APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Anthony Harris, has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that he was ineffectively represented and that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the purchaser of real property at a delinquent tax sale is entitled to recover delinquent property taxes paid on the property during the redemption period. We hold that funds expended to pay delinquent property taxes during the redemption period are lawful charges to preserve the value of the property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2704, and therefore, the purchaser is entitled to recover these charges. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This case involves a non-custodial parent’s attempt to give consent for her fourteen-year-old daughter to get married. After the parties divorced, the father was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ daughter, and the mother had regular visitation. When the daughter was fourteen years old, the father took her to the mother’s home for visitation. Without telling the father, the mother took the daughter and her eighteen-year-old boyfriend to the juvenile court below to seek permission to get married. At the juvenile court, the mother signed an affidavit consenting to the marriage. Based on the mother’s affidavit, the juvenile court judge signed an order granting the daughter and her boyfriend permission to marry. They immediately obtained a marriage license and got married. After learning of the marriage, the father filed a motion in the juvenile court asking it to set aside its order giving the daughter permission to marry. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion to set aside. It also held that setting aside the prior order rendered the daughter’s marriage void. The mother now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its order giving the daughter permission to marry. Additionally, we note that the marriage is merely voidable, not void.

This appeal arises out of a petition for civil contempt based on the failure to pay child support. The state, on behalf of the obligee mother, filed this petition for contempt against the obligor father for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the juvenile court determined that the father was willfully underemployed and in contempt of court. The father filed a petition for a rehearing under the local rules of the juvenile court, seeking to introduce additional evidence on the issue of willful underemployment. The juvenile court treated the father’s petition as a motion to alter or amend under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the father was not entitled to such relief. The father appeals, arguing that he should have been permitted to introduce additional evidence under the applicable juvenile court local rules, and that the juvenile court erred in finding him in contempt. We conclude that the trial court appropriately considered the father’s petition as a motion to alter or amend under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of the father’s petition, and therefore affirm.

The Defendant, Larry Carter, was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and sentenced to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at his jury trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

This is an appeal from a post-judgment collection proceeding in which the judgment creditor sought to subject the assets of three trusts, of which the judgment debtor was a beneficiary and trustee, to satisfy a default judgment. The trial court found that the trusts were passive or dry and that the legal and equitable estates had merged, resulting in the judgment debtor’s holding fee simple title to the trust property. Debtor asserted that he had dissipated the assets of two trusts, but one trust still held income-generating farm land. The trial court ordered the farm land sold and also ordered further discovery to locate the assets of the other two trusts. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The appellant, Kenneth Lyle Davis, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and reinstating his original two-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Blackburn, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed the pretrial identifications of the defendant as unduly suggestive, raises numerous challenges to the handling of the testimony of co-defendant Danny Green, asserts that he should have been permitted to impeach the testimony of one of the victims by the use of a prior conviction, insists that the evidence was insufficient, in light of the “numerous” errors at trial, to support the convictions, and complains that the trial court erred in the assignment of weight to the established enhancement and mitigating factors. Because the trial court should have granted the defendant’s request for a mistrial, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Quincy DeAngelo Gardner, was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the single issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. He argues that the proof was insufficient to overcome his claims of self-defense and intoxication at the time of the murder. After a review of the evidence in the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Nathan Jack Childress, was convicted of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, after taking a dump truck from a construction site during his escape from police custody. He was sentenced to twelve years as a Range III, career offender for this offense. Additionally, he pled guilty to a charge of escape and was sentenced to six years for that offense, with the sentences to run consecutively to one another and to his unfulfilled sentences for a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Jesse Raymond Proctor and Janie Kay Proctor (“Plaintiffs”), husband and wife, sued Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C. and Center for Sports Medicine & Orthopaedics, LLC (“Defendants”) alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq., concerning certain business practices of Defendants related to surgery performed on Mr. Proctor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim sounded in alleged deceptive business practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977; that the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; that defendants’ affirmative defenses contending that Plaintiffs’ claims sound in medical malpractice should be denied; and that Plaintiffs were barred from amending their pleadings to raise medical malpractice claims. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We reverse and hold that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 can apply to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspects of a medical practice, and since Plaintiffs’ complaint sounds in alleged deceptive business practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

We granted review of these workers’ compensation cases to decide when a case becomes “pending” for purposes of the prior suit pending doctrine. We conclude that a lawsuit becomes “pending” when the complaint is filed. Although the filing of the complaint initiates the pendency of  the case, a subsequent case will be subject to dismissal under the prior suit pending doctrine only if the court in the prior case has acquired personal jurisdiction over the parties. Accordingly, the lawsuit filed by the employer in West v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. was entitled to priority, and the employee’s lawsuit is remanded to the trial court for dismissal. The employee’s lawsuit in Thompson v. Peterbilt Motor Co. has been rendered moot and is dismissed.

The Defendant, Julio Villasana, pled guilty to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, and to one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for the former and to two years for the latter. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for the Class A felony. We affirm the sentences ordered by the trial court.

The defendant, Robert L. Yates, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and in allowing into evidence a photo identification. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The charter and code of ordinances of the City of Memphis set out certain specific provisions, including civil service protections, concerning the organization and operation of the City’s police department. This appeal arises from a suit brought by several high ranking members of the police force who allege that the City created a de facto rank in conflict with the City’s charter and ordinances. The trial court held that the City had impermissibly created a new rank and granted relief in the form of an injunction and a declaratory judgment. It, however, denied claims for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an implied right of action under the City’s civil service rules. We find that the question regarding the appropriateness of the trial court’s awarding injunctive and declaratory relief is now moot and accordingly vacate that part of its decision. We affirm the trial court’s decision that monetary damages are not available.

The defendant, Reginald Rome, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Jury of first degree murder and of five counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies. The defendant is serving sentences of life without parole for the first degree murder and twenty years for each of the five attempted first degree murder convictions. The sentences were imposed consecutively, for an effective sentence of life without parole plus 100 years. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of first degree murder, (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a nurse about a bullet recovered from the victim at the hospital, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing admission of insufficient evidence about the chain of custody of the bullet recovered at the hospital, (4) that the prosecution withheld information about a technical failure in videotaping the deposition of an unavailable witness, (5) that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant could not introduce evidence from the deposition of a nontestifying state’s expert and then call its own expert to refute that proof, and (6) that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. Upon consideration of the defendant’s issues, we hold that no error has been shown, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Brian Foster Vise, was convicted of facilitation of aggravated burglary and filing a false police report, Class D felonies, and facilitation of theft of property valued under $500, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant received a sentence of thirty days for the misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years for each felony conviction, ordering the seven-year sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, he presents a single issue for our consideration: whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Probate Court did not have jurisdiction to extend the statute of limitations to elect against the will and that the Agreed Order extending the statute of limitations was not effective. The appellant also claims that the surviving spouse cannot elect against the will because he waived his right to elect by signing a waiver and accepting the benefits of the bequests to him under the will. Finally, the appellant claims that the Probate Court erred in calculating the award of exempt property, year’s support, homestead exemption, and elective share.  Finding that the Probate Court did not err in extending the statute of limitations, that the surviving spouse did not waive his right to elect against the will and that the Probate Court correctly awarded the homestead exemption, but finding that the Probate Court erred in calculating the award of exempt property, year’s support, and the surviving spouse’s elective share, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the Probate Court to make recalculations.

This appeal involves an election contest filed by a losing candidate for county executive. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, the county election commission provided the minimum number of voting machines required by state law. However, the plaintiff alleged that the commission should have provided more voting machines because long lines at some voting locations caused many people to leave without voting. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, among other things. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves a petition for custody of two minor children. The juvenile court named the father primary residential parent and the mother alternate residential parent. The mother appeals; we affirm.

The defendant, Khalfani Marion, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the four aggravated robbery counts into two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and nine years for each aggravated robbery conviction, ordering all sentences to be served consecutively on the basis that the defendant was a dangerous offender.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and alleges numerous sentencing errors by the trial court. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2004 the petitioner, Bradford Thurman, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. No direct appeal was taken from this conviction. In 2005 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently made and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.In 2004 the petitioner, Bradford Thurman, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. No direct appeal was taken from this conviction. In 2005 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently made and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the hospital is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of an emergency room physician. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the hospital finding that it was not vicariously liable for the conduct of the emergency room physician because he was neither its actual or apparent agent. We find the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the hospital on the issue of actual agency because there are no material facts in dispute and the hospital is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of actual agency as a matter of law. We, however, find that material facts are in dispute concerning whether the hospital held itself out to the public as providing medical services; whether the plaintiff looked to the hospital rather than to the individual physician to perform those services; whether the patient accepted those services in the reasonable belief that the services were provided by the hospital or a hospital employee; and, if so, whether the hospital provided meaningful notice to the plaintiff at the time of admission that the emergency room physician was not its agent. Accordingly, we have determined the hospital was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of apparent agency. Therefore, we remand to the trial court the issue of apparent agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Charles Lincoln Faulkner, was convicted of selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000' of school property and delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000' of school property. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty years in prison and a fine. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the charges because of a material variance between the presentment and evidence at trial; (2) failing to exclude evidence of prior bad acts; (3) failing to exclude expert testimony; (4) instructing the jury in error; (5) failing to bifurcate the trial; and (6) sentencing the Defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James C. Murray, was convicted in 1994 by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison on the murder conviction and twenty-two years on the conspiracy conviction. The court ordered the sentences to be run consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. In this habeas corpus petition, the Petitioner argues that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is thus void. After a thorough review of the issue and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.