APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The parents, who have three minor sons, were divorced in 2003, and they entered an agreed parenting plan whereby the mother was designated the primary residential parent and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father experienced an increase in income the following year, and the mother petitioned the chancery court for an increase in his child support obligation, to which the father agreed. In early 2006, the father left his job for a similar job with his stepfather and brother which provided him with less income. The father petitioned the chancery court for a downward modification of his child support obligation, citing his decreased income. The mother then sent the father a notice of her intent to relocate from Memphis to Franklin, Tennessee, because of an employment opportunity. After hearings, the chancery court denied the mother’s petition for relocation. The chancery court instructed the parties’ attorneys to calculate child support according to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines using income amounts that it had imputed to the mother and father, and without providing any basis as to how it had determined these figures. At a later hearing, the chancery court set a child support amount in excess of what the parties had determined according to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, which amount was ordered to include the father’s contribution to the children’s private school tuition. The chancery court did not include the child support worksheets in its order, nor did it provide written findings supporting its decision to deviate. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Northwest Correctional Complex Inmate Disciplinary Board convicted a prisoner of disciplinary infractions. The prisoner filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari alleging the Board committed several procedural violations related to the disciplinary hearing, including violation of the prisoner’s due process rights. In this appeal we must determine whether the chancery court properly granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the prisoner’s petition. The chancery court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the prisoner did not verify his petition. The prisoner contends that the petition was verified because, along with the petition, he filed a verified inmate trust fund certification balance form and a verified affidavit of indigency. We affirm.

The defendant, Lachanta Monique Tyler, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft of property involving merchandise valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102; 39-14-103; 39-14-105; 39-14-146. She was sentenced to three years for the aggravated assault conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, with the sentences imposed concurrently and to be served on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of aggravated assault, (2) that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on aggravated assault, (3) that the trial court erred in failing to sever these offenses from two other offenses of which she was acquitted, (4) that the court erred by admitting prior bad act evidence of a prior shoplifting incident. Upon review, we affirm the defendant’s theft conviction, modify the aggravated assault conviction to assault, and remand the case for imposition of judgment on the assault conviction including a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation and concurrently with the theft sentence.

The plaintiff-buyers entered into an installment sales contract in 1991 in which they agreed to purchase real property owned by the defendant-seller. The contract provided that upon the plaintiffs’ payment of the purchase price, the defendant would provide a deed conveying the property to them free of encumbrances. In 2002, a general sessions judgment was entered against the defendant in an unrelated case, and the defendant appealed that judgment to the circuit court, where that case currently remains pending. The judgment was filed as a lien on the real property in 2002. In late 2004 or early 2005, the plaintiffs had made all necessary payments on the real property, and the defendant conveyed the property to them by warranty deed. While attempting to sell the real property in 2005, the plaintiffs discovered the existence of the 2002 judgment lien on the property, and they placed funds in escrow in order to satisfy their intended purchaser that the lien would be removed or paid. The plaintiffs filed a warrant in general sessions court against the defendant, alleging that he was liable for breach of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed. The general sessions court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and sought an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment, but denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees. On appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred below and on appeal.

In this action to enforce an option to purchase contained in a lease between plaintiff/lessee and the children of the deceased lessor, the Trial Court, while finding the terms of the lease had been breached by the lessee, held that the plaintiff had properly exercised the option to purchase the property. Defendants have appealed and we reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The defendant, Terna Hatten, appeals the five-year sentence he received after pleading guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He argues that the length of the imposed sentence was too long and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence beyond the minimum of three years. After review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant, William Phillip Graham, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, at a jury trial in the Madison County Circuit Court. He is presently serving a twenty-year sentence as a Violent Offender in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, he argues 1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) that the trial court erred in denying his petition to compel attendance of an out-of-state witness; 3) that the trial court made erroneous rulings during the trial relative to the scope of redirect examination of a state’s witness; 4) that the court erred in denying his request to make an offer of proof after an adverse evidentiary ruling; 5) that the court erred in allowing the state to recall the victim during its case-in-chief; and 6) that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requests for curative instructions relative to two aspects of the prosecutor’s closing argument. We conclude that no reversible error occurred, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn.

The petitioner, Constancia Reyes, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to possession of three hundred grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and agreed to a fifteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Subsequently, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of her traffic stop and that she was coerced into pleading guilty. The post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendants in its suit filed on the theory of equitable subrogation. The trial court found that the undisputed facts established that plaintiff acted as a volunteer and proved no fraud, accident or mistake. We affirm.

The Appellant, Freddie McCullough, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for non-incarcerative alternative sentences. McCullough pled guilty to one count of statutory rape and one count of sexual battery, both Class E felonies, and, under the terms of the plea agreement, received one-year sentences for each conviction with the trial court determining the manner of service of the sentences. The agreement also allowed McCullough to seek judicial diversion. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered McCullough to serve concurrent terms of sixty days in the workhouse on each one-year sentence, followed by one year of probation. On appeal, McCullough argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion or, in the alternative, total probation. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the absolute litigation privilege applies to what may be defamatory communications made by an attorney prior to a proposed judicial proceeding when the communications are directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. We hold that an attorney is privileged to publish what may be defamatory information prior to a  proposed judicial proceeding even when the communication is directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. In order for the privilege to apply, (1) the communication must be made by an attorney acting in the capacity of counsel, (2) the communication must be related to the subject matter of the proposed litigation, (3) the proposed proceeding must be under serious consideration by the attorney acting in good faith, and (4) the attorney must have a client or identifiable prospective client at the time the communication is published.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to six of her children based upon the persistence of conditions that led to removal of the children from Mother’s care by the Department of Children’s Services and upon finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

We granted review in this case to determine whether UT Medical Group, Inc. presented a justiciable case or controversy to the trial court when it alleged that Dr. Vogt anticipatorily breached an employment contract covenant. Because the record fails to show that Dr. Vogt committed an anticipatory repudiation of the non-competition covenant found in her employment agreement, Dr. Vogt is entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing the case.

The petitioner, James Beasley, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denying him postconviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403; 39-14-103; 39- 14-105(1). He was sentenced to fifteen years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served concurrently as a Range III offender. The petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying him post-conviction relief based upon the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We conclude that no error exists and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this case, the plaintiff wife filed for divorce from the defendant husband in December of 2003.
The husband collaterally attacked the validity of the wife’s previous divorce from her second husband in 1985, asserting that the wife was still married to her second husband. The trial court
bifurcated the proceedings to determine the validity of the parties’ marriage. After the hearings on
this issue, the trial court found that the wife’s efforts at service of process on her second husband
during her second divorce had been insufficient, and ruled that any subsequent marriage was
therefore invalid. After conducting further hearings as to the parties’ property, in its order on
division of assets, the court found that a bank account held jointly by the parties was the sole
property of the husband, and it awarded each party a one-half interest in real property located in
Humphreys County, Tennessee. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings in the circuit court.

The Defendant, Kenneth C. Dailey, III, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law regarding the admissibility of his statements of confession to the crime. Disagreeing with the trial court, the prosecutor, and the defense that the question was dispositive of the case, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal. We hold that, on the record before us, the certified question is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for its review of the certified question on its merits.

The defendant, Antonio Dante Edmondson, was convicted at a jury trial of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, Class C felonies. He received two five-year terms to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction, for an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, he claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in admitting proof of other robberies under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (3) that he was improperly sentenced. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Demarcus Smith, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his “petition for writ of habeas corpus to correct illegal sentence.” He contends his sentence is illegal because a Range I, standard offender cannot be required to serve one hundred percent before release eligibility.  After review, we conclude the judgment is facially valid and the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The defendant, Eric Berrios, was charged with one count of possession with intent to sell or  deliver more than three hundred grams of cocaine. After the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine seized during the traffic stop, the State was granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the suppression of the evidence. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the officer’s actions amounted to an unconstitutional seizure and, if so, whether the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was sufficiently attenuated from that illegal act. Because the seizure violated constitutional safeguards and because the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the violation, we affirm the suppression of the evidence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

In 2004, the plaintiff, Michael Wilhelm, filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging an injury to his back and left hip. In response, the defendant, Krogers d/b/a Peyton’s Southeastern, denied the claim, asserting that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff a 35% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment. Because, however, the injuries do not qualify as work-related and an earlier workers’ compensation settlement bars recovery, the judgment must be reversed and the case dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Ray Bates, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of four counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in a community corrections program. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposition of confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee suffered a permanent psychological injury while working, and awarded seventy percent (70%) permanent partial vocational disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed that ruling, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that the employee received a permanent psychological injury and that the award of seventy percent disability to the body as a whole is excessive. Also, the employer contends that the trial court erred in awarding the payment of past and future medical treatment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review to answer two questions: (1) whether the trial court erred by dismissing a petition for post-commitment relief from a probation violation in juvenile court; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal as moot because the Petitioner had reached the  age of nineteen. Because an oral directive by the juvenile court placing a minor under house arrest is not a valid court order, the trial court erred by dismissing the petition for  post-commitment  relief. Because a probation violation in juvenile court may have adverse consequences after the completion of a term of commitment, the doctrine of mootness does not apply. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the order of juvenile commitment is set aside.

We accepted review of this case to decide whether a tenured university professor whose employment by the State was wrongfully terminated may recover back pay and lost benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-8-304. While the trial court initially found there was no statutory authority to grant monetary damages, the plaintiff was awarded back wages, lost benefits, and interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because there is no statutory authority for the award, however, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the cause dismissed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had not had a meaningful return to work, and awarded twenty percent (20%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed that ruling, contending that the award should have been “capped” in accordance with Tenn. Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2004) and that the Court erred by accrediting the testimony of Dr. Fishbein over that of Dr. Talmage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified herein.