APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Alberto Camacho, was indicted on six counts of theft and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of four counts of theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five hundred dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each Class D felony and two years for each Class E felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of four years. The trial court further ordered Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, with the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. Appellant was also ordered to pay $750 per month toward restitution. Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the charge of impersonation of a licensed professional and that his sentence is improper. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury and the trial court properly applied enhancement factors (2) and (16), we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court erred in imposing a sentence ordering Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day.

The defendant, Antonio Lamar Osborn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation order because more than thirty days had elapsed since the entry of the order. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found the Employee's bilateral shoulder injury to be compensable and awarded benefits for 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer asserts that the trial court erred by accepting the evaluating physician's opinion that Employee suffered an 11% impairment and by awarding Employee 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer also contends that the permanent partial disability award should be limited to one and one-half times Employee's medical impairment rating because there was a meaningful return to work. We find the trial court did not err in accrediting Employee's medical proof, but we conclude that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court's finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding benefits in excess of the one and one-half statutory cap. We modify the trial court's judgment and award one and one-half of the medical impairment rating of 11% or 16.5% to the body as a whole.

The defendant, Szumanski Stroud, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury trial convictions of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, for which he received seven-year and six-month sentences, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. In this appeal, he claims (1) that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “intentionally” and “knowingly” mental states, and (3) that he was excessively sentenced. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Delta Faucet, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the date of injury was prior to July 1, 2004, and that the award was therefore not subject to the "cap" of 1.5 times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241(d)(1)(a) (Supp. 2004). The employee argues that the award of 25% permanent partial disability to both arms is inadequate. We conclude that the injury occurred after July 1, 2004, and modify the award to 15% permanent partial disability to both arms.

Defendant, Gregory Lee Smith, was indicted for aggravated rape. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). The trial court awarded eighty percent permanent partial disability to each arm, arising from employee's carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer, Convergys Corp., contends that the trial court erred in determining the date of injury, failed to apply the last-injurious-injury rule, and erroneously found that notice was timely. We affirm, as modified, the trial court's judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. A complaint was filed by Francois Dextra in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging both a claim based in tort and one appearing to seek workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court dismissed the tort claim and directed the case proceed as a workers’ compensation claim. After more than two years, the case was dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute due to the failure of Mr. Dextra to have his case set for trial. On appeal, Mr. Dextra has not asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the workers’ compensation claim but alleges the trial court erred by dismissing his tort claim and converting it to one for workers’ compensation benefits. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s dismissal of the case and affirm that judgment. Appellate jurisdiction with regard to the dismissal of Mr. Dextra’s tort claim lies with the Court of Appeals and, pursuant to Rule 17 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the cause is transferred to that court for appropriate review.

The decedent executed a will in 2001 and a second will in 2004. The decedent made handwritten alterations to the 2001 will at some time subsequent to its execution. After the decedent died, the 2004 will could not be located, and the 2001 will was presented for probate. The trial court ruled that the 2001 will was revoked by the 2004 will and that the decedent died intestate. We reverse the judgment of the trial court because there was no proof that the terms of the two wills were inconsistent or that the 2004 will contained a clause revoking the earlier will. Further, we remand for a determination as to whether the decedent intended to revive the 2001 will and if so, the effect of the decedent’s markings on such will.

I respectfully dissent from the decision reached in the majority opinion. I believe the petitioner should be granted relief because he did not get the benefit of pretrial jail credits in this case as provided in his plea agreement.

I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I cannot agree, though, that the defendant committed the offense “to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement.” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7).

The Defendant, Katia Lenee Harris a/k/a Fuzzy, pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to ten years confinement based on the application of three enhancement factors. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when sentencing her. We conclude the trial court erred in enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based on enhancement  factors (1) and (10). Thus, we modify the Defendant’s sentence to nine years.

The Petitioner, James Swiggett, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Swiggett is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment as a result of his conviction for first degree murder. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his petition failed to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Johnson County Criminal Court dismissing the petition.

In this appeal, the trial court determined that a deed to the involved property created a resulting trust in favor of the family of the deceased grantor property owner. Grantee appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Marlon Fitzgerald, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. Fitzgerald was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and theft of property. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with lesser-included offenses was harmless error. Fitzgerald then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. After a review of the entire record on appeal and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he suffered a compensable injury as a result of a fall at his workplace. The trial court held that the injury was not compensable because the fall was idiopathic and was not associated with a hazard of the employment. Employee appeals, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of the trial court. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Employee had sustained a hearing loss as a result of his employment and awarded 30% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Employee's hearing loss was work related. In the alternative, Employer argues that the trial court erred in finding the hearing loss to be related to Employee's work for Employer. Finally, Employer contends that the trial court used an incorrect burden of proof. We affirm the judgment.

The Appellant, Reginald Cortez Richardson, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of two counts of Class B delivery of cocaine and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to concurrent  twelve-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Richardson raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the petitioner, Edward L. Williams, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder conviction and twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On direct appeal, this court remanded for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and deleting any reference to a merger of the premeditated murder count and the felony murder count. The court further ordered that the sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. The judgment of the trial court was otherwise affirmed. State v. Edward L. Williams, No. E2002-00325-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22462533 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 31, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the post-conviction court subsequently denied after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner now appeals. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred by finding that the employee had proven a compensable injury, determining that the date of injury was May 13, 2004, and awarding the employee a permanent partial disability of 50% to the right arm. Pursuant to our duty to review and weigh the evidence, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of a compensable injury. We disagree with the trial court’s finding of the date of the injury and the trial court’s award. Accordingly, we affirm the finding of a compensable injury and modify the date of injury and the amount of the award.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 80% permanent partial disability to the right leg. The appellants claim that the trial court’s award is erroneous because it was based on the body as a whole and not a scheduled member, and further that the award is excessive and is not supported by the evidence. We conclude that the trial court based its ruling on loss of use of the scheduled member. We further conclude that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s award. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s finding that the injured party was not
made whole by his recovery for injuries received in an automobile collision. We conclude that the trial court erred in its computation of the injured party’s total recovery by failing to consider the injured party’s recovery from all sources. We also conclude that the record is insufficient to determine whether the injured party has been made whole. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of permitting both parties to present evidence. The injured party will have the burden of presenting evidence that sufficiently enables the trial court to make a reasonable assessment of the injured party’s damages. The trial court will determine the monetary value of the party’s damages. Finally, if the trial court finds that the injured party has been made whole, reimbursement should be awarded to the insurer only to the extent that the injured party’s total recovery exceeds the injured party’s total damages.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sale, a class E felony. Petitioner was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years for the cocaine conviction and two years for the marijuana conviction to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction and a $100,000 fine. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by this court. See State v. Boales, 2005 WL 517538, at *1. (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 3, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 27, 2005). This Court also affirmed his sentence as to incarceration, but reduced the fine imposed to $50,000. See Boales, 2005 WL 517538. Petitioner timely filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record of the post-conviction hearing, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Walter Martin, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish Shelby County as the proper venue for his trial and that he was erroneously sentenced. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Defendant’s sentence but remand for correction of two clerical errors made in the judgment of conviction.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found that the employee suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of witnessing a visually disturbing incident in the course of his job as a police dispatcher and awarded 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the triggering incident was not beyond the normal stress associated with the employee’s job and was therefore not compensable. The employee contends the trial court’s award was inadequate. Because we find that the triggering event went beyond the normal stress level associated with the employee’s job and that the employee does not have to be exposed to danger in order to recover for a purely psychological injury, we affirm the trial court’s decision.