APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This third appeal in a long-running landlord/tenant dispute presents the question of the proper amount of an attorney’s fees award. The tenant, John T. Rochford, III, and several business entities owned or controlled by Mr. Rochford (collectively “Rochford”), sued the church now known as Green Hills Community Church (“Church”), claiming among other things that Church breached a lease agreement. Following a second appeal in which this Court held that an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Church was warranted, the trial court awarded Church $343,535.07 in attorney’s fees and expenses, which reflected a rate of $295 per hour. The trial court declined Church’s request for 10% yearly interest starting from the date of the filing of the complaint, July 30, 2015, finding it unwarranted by the terms of the lease. Church appeals, arguing that it should have been awarded attorney’s fees at a rate of $450 per hour and interest. We affirm.

This appeal concerns access to a spring on rural land. Arthur Ray Nicely and Henrietta
Nicely (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Jarrod W. Atkins (“Defendant”) in the Chancery
Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to establish the boundary line
between their respective properties. After a hearing, the Trial Court accepted the opinion
of Defendant’s surveyor as to the boundary line. The spring at issue was determined to be
on Defendant’s land, but the Trial Court also found an easement by implication whereby
Plaintiffs may use water from the spring. Defendant appeals the Trial Court’s finding of
an easement by implication. We find that, while separation of title was proven, the other
elements of an easement by implication, prior use and necessity, were not proven.
Plaintiffs failed to prove any obvious, permanent, or long-established practice of their tract
using water from the spring.

The Petitioner, Devon Brown, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his
2012 convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault,
facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
reckless endangerment. Specifically, the Petitioner contended that he had recently
discovered the State withheld evidence that several of the victims’ vehicles present on the
scene were stolen, information that would have materially impacted the credibility of the
State’s witnesses at trial and might have led to a different outcome. The coram nobis court
found that the petition was time-barred, that the Petitioner was not entitled to due process
tolling, and that the Petitioner had not presented newly discovered evidence entitling him
to a new trial. The Petitioner appeals, and following our review, we affirm.

Makyle J. Love, Petitioner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On
appeal, he alleges that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief
because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an employment contract dispute involving the interplay of a paid sick leave provision and a bonus compensation provision. The appellant, Keith Cousins (“Cousins”), was hired by a real estate business in 2017. He signed a two-year contract which included provisions for salary, bonuses, and paid sick leave. After being with the defendant company for only a few weeks, Cousins suffered a major heart attack and, ultimately, never returned to work. A dispute regarding his compensation arose and in July of 2017, Cousins filed suit against his former employer for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court determined that the company breached Cousins’ contract and awarded him some damages, but not the full balance of the two-year contract as Cousins requested. Both Cousins and the company appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Jerome Barrett, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by not recusing itself and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case concerns service of process on an out-of-state defendant’s registered agent by
mail and a subsequently entered default judgment in the general sessions court. The
defendant moved under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the default judgment based on
insufficient service of process. The defendant also asserted that the default judgment was
void because the general sessions court awarded a judgment greater than the amount prayed
for in the summons. The circuit court found service was valid and upheld the default
judgment in all respects. We agree that service was sufficient and could serve as a basis
for default judgment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-904(e); however, we reduce the
amount of the judgment to conform with the amount the plaintiff requested in the summons.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.

The petitioner, Keith Trammell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A father filed a petition seeking, in addition to a modification of child support, a judgment
for past overpaid support. The father asserted that mother, without his knowledge, had
received for a period of time double child support payments as a result of payments being
taken directly from his paycheck and also being paid through electronic funds transfers that
he remitted directly to mother. While prevailing as to child support modification, the trial
court denied the father’s claim for overpayment of child support. The trial court concluded
his claim was barred by res judicata and, also, a directed verdict on this matter was
warranted due to the father’s failure to present certain critical evidence in support of his
claim. Father appealed the court’s decision barring his claim due to res judicata, but he
did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict in connection
with failure to present evidence to support his claim. As a result of the appellant’s failure
to challenge an independent alternative basis for the trial court’s decision on appeal, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.

A restaurant supplier brought suit for breach of a guaranty. The guarantor admitted
liability. So the trial court entered partial summary judgment on that issue. The supplier
then moved for summary judgment on damages. The guarantor challenged the
admissibility of the evidence submitted in support of the motion. But the trial court ruled
that the evidence was admissible under the business records exception. And, based on the
undisputed facts, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. We conclude that
some of the supplier’s evidence should have been excluded. So we vacate the summary
judgment on damages.

The Petitioner, Edwin Orlando Millan, appeals from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his filing a false police report and
tampering with evidence convictions. The post-conviction court granted relief in
connection with the filing a fraudulent insurance claim conviction after determining that
the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the court erred by denying relief on his remaining convictions because (1) he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the State elicited false trial testimony in
violation of his due process rights, (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83 (1986), and (4) he is entitled to relief pursuant
to the cumulative error doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The defendants in this action failed to timely answer the plaintiff’s complaint.  Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered judgment by default against the defendants.  The defendants moved to set aside the default judgment.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside.  Because the trial court’s order lacked findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their child.
Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to
establish the following statutory grounds of termination for each parent: (1) abandonment;
(2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions
which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the
child. The court also found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest
of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

A landlord appeals from the grant of summary judgment to a commercial tenant in the landlord’s breach of contract action. The lease contained a provision requiring the tenant to obtain fire insurance on the “Premises.” The trial court concluded that the lease failed to define the term “Premises” and that such failure rendered the fire insurance provision unenforceable. We reverse because we find the term “Premises” as used in the fire insurance provision to unambiguously refer to the space within the commercial building that the tenant rented and occupied during the lease. We further conclude that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether it was possible for the tenant to obtain fire insurance on only the portion of the building which it rented and occupied. Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The City of Orlinda filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the Robertson County Planning Commission’s rezoning of property from “Agricultural Residential” to “Neighborhood Commercial,” alleging the rezoning was “illegal spot zoning” and was also procedurally deficient. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

Jonathan Howell, the Defendant, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal
Court’s denial of probation following his plea of guilty to theft of property valued at
$60,000 or more. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying an
alternative sentence and by basing its denial solely on deterrence. Following our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Melvin Summerville, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court
of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony about a
previous domestic assault against the victim in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b); (2) allowing cellular telephone records into evidence when the State did not
establish relevance for the records; and (3) failing to suppress the testimony of a material
witness when the State did not reveal the name of the witness and turn over police body
camera video involving the witness until the “eve” of trial. Based on our review, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe
child abuse. Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her
rights was in the best interest of the child. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence
was presented of both the ground for termination and that termination was in the child’s
best interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey Michael Davis, of one count of
attempted aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly allowed irrelevant
testimony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted
aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

The owners of a restaurant in downtown Clarksville sued the City of Clarksville for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the City’s failure to construct an alleyway on property Plaintiffs sold the City. Plaintiffs also filed a claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the City’s construction of a sewer line encroached on their land. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and dismissed Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim on summary judgment. After a jury trial on the inverse condemnation claim, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $8,335 for the value of land on which the sewer was built, and the trial court awarded Plaintiffs $30,000 in attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees. Plaintiffs appeal each of the dismissals, the measure of damages from the jury trial, and the award of attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees, among other things. We affirm the decisions of the trial court and decline to award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees on appeal.