APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury found the Appellant, Devin Banks, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of Kadhem Al-Maily and the Class A felonies of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery of Hussain Atilebawi. Following the penalty phase hearing, the jury found the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances and imposed the sentence of death. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Banks to twenty-five years for each of the Class A felonies and ordered them to be served consecutively to one another and to the sentence of death. Banks now seeks review by this court of both his convictions and resulting sentences, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the surviving victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting Banks’ statements absent a ruling on the motion to suppress; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court failed to properly certify the Arabic translator; (6) whether the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury as to lesser included offenses; (7) whether the indictment failed to charge a capital offense; (8) whether the victim impact jury instruction was coercive; (9) whether the closing argument by the prosecutor was improper; (10) whether the sentences for the non-capital offenses are excessive; (11) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statutes are constitutional; and (12) whether the death sentence in this case is disproportionate to death sentences in other cases. Following review, we affirm Banks’ convictions for first degree murder, criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. His sentences for the Class A felony convictions are also affirmed. We further conclude that the evidence does not support application of the (i)(6) statutory aggravating circumstance.  and the sentence of death is affirmed.
 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., dissenting.
I start with an elementary and bedrock principle of Tennessee jurisprudence: when a party
timely files a complaint in circuit court, alleges facts making out a cause of action, and demands a
jury, that party has a constitutional right to have a jury pass upon the merits of its allegations. Tenn.
Const. Art. I, §6. (“That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . .”). I fully recognize that
a party’s jury demand and its right to pursue its alleged cause of action can be legitimately thwarted
if the party sued can demonstrate, under the rubric of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, that it is entitled to
summary judgment. Hence, if the material facts pertaining to a defense are not in dispute and if
those facts show conclusively that the defendant is entitled to a judgment, the plaintiff loses its
constitutional right to a jury trial, its case is over, and the defendant goes away with summary
judgment.

The operator of an automobile junkyard in Smith County appeals the permanent injunction issued against him by the Chancery Court enjoining him from maintaining an excessive number of inoperable vehicles within one thousand feet of a county road in violation of the Smith County Junkyard Control Act, Chapter 97 of the Private Acts of 1987. The junkyard operator contends the evidence was insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Finding the evidence more than sufficient, primarily due to admissions by the operator of the junkyard, we affirm.

Decedent’s vehicle was struck by defendants’ train at a railroad crossing, resulting in decedent’s death. The Trial Court granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment. The Estate has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Joshua Eugene Anderson, of eight offenses involving victims Sampson Jonathan McGhee (“McGhee”) and George England (“England”). The convictions were: (1) first degree premeditated murder of McGhee; (2) felony murder (robbery) of McGhee; (3) felony murder (theft) of McGhee; (4) attempted especially aggravated robbery (by violence) of McGhee; (5) attempted especially aggravated robbery (by putting in fear) of McGhee; (6) attempted first degree murder of England; (7) attempted aggravated robbery (by violence) of England; and (8) attempted aggravated robbery (by putting in fear) of England. The trial court properly merged certain offenses and sentenced the defendant to serve an effective 25-year sentence in the Department of Correction consecutively to the life-without-parole sentence imposed by the jury. The defendant appeals on several grounds, including whether the trial court erred in: (1) failing to suppress the evidence that resulted from the warrantless search of the defendant’s home; (2) failing to suppress the defendant’s statement to police; (3) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the State failed to preserve his entire statement; (4) failing to exclude the defendant’s recorded statement when the entire statement could not be entered into evidence; (5) denying a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) declining to answer the jury’s question regarding the consequences of not reaching a unanimous verdict at sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2005, the petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder and received an effective sentence of fifty years. Subsequently, he filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea of guilty to the latter offense was unknowing and involuntary and that counsel who had represented him at the time of the plea was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition and this appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal.

This is an insurance case. The plaintiff insurer issued a policy of insurance for a motorcycle. The
named insured kept the motorcycle at his home, and allowed his adult son unrestricted access to hishome and the motorcycle. The adult son borrowed the motorcycle and drove it to a friend’s house. While there, the adult son let the friend take his minor stepdaughter for a ride on the motorcycle. The friend lost control of the motorcycle and the stepdaughter was injured. The accident prompted the stepdaughter’s biological father to file a petition against his daughter’s mother in chancery court for a change of custody. During the custody dispute, the chancery court appointed both a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem for the stepdaughter, and ordered the attorney ad litem to pursue any legal actions on behalf of the stepdaughter for the accident. When the attorney ad litem filed a claim on the stepdaughter’s behalf with the plaintiff insurer, payment was denied. The guardian ad litem then filed a separate tort action against the friend. While the tort action was pending, the plaintiff insurer filed this declaratory judgment action against the named insured and the friend, seeking a declaration that its insurance policy did not cover the friend. The guardian ad litem intervened in this action. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the insurance policy covered the friend for the motorcycle accident, and awarded the guardian ad litem discretionary costs, which included attorney’s fees for the attorney ad litem. The plaintiff insurer now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decisions on the issue of coverage and discretionary costs, and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

The pro se petitioner, Billy Harris, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of counsel.

This is a breach of contract case. The defendants own a commercial building that was seriously damaged by a fire. The plaintiffs entered into a lease-purchase contract with the defendants to acquire the building at the expiration of a ten-year lease. Under the contract, the plaintiffs agreed to renovate the building from the fire damage, consistent with the local city building code and the defendant owners’ approval. After some renovations were made, prior to the expiration of the contractual repair period, the defendants deemed the renovations to be not in compliance with the city code and disapproved them. The defendant owners then declared the plaintiffs to be in breach of the contract and repossessed the property. The plaintiff lease-purchasers sued the defendant owners for breach of contract, claiming that, at the time of repossession, the renovations were not yet completed and that they still had time under the contract to complete them. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had breached the contract because the renovations were not in compliance with the city code and did not meet the approval of the defendant owners. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs breached the contract by making repairs that were not in compliance with the applicable code; the fact that the contractual repair period had not yet expired is immaterial.

This is a quiet title action. The plaintiff’s mother owned a parcel of real property. In 1977, the mother executed a deed, conveying the property to one of her sons. Two years later, the plaintiff and her four siblings filed a separate but related lawsuit to set aside the 1977 deed for fraud. In 1985, by court order, the trial court divested the son of sole ownership and created a trust; the son was appointed as trustee for the use and benefit of the mother’s grandchild and the grandchild’s minor children, until the youngest minor child reached the age of majority. In 1986, by court order, the trial court removed the son as trustee and substituted the grandchild in his place. Despite these orders, in 1994, the son executed a deed purporting to convey the property to a third party. In December 2001, the defendants obtained a deed to the property from a successor in interest to the son. Meanwhile, the youngest beneficiary of the trust reached the age of majority. The plaintiff later obtained a warranty deed to the property from the youngest beneficiary and a quitclaim deed from the trustee grandchild and her other four children. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit and moved for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment. The defendant answered, raising the defense of adverse possession, and filed a motion to dismiss, raising a defense under T.C.A. § 28-2-110. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the 1985 and 1986 orders, as well as the deeds from the grandchild and her five children, established the plaintiff as the rightful owner. The defendant appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is a parental relocation case. After the parties separated, the mother and the child moved in
with the mother’s parents in Memphis, Tennessee. Under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”), the mother was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ child, and the father was granted parenting time every other weekend. Two months after entry of the divorce decree incorporating the MDA, the mother sent the father a letter notifying him of her intent to move to South Carolina with the child. The mother explained that her parents were moving to South Carolina and she wanted to move with them. The father filed a petition in opposition to the mother’s proposed relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose for the move and denied her request to relocate. The mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose but remand the case to the trial court for a best interest determination as required pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(e).

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employer has appealed the action of the trial court, which found that the Employee is permanently and totally disabled and that the Employer is responsible for 62.5% of the award and the Second Injury Fund is responsible for 37.5%. We find that the award should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new hearing.

The circumstances of the present case are unusual and demand an unusually circumspect analysis of the axioms of post-conviction review. The petitioner, who is serving a life sentence for first degree murder, declined a plea offer of three years as a Range I offender for reckless homicide based upon counsel’s advice to go to trial and pursue an “all or nothing” strategy.  Although I do not quarrel per se with counsel’s recommendation in this respect, I do point to counsel’s failure to exploit at trial the indications of Ms. Davis’s sole responsibility for the victim’s death, and I view the failure as deficient performance of counsel that prejudiced the petitioner.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the petitioner failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Defendant, Samuel L. Mangrum, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of driving under the influence, second offense. On appeal, he alleges the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after he objected to a portion of the videotaped stop that was played for the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis Pylant, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Cheatham County Circuit Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erred in: (1) suppressing hearsay testimony; (2) finding trial counsel effective; and (3) denying relief based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors. After careful review, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.

The defendant, Marquette Houston, appeals as of right from his conviction of second degree murder for which he received a twenty-five-year sentence as a violent offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying the admission of first aggressor evidence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to police; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand this case for resentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act with consideration of the constitutional restrictions upon enhancing the defendant’s sentence above the presumptive minimum.

This appeal involves a dispute between a city and a rural water association as to which entity is entitled to provide water service to a proposed subdivision. The rural association has a defined service district in which it is empowered to provide water service, and most of the disputed property lies within the rural association’s boundaries. However, the city annexed the proposed subdivision and now claims that it has the exclusive right to provide water service to the property. The rural association argues that 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), the Anti-Curtailment Provision of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, protects its service area and prohibits the city from providing water service to the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding the federal statute inapplicable. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James D. West, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claimed in his petition that he was entitled to relief from the state’s incarcerating him following an eleven-year delay in execution of his sentence. We hold that the petitioner stated a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief, reverse the trial court’s dismissal, and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing on the allegations.

Trial court ordered foreclosure on a deed of trust finding obligor failed to prove failure of consideration for the lien. We reverse.

This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving a minor child. The plaintiff mother filed a complaint for divorce against the defendant father. The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement as to property and debt division, but they could not come to an agreement on custody for their three-year-old son. A trial was held on the custody and visitation issues. The trial court granted the divorce, named the mother the primary residential parent of the child, and gave the mother full decision-making authority for the child. The parenting plan adopted by the court allowed the father visitation on alternating weekends and holidays, and for four weeks each summer. The trial court awarded the mother the federal tax exemption for the child, as well as $1,500 in attorney’s fees that she incurred litigating the custody issue. The father appeals the trial court’s initial custody decision regarding visitation and decision-making, and the award to the mother of the federal tax exemption and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

The petitioner, Carl McIntosh, was convicted of one count of selling 0.5 gram or more of cocaine(Class B felony), one count of delivering 0.5 gram of cocaine (Class B felony), and two counts of simple possession (Class A misdemeanor). The convictions for selling and delivery were merged, and the counts of simple possession were merged. He was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction for the Class B felony and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor, to be served consecutively to the Class B felony for a total effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. He appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed his convictions. State v. Carl McIntosh, No. W2003-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 30, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 29, 2005). Here, he appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief and contends that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner specifically contends that counsel did not meet with him prior to trial, failed to adequately investigate the confidential informant, failed to discuss the petitioner’s testimony with him prior to trial, and failed to object to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) forensic report used at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment from the postconviction court.

The defendant, Donald D. Mathis a.k.a. Michael D. Mathis a.k.a. Michael Lee Dixon, was convicted of robbery (Class C felony) by a Davidson County jury and was subsequently sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal he contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing introduction of a surveillance photo; (4) the trial court erred in denying a requested jury charge; (5) the trial court erred in approving the jury verdict as the thirteenth juror; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the maximum within his range. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Atoya L. Every and Charlie Letez Fleming, were indicted for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect resulting in the death of the two-year-old victim, Amber Cox Cody. A jury convicted the defendants of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (Class A misdemeanor). Both defendants were sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. Defendant Every was placed on full probation. Defendant Fleming was sentenced to serve six weeks, with the remainder on probation. The defendants’ appeals of their convictions have been consolidated. Defendant Every poses two issues: 1) whether misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of first degree murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Defendant Fleming contends that the trial court erred in its failure to grant (1) his pretrial motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; and (2) his motion for judgment of acquittal for failure to “present sufficient facts to constitute felony murder.” After review, we affirm the defendants’  judgments of conviction.

The Defendant, June Leeann Franks, pled guilty to statutory rape. Her request for judicial diversion was denied by the trial court, who sentenced her to fifteen months to be served on probation. She appeals that decision. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marquerite L. Tibbs, was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of driving on a revoked license. Each count of vehicular homicide involved the same victim, but alleged different theories of guilt. On February 16, 2005, Defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide and one count of possession of marijuana. In exchange for her plea, Defendant received eight years for the vehicular homicide conviction and eleven months, twenty nine days for the possession conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. An order of nolle prosequi was entered as to the remaining counts of vehicular homicide and driving on a revoked license. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eight years in the Department of Correction for the vehicular homicide conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing.