APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Melvin Cofer, was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. As a result, the petitioner received concurrent sentences of twenty-one years and three years. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Melvin Cofer, No. W2002-01984-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21729450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 25, 2003), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2003). Subsequently, the supreme court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, on numerous grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and several amended petitions were filed. The petition was denied by the post-conviction court after a hearing. This appeal followed. Because the post-conviction court properly denied the petition, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Milton Lebron Byrd, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the offenses and sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the repeat violent offenders statute is unconstitutional in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and of his due process and equal protection rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action, plaintiff obtained a Default Judgment. Defendant moved to set aside the Judgment. The Trial Court refused, and we affirm.

The defendant, John Dupree, appeals the trial court’s judgment denying any form of alternative sentence. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow him to call witnesses during the sentencing hearing and in denying an alternative sentence. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error occurred during the sentencing hearing and that the denial of alternative sentencing was proper. We affirm the judgment from the trial court.

James Wesley Daniels, the defendant, appeals his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The defendant asserts as grounds for appeal that: the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; the trial judge erred in refusing to recuse himself; and the trial court erred in failing to take remedial action after the defendant was observed in restraints by some jury members. We have concluded that no reversible error is present, and we affirm the convictions.

The petitioner, Ronald Dennis Crafton, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that his judgments for rape are void because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and because he was sentenced in absentia. Because the petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed

Muriel Powers Davis was hospitalized in the John W. Harton Regional Medical Center for pneumonia. During the admission process, it was noted she had recently fallen and had difficulty ambulating without assistance. As a result, fall precautions were implemented. Two days later, during the evening hours, she was discovered lying in the floor. An X-ray revealed a fractured femur. The fracture was surgically repaired, but Ms. Davis died some twenty days after her fall. Her next of kin instituted a medical malpractice action against the hospital alleging that Ms. Davis's fall was the result of negligent care provided by the hospital. The hospital moved for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. After carefully reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that the affidavit filed by the hospital in support of its motion for summary judgment failed to negate the plaintiffs' right of recovery and so we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, after denial of his motion to suppress evidence, entered a plea of guilty to possession with intent to sell more than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. The negotiated sentence was eight years as a standard offender. The defendant appeals pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(I). After review, we conclude that denial of the motion to suppress was error. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges.

The petitioner, Marcillo C. Anderson,1 appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
He argues that counsel was ineffective due to his failure to: (1) adequately communicate with him
concerning his case; (2) provide him with discovery materials regarding his case; (3) adequately
investigate the case; and (4) adequately present proof that he was acting in self-defense. After
review, we affirm the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Macario Chism, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his 2007 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, the petitioner challenged the validity of his
multiple 1993 Shelby County convictions, which were the results of guilty pleas and included
convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. The petition
alleged that the petitioner was free on bond on the charge of aggravated burglary when he was
arrested for nine of the other offenses, and he claimed that the partial concurrent alignment of the
resulting sentences rendered his judgments void. Because the petitioner failed to file a statutorily
compliant petition, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Terrance N. Carter, pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in Davidson County which was summarily dismissed. He appealed pro se and was appointed counsel by this court. His pro se filing challenges whether the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. His appointed counsel requests that his habeas corpus petition be treated as one for post-conviction relief and that this court order the Davidson County Court to transfer the matter to the Maury County Criminal Court to proceed as if the petition was for post-conviction relief. We conclude that, without express authority, we should not order a transfer in this case, and the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The defendant, David Milken, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He received concurrent sentences of life and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs into evidence. We conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case, the plaintiff, Charles Jones, stepped onto a wooden bench while playing a round of golf at Vanderbilt Legends Club of Tennessee (Legends), a golf course owned by the defendant, Kite/Cupp Legends Golf Development Co. (Kite). The bench overturned and Mr. Jones fell sustaining significant injuries. Mr. Jones brought a premises liability suit against the golf course alleging that it was negligent by failing to have secured the bench to the concrete slab on which it was sitting or by failing to have warned players it was not so secured. Kite filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. We find there are genuine issues of material fact, and so we reverse.

This is an appeal from a judgment that was not final. This Court ordered that a final judgment be entered with a copy filed in the record before us, which the appellant has failed to do. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee, Gerald Amos, suffered a heart attack following a theft from his person while waiting at a truck stop for a scheduled pick-up. The trial court found the employee’s heart attack to be compensable and awarded benefits for permanent total disability. The trial court refused, however, to set off a portion of his social security benefits as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). The employer contends that the heart attack did not arise from or occur in the course of the employment. The employer also contends that the trial court erred by not setting off a portion of the employee’s social security old age benefits against the award. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on causation, but modify as to the set-off. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (Supp. 2006

The petitioner, Michael Lindsey, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petitioner has failed to allege appropriate grounds for coram nobis relief and because his petition for post-conviction relief is procedurally barred, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Lorenzo “Buster” Woods, pled guilty to one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended upon the service of six months in the local jail. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting misdemeanor community corrections supervision for five months and twenty-nine days.

The defendant, Charles Stan Martin, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and received a four-year sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction, (2) the reckless homicide statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior incident, (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an alibi defense, and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce case involving several issues stemming from a modification of child support and custody hearing and order resulting from that hearing. The parties were divorced in 2003, and the permanent parenting plan was filed on November 10, 2003. Wife retained custody of the parties’ two minor children. Husband was to pay Wife $1,250 a month child support. In 2005, Husband filed motions to review and revise both the custody and visitation arrangements contained in the permanent parenting plan and his child support obligation. The court treated Husband’s motions as a petition for modification of custody and child support. Husband represented himself pro se on July 17, 2006, at the petition hearing. The court entered an order on August 21, 2006, finding no material change of circumstance and thus, Wife retained custody of the two children. The order also increased Husband’s child support obligation. Finally, the court found Husband in contempt of court and sentenced him to five days in jail with $1,000 bond. Husband appeals, arguing that 1) the court erred in finding no material change of circumstance; 2) the court erred in the findings concerning both Husband and Wife’s income pertaining to the child support; and 3) the court erred in finding Husband in contempt. We affirm.

The petitioner, Sidney Porterfield, pro se, seeks habeas corpus relief from his 1986 Shelby County first degree murder conviction and death sentence, alleging his indictment was void because it was returned by a grand jury from which women had been systematically excluded as grand jury forepersons.  He now appeals from the Davidson County dismissal of his petition.  The State contends that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and offered no explanation and, further, that the petition does not meet all the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107.  Furthermore, the State contends that a void indictment does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction, that the petitioner’s claim is not cognizable for habeas corpus relief because proof beyond the face of the judgment and record is required, and that our Supreme Court has rejected an identical claim regarding discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson in State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662 (Tenn. 1999).  After careful review, we conclude that the notice of appeal is not jurisdictional and may be waived in the interest of justice.  However, without explanation or request being filed, the interest of justice weighs against waiver; therefore, we dismiss this appeal. 

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for aggravated arson and vandalism over $10,000.00, but below $60,000.00. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years as a Range I Standard Offender for the aggravated arson conviction and eight years as a Range II Multiple Offender for the vandalism conviction. The trial court also ordered these sentences to be served consecutively. Appellant now appeals these judgments arguing that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) evidence of impeachment by prior conviction was improperly admitted; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the amendment of the indictment; and that (4) the trial court erred in enhancing the sentence and in imposing consecutive sentences. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found the employee’s elbow injury to be compensable and awarded benefits for 25% permanent partial disability to the left arm. The employer contends that the injury did not arise from or occur in the course of the employment and that the employee did not give timely notice of her injury in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable and dismiss the employee’s complaint.

This is an appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of aggravated robbery, and an appeal by the State from the sentencing decision. The Defendant originally received an enhanced sentence of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender, but his sentence was subsequently reduced to fifteen years by the trial court based upon Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). On appeal, the Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. The State appeals the modified sentence, arguing the trial court erred in reducing the Defendant's sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the conviction, but remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this Public Records Act case. I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the Clerk and Master and the deputy clerk and vacate the grant of summary judgment as to the judge’s assistant.

A Shelby County jury found the Appellant, Demario Tabb, guilty of the first degree felony murder of Floricelda Reynoso Ambrocio; the first degree felony murder of the unnamed, viable fetus of Floricelda Ambrocio; and the attempted aggravated robbery of Rodrigo Ramirez. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed Tabb’s punishment at life without the possibility of parole for each murder conviction. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Tabb to five years imprisonment for his Class C felony conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and ordered that all sentences be served concurrently. On appeal, Tabb presents the following issues for ourreview: (1) whether his statement to police should have been suppressed because it was obtained inviolation of his constitutional right to counsel; (2) whether the statement was properly admitted asrebuttal proof; and (3) “whether [the trial] court erred in its use of curative instructions to [the] jury.”Following review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.