APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a bench trial in the Union County Circuit Court, the defendant, Timothy A. Summers, was found guilty of one count of driving on a revoked license, second offense (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress. Specifically, he contends that the statements made by him on a videotape of the police stop, consisting of an admission that he was driving the vehicle, should have been suppressed because they were obtained as result of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Following review, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion.

This is a negligence action. Appellees filed a complaint against Appellant alleging that its employee negligently drove a company truck into the back of Appellees’ car. Appellant was granted partial summary judgment because a latent mechanical problem caused its truck’s brakes to fail. The trial court then held a bench trial to determine if the employee’s negligent driving was also a cause of the accident. Although it made no findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the employee was negligent, and awarded Appellee, Harry Jacocks $15,350 in damages. Appellant appeals, asserting that the evidence presented does not support the trial court’s judgment. Because we agree that the evidence was insufficient, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Frank Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of rape and sentenced to eight years on each count, to be served concurrently. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The defendant, Steven Davis, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Leon Flannel, was convicted by jury of one count of murder in perpetration of a theft and one count of premeditated murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for both convictions, which were merged. The defendant now appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and his conviction for murder in perpetration of a theft was unconstitutional; (2) the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court erred in qualifying certain state witnesses as experts; (5) the trial court erred in admitting a letter into evidence without proof of chain of custody and proper authentication; (6) the trial court made improper comments regarding witness qualification and jury instruction; and (7) cumulative error in the trial proceedings requires relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Barnett Bills, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He was convicted of one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because she did not file a motion to suppress and failed to object to the introduction of a letter into evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Erica Lin (“Plaintiff”) began working as a teacher for The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Defendant”) in 2002. During her employment, Plaintiff complained of actions which she believed to be discriminatory based on her race and alleged disability. Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter on April 1, 2006, informing her that her employment was being terminated effective May 26, 2006. Plaintiff eventually abandoned her race and disability discrimination claims and proceeded only on a claim for retaliatory discharge. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts established that Plaintiff was terminated for poor work performance. The Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment neither negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim nor conclusively established an affirmative defense. Therefore, we vacate the order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, David Pugh, appeals the order of the Hardeman County Circuit Court revoking his probation. The defendant entered guilty pleas, in three separate cases, to four counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (Class B felonies) and one count of possession of contraband in a penal institution (Class C felony). He was subsequently sentenced to an effective sixteen-year sentence, which was to be served on probation following service of six hundred days in jail.  Following his release to supervised probation, a violation warrant was filed in the three cases alleging numerous violations of the terms of the defendant’s probation. Following a hearing, the defendant’s probation was revoked, resulting in the reinstatement of his original sentences, which the trial court ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation. Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Carl Junior Fritts, appeals the sentencing decision of the Rhea County Circuit Court. Following his guilty pleas to four counts of burglary (Class D felony), vandalism over $1000 (Class D felony), and evading arrest (Class E felony), the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each Class D felony conviction and a four-year sentence for the Class E felony. The court further ordered that all sentences be served concurrently with the exception of the vandalism conviction, which was to be served consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing the maximum sentence within the range for each conviction, and (2) imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The buyers of a home in Nashville sued the sellers for misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of contract. The proof showed the sellers did not acquire the proper permits and inspections required by the applicable building codes and that work on the plumbing, the electrical system, and the heating and air conditioning system was not performed in accordance with the codes. The sellers did not disclose the lack of permits and improper work on the statutorily required disclosure form. The chancellor found for the buyers. The sellers appealed. We affirm.

Ronald Steven Brown, the defendant, was convicted of the following offenses under four separate indictments: No. 14233, attempted first degree murder (Class A felony); No. 14232, attempted second degree murder (Class B felony) and assault (Class A misdemeanor); No. 14235, aggravated assault (Class C felony); and No. 14231, felony evading arrest (Class E felony) and DUI, first offense (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to an effective sentence of forty-three years, consecutive to a ten-year federal sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleges error in four areas: (1) The failure of the State court reporter to preserve transcripts of the pretrial motions and sentencing hearing violated his right of due process: (2) The trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (3) The trial court permitted the State to amend an indictment over his objection after the jury was sworn; and (4) He was sentenced in violation of Gomez v. Tenn., 127 S.Ct. 1209 (2007). After careful review, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to any relief and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This is the second appearance of the dispute between these parties in this Court. The current appeal arises from the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff/Appellant Kim Brown (Mr. Brown). Upon motion by Defendant/Appellee William Shappley, M.D. (Dr. Shappley), the trial court dismissed Mr. Brown’s breach of contract action and awarded Dr. Shappley attorney’s fees in the amount of $500 pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm dismissal of Mr. Brown’s action under the doctrine of res judicata, but reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions and the award of attorney’s fees.

The defendant, Jason Glen Jacobs, pled guilty to the crime of child abuse, a Class D felony, in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The crime occurred on September 17, 2004. Following a sentencing hearing on January 19, 2007, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to three years of probation.  Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to serve the first six months in confinement and was required to complete parenting classes. On appeal, he argues that he should have been sentenced to serve the entire term on probation without confinement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sharon Virginia Hinkley, appeals the revocation of her probation. After review, we conclude that the appellate record does not contain any documents pertaining to the conviction and sentence contested by the defendant. Therefore, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal.

This case involves the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court entered a pre-trial order requiring the defendant to produce various personal and business records and to compile a list of the assets belonging to the defendant and his businesses. The defendant failed to comply with or object to the order. At a contempt hearing, the defendant’s attorney assured the chancellor that the defendant would comply with the order if the contempt hearing was continued for two more weeks, and the chancellor continued the matter. At the next hearing, the defendant’s attorney stated that his client would not be complying with the order based on Fifth Amendment grounds. The chancellor held the defendant in civil contempt and ordered the defendant’s attorney to pay the opposing party’s attorneys’ fees. The defendant and his attorney appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

A Gibson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Stephen Hayes, ofattempted second degree murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with intent to use it in the commission of an offense, and he received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the attempted murder conviction, (2) his sentences are excessive and the trial court erred by granting his request for alternative sentencing, and (3) the trial court made a clerical mistake on the judgment form for the attempted murder conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions but modify the appellant’s attempted murder conviction from ten to eight years. We also remand the case to the trial court in order for the court to sentence the appellant for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction, to address alternative sentencing, and to correct clerical mistakes on several judgment of conviction forms.

The appellant, John Shields, was indicted in January 2007 for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and driving on a suspended license. In this interlocutory appeal, he argues that the instant criminal prosecution violates double jeopardy protections under both the state and federal constitutions because the State has previously assessed and levied a tax under the Tennessee Taxation of Unauthorized Substances Act for the same cocaine. He asserts that because the tax is punitive in nature, the present prosecution would impose a second punishment for the same offense. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

The petitioner, James Wayne Kimbrough, was convicted of first degree murder (Class A felony) and two counts of spousal rape (Class C felony) on October 17, 2002. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole for the murder conviction and to fifteen years for the spousal rape conviction, to be served consecutive to the life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief. Specifically, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied due process because he was prosecuted with fabricated evidence and perjured testimony. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Cornell Poe, appeals as of right the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner alleges that his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of theft valued at over one thousand dollars, and three counts of aggravated assault were not voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly made due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and the alleged effects of the petitioner’s medication. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Delmar K. Reed, was found guilty by a jury of ten counts of harassment (Class A misdemeanor), one count of attempted aggravated burglary (Class D felony), one count of vandalism over $1000 (Class D felony), one count of vandalism under $500 (Class A misdemeanor), and one count of setting fire to personal property (Class E felony). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of nineteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial; and his convictions for harassment should have been merged into two convictions. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

he defendant, Charles Hopson Stewart, was convicted on his guilty pleas of four counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to nine years for each offense, to be served on split confinement of thirty days of jail on the weekends and probation, with the sentences imposed concurrently. His probation was revoked, and the court also denied a motion to modify his sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the drug court team to determine whether his probation should be revoked and what consequence should follow the revocation, (2) alternatively, that the decision of the drug court team that the defendant should serve his sentence in confinement was too harsh given the facts and circumstances of the case, and (3) that the trial judge should be disqualified from presiding on remand. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing, at which another judge shall preside.

This is an appeal from a Final Judgment issued by the Chancellor in respect to a Petition for Registration and Modification of Foreign Decree in the Chancery Court of Blount County, Tennessee. The Trial Court ordered the registration of the foreign Judgment, but denied the request for modification. On appeal, we affirm.

Executrix appeals the trial court’s interpretation of language from decedent’s Last Will and Testament. Decedent was a well-known author of science fiction literature and the rights to that literature comprise a significant portion of her estate. Beneficiary under Will sought construction specifically of his bequest granting “the royalties from all posthumous publication of any of my works[.]” The trial court held there was a patent ambiguity in the Will precluding extrinsic evidence of intent. Executrix objected and made an offer of proof of decedent’s intended use and meaning of the terms “copyright,” “royalties,” and “posthumous publication.” The court found decedent used “copyright” and “royalties” interchangeably and intended Beneficiary to have both the copyrights and posthumous royalties from all of her works.

Based on the language in the four corners of the Will, we agree there was an ambiguity in the Will but have determined it was latent, rather than patent, and we reverse the trial court on itsambiguity finding. Accordingly, the consideration of extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s intent and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will is permitted and is necessary for the proper administration of the estate. After careful review of the record including Executrix’s proffered evidence of decedent’s intent, we have determined that the decedent intended different meanings of the terms “copyrights” and “royalties” and we reverse the court’s determination that those terms were used interchangeably. In doing so, we award the copyrights not previously bequeathed in the Will to Executrix and the royalties, as defined in this opinion, to Beneficiary. In view of the circumstances of this case, we affirm the decision of the trial court that Executrix should be removed as executrix of the estate and an administrator ad litem appointed. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained an aggravation of pre-existing pulmonary disease as a result of exposure to a chemical in the workplace. The trial court awarded benefits. On appeal the employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We affirm the judgment.

The Defendant pled guilty to four counts of selling .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug and one count of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug for resale. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective twenty-seven year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing her as a Range II offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.