APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, William Keith Gillum, was charged in count one of the indictment with first degree premeditated murder, and in count two with aggravated assault. Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty in count one to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and the State dismissed count two of the indictment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to seven years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve three months in the county workhouse, with Defendant placed on probation for the balance of his sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in the weight assigned to the one enhancement factor and the three mitigating factors. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Paul Graham Manning, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed and because the petition did not allege newly discovered evidence or make allegations which had not been previously raised or litigated. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck.

Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of cocaine. Prior to his plea, Defendant filed and the trial court heard a suppression motion. The trial court, after the hearing and submission of briefs by the parties, denied the motion. Defendant properly preserved a certified question of law. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against Defendant.

The defendant, Michael Anthony Sales, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating an habitual traffic offender order and was sentenced to consecutive terms of five years and six months in the Department of Correction for each offense. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the sentence he received is excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the sentence of the trial court.

R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals, Middle Section
Circuit Court for Williamson County
No. II-CR04274 R.E. Lee Davies, Judge
No. M2005-00213-SC-R11-JV - Filed February 6, 2008
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I
respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion
to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck.

This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress
incriminating statements and seized evidence. The trial court found that the juvenile defendant was not in custody at the time he made his incriminating statements, thus not triggering Miranda requirements; the Court of Appeals agreed. We affirm that part of the Court of Appeals’ holding. However, due to a lack of evidence in the record regarding the law enforcement officer’s role as a school resource officer, we remand the case to the trial court for a new trial to determine whether the law enforcement officer was required to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the juvenile defendant’s truck. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded
 

This interlocutory appeal arises from a petition for contempt to enforce a child support order. Although it is undisputed that neither the parents nor the child who is the subject of the support order in this case resided in Crockett County for at least six months prior to the filing of the current petition, the trial court denied Mother’s request under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-3003 to transfer the matter to Dyer County, where the child resides with Father. We reverse, remand, and order the matter transferred.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that probable cause did not exist for the search of the defendant. I would hold that the canine’s positive alert on the defendant’s car provided the authorities with probable cause to search the defendant, the car’s driver.

The defendant, Triston Lee Harris, appeals a certified question of law following his Lawrence County Circuit Court June 12, 2006 conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, for which he received a six-year Department of Correction sentence. The defendant challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We hold that although the defendant’s vehicle was subject to a search following a proper canine sweep, the contraband which was found on the defendant’s person should have been suppressed, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles G. Summers, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence is illegal and that his judgment is, therefore, void. The petitioner has established that his sentence for escape was imposed in direct contravention of a statute, and is, therefore, illegal and void. Because the petitioner has made a threshold showing that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing to determine the scope of the remedy available to the petitioner.

The defendant, James David Johnson, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder; felony first degree murder; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. The felony first degree murder conviction was merged with the premeditated first degree murder, and a life sentence was imposed. The defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a multiple offender for aggravated robbery and to fifteen years as a career offender for theft over $10,000. The theft offense was set as concurrent to the aggravated robbery, but the two, together, were consecutive to the life sentence. This resulted in an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the defendant submits three issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant’s statements; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony. After review, we affirm the convictions.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, was convicted in 2001 of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. We affirmed that judgment on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. Upon a thorough review of the applicable record and law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Paula Nesbitt. The trial court granted the parties’ divorce, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129, and ultimately awarded the divorce to the wife because the husband appeared to be at greater fault on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. Farrell Nesbitt challenges the trial court’s alimony in futuro award, arguing rehabilitative alimony was the proper award. We affirm the trial court’s ruling. Costs of this appeal shall be assessed to the appellant, Ferrell Nesbitt.

The pro se petitioner, Bobby A. Davis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his aggravated rape and aggravated robbery convictions are void due to various defects in the indictments. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority based upon my conclusion that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that, in my view, presents a cognizable claim for relief. The record reflects that the petitioner pled guilty to theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and evading arrest, and that he received concurrent sentences of two years and one day and one year, respectively. In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, the petitioner alleges that the judgment for the theft conviction is void because he did not agree to a sentence of two years and one day and that such a sentence “is void, as obtained through misrepresentation and [an] unfulfilled promise [of] a total two (2) year sentence.” Additionally, he alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not agree to the two year and one day sentence. In support of this allegation, the petition further asserts that both the technical record and the transcript of the guilty plea proceedings reflect that the sentence imposed should have been two years. However, neither the technical record nor the transcript of the guilty plea were attached to the petition in the habeas court. Attached to the petition for the habeas court’s consideration is the judgment of conviction reflecting a sentence of two years and one day for the theft conviction.

The Appellant, Christopher Keyln Dearing, proceeding pro se, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Dearing is currently an inmate at Northeast Correctional Complex in Johnson County as a result of his convictions for Class under the terms of his plea agreement, he pled guilty to Class D theft in exchange for a sentence of two years; however, the judgment form and Department of Correction records show that the actual length of the sentence he is serving is two years and one day. Dearing argues that, because the State has breached the plea agreement, his sentence of two years and one day is void. After review, we agree with the trial court that Dearing’s petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the result that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but respectfully, I disagree with the holding that the habeas corpus petition was filed in an appropriate court.

The Petitioner, Paul Tobias Davis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, the Petitioner asserted that his sentence is illegal because he was denied pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the petition did not state a sufficient reason for not being filed in the county nearest to the Petitioner. On appeal, the Petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a motion filed in the habeas corpus court to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure can operate to limit the jurisdiction of this Court; and (2) whether the fact that the convicting court possesses relevant records relating to a petitioner’s sentence and retains the authority to correct an illegal sentence at anytime is a sufficient reason under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105 to file a habeas corpus petition in the convicting court rather than the court closest in point of distance to a petitioner. Following our review, we hold that motions filed pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not affect the jurisdiction of this Court in actions for habeas corpus relief and that the Petitioner presented a sufficient reason for filing his petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court and remand for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Cedric Terry, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The State of Tennessee has filed a petition requesting this court to rehear its opinion filed on December 3, 2007. In its petition, the State requests that the court reconsider our holding that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is not applicable to State habeas corpus proceedings brought by petitioners who are incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions in state courts. The State also takes issue with this Court’s direction that upon remand, the trial court should appoint counsel to represent the petitioner during further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant’s Estate. The Trial Court held the claim against the Decedent’s Estate was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. The husband is a musician and songwriter; the wife is a medical assistant. During the marriage, the husband became physically incapacitated, and the wife quit her job and took care of him. The parties’ living expenses and costs associated with the husband’s medical care were funded through monies that the wife inherited as well as credit cards. This resulted in significant credit card debt. The husband eventually recovered, but was deemed completely disabled and received social security disability payments during the marriage. The wife then had a health crisis. During the wife’s health crisis, the husband took over the parties’ finances, and both parties signed a document outlining division of the parties’ property in the event of divorce. Over a year later, the wife filed for divorce, based in part on the husband’s failure to care for her during her health crisis. The husband counterclaimed for divorce. After declaring the parties divorced, the trial court held a trial on the issue of property division. After one day of testimony, the husband filed a motion seeking to enforce the document signed by the parties purporting to divide their property in the event of divorce. After the hearing, the trial court refused to enforce the alleged agreement. It divided the marital property, including in the marital estate the social security disability payments that had been received by the husband. The trial court refused, however, to divide the parties’ marital debt. The husband appeals the trial court’s refusal to enforce the alleged agreement and the inclusion of his social security disability benefits in the marital estate. Both parties appeal the trial court’s failure to divide the marital debt. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that (1) the social security disability payments were properly included in the marital estate, (2) the document is neither an MDA nor an enforceable postnuptial agreement, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to divide the parties’ marital debt.

The Trial Court granted defendant permission to attend traffic school in lieu of a fine. On appeal, we reverse because State and federal law does not permit diversion for a commercially licensed operator.