APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a personal injury case involving the Tennessee suspension statute. On August 27, 2003, the defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. On August 23, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against the defendant for damages arising out of the accident. On the same date, a summons was issued to the defendant at her last known address in Tennessee. A few days later, the summons was returned with a notation indicating that the defendant had moved to Georgia. The plaintiffs failed to renew process within one year of the original date of service. Finally, in March 2006, an alias summons was issued and served on the defendant in Georgia. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the suspension statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-111, because the defendant lived in another state when suit was filed. We affirm, concluding that the suspension statute is inapplicable in this case.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the employee’s work injury of October 15, 2003, rather than his non-work injury of March 2004 caused his permanent disability; (2) assessing 60 percent vocational disability for the employee’s injury; and (3) assessing the employer for the medical treatment received by the employee by Doctors Smith and Hodges. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping of his live-in girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old, mentally-challenged daughter. A jury convicted the defendant of both indicted offenses. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years for the aggravated rape and eighteen years for the aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing questions to jurors in voir dire regarding mental retardation; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding the victim’s I.Q. test scores and capabilities; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a State witness regarding statements of the victim; (5) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony from a lay witness regarding recency and appearance of the injury to the victim; (6) that the trial court erred in determining that the victim was competent to testify; and (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to an enhanced and consecutive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write in dissent to express my opinion as to what the “record in the underlying proceeding” means.

This lawsuit concerns coverage for real and personal property under three insurance policies issued by Defendant. The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties and entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Both parties appeal. We vacate the trial court’s order entering final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 and remand.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Plaintiff, former employee of Defendant Memphis Light Gas and Water Division (“MLGW”), upon determining that Plaintiff was entitled to severance benefits under “personnel policy 22-25" because revocation of the policy by MLGW’s Board was negated due to violations of the Open Meetings Act. We reverse the award of summary judgment to Mr. Thompson and award summary judgment to MLGW on other grounds.

The petitioner, Brian Roberson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of selling cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. He contends that his judgments of conviction are void because his sentences are illegal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court and remand this case to the Johnson County Criminal Court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The petitioner, Billy Ray Riley, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of theft of property valued more than $1000 but less than $10,000, and he was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not thoroughly reviewing his file with him, by not convincing him to testify at trial, and by having a conflict of interest regarding the case. The post-conviction court found that counsel was not ineffective and denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner contests the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Tommy Ray Kitts, was convicted of two counts of theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court merged count two into count one and sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to twelve years. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his "Personal Injury Suit" against the attorney who represented him in a previous criminal matter. The trial court dismissed the action finding the complaint does not state a cause of action due to the lack of any allegation of severe mental injury and that any action arising out of alleged misconduct occurring on March 9, 2001, would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Finding the inmate's suit wholly without merit, we affirm.

In this administrative appeal, a Shelby County firefighter challenges the judgment of the lower court reinstating the Fire Department’s decision to terminate his employment for a conceded violation of the county residency requirement set forth in the Shelby County Charter. The Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board (Merit Board) had modified the Fire Department’s sanction from termination to suspension without pay for the time of suspension already served. The trial court, however, ruled that the Merit Board exceeded its authority by failing to heed the Shelby County Charter’s provision mandating termination. The Appellant argues that the Charter does not mandate termination; that, even if it does, he had moved back to Shelby County at the time of his termination and should not have been discharged; and that, alternatively, he is entitled to a remand to advance an equal protection argument because he was unfairly prevented from doing so in the lower court. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Chris Grunder, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated assault, and theft of property over $500.00. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This petition was denied by the post-conviction court. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tommy Roscoe, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether a pretrial photographic identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner brought an action for mandamus in Circuit Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for maintaining an action. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Michael Rodiquez Payne, was convicted of aggravated robbery, sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender, and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000. He filed a timely appeal, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) he should have received a lesser sentence; and (3) the indictment should have been dismissed because the State lost the audiotaped recording of the first preliminary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment and sentence.

The Appellant, Pamela A. Inghram, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Inghram pled guilty to Class E felony possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and received an eighteen-month sentence, which was suspended. As a condition of her guilty plea, she explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress evidence, specifically drugs and drug paraphernalia, found in her home. Inghram argues that the warrantless entry into her home by police in response to a burglar alarm call was without legal authority. After review, we conclude that exigent circumstances justified police entry and the subsequent seizure of the contraband, which was observed in plain view. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying the motion to suppress.

The defendant, Lavon Lyn Nunnery, appeals from the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of eight months in confinement followed by two years of probation. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the state’s inclusion of waiver language in his probation order violates Tennessee statute and that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering split confinement. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Benjamin Ashley Ray Dickens, was convicted of first degree felony murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Braxton, of aggravated rape and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals that dismissal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Victor Eugene Tyson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and felony murder. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. He was sentenced to fifteen years as a Career Offender to be served in the Department of Correction consecutively to a prior conviction. In this appeal, he claims that the circumstantial proof of his guilt is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bobby Rayle, pled guilty to one count of child rape in the Hawkins County Criminal Court. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the Lake County Circuit Court from his imprisonment for three 1982 armed robbery convictions. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he was sentenced to serve concurrent twenty-five year sentences at thirty-five percent and that because he has served that percentage of the sentences, his sentences have expired. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its judgment.

The defendant, Felicia Ann Lowery, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing or probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Kelley, was convicted of reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor, at a bench trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. He was given a six-month sentence, of which he was ordered to serve thirty days in the workhouse. He appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.