006), and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon, a throwing star, see id. § 39-17-1302(a)(8) (2006). The court sentenced the defendant for the DUI conviction to 11 months and 29 days suspended after serving 120 days. For the possession of a handgun charge he received 11 months and 29 days suspended after serving 30 days. Likewise, he received 11 months and 29 days suspended after 30 days for the possession of marijuana conviction. All sentences were to run concurrently. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and complains, only in regards to his DUI conviction, that (1) the trial “was fundamentally unfair due to the State’s failure to preserve the video tape of the field sobriety tests . . ., which . . . would have been exculpatory in nature,” and (2) “the verdict . . . was unreliable based upon [the deputy’s] erroneous testimony . . . concerning the Breathalyzer Machine and the test he gave and the manner in which he gave it.” After review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Wadie Michael Holifield, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a violent offender to serve eighteen years in the Department of Correction.  He appeals two issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the jury allegedly was tainted by overhearing courtroom conversations between the victim and her family. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the date of the offense as January 16, 2005, rather than February 4, 2005.

The plaintiff was a Nashville man who bought a bottle of mail order vitamins from a California company and directed the company to send the order to one of his relatives. The plaintiff was unsatisfied with the product and mailed it back to the company and asked for a refund. When no refund was immediately forthcoming, he filed suit in General Sessions Court. The company sent the plaintiff a full refund after it was served with the lawsuit. The plaintiff continued to pursue his suit through an appeal to the Circuit Court, which dismissed the case. We affirm the Circuit Court.