APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Jahue Mumphrey, pled guilty by criminal information to possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to sell and three counts of domestic assault. He was
sentenced to an effective term of ten years. He later filed a petition for post-conviction
relief alleging that his plea was entered involuntarily and that his lawyer rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by, among other things, failing to review pretrial
discovery with him. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the
Petitioner appealed to this Court. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.

The Defendant, Douglas McArthur McGill,1 was convicted by a jury of violating the
Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and
Tracking Act of 2004 by failing to register a secondary address. He was sentenced as a
Range II, multiple offender to a term of two years and six months. On appeal, the
Defendant seeks a new trial, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
evidence. The State concedes that reversible error exists in the record, and we agree. We
respectfully reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and
remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Darcell Dominique Wright, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it held that the Petitioner’s claim of limited ability to access the penitentiary law library due to lockdowns did not entitle him to due process tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Governmental entities generally are immune from suit. But the Governmental Tort Liability Act removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee. In this case, we consider whether the term “negligent” in the Act’s removal provision is limited to ordinary negligence or instead also encompasses gross negligence or recklessness. We hold that the Act removes immunity only for ordinary negligence. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the majority’s analysis and holding that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 29-20-205 removes immunity for Hawkins County only for ordinary negligence,
not gross negligence or recklessness. I write separately to highlight an issue not addressed
in the majority opinion—whether we should continue to apply the common law public duty
doctrine and the related special duty exception in cases where the legislature has addressed
the issue of immunity by statute.

Ricky Hunter, Defendant, was indicted for one count of first degree murder and one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of
the lesser included offense of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 33 years. The trial court denied
a motion for new trial. After this Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal,
this appeal ensued. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
sustaining the second degree murder conviction. We find the evidence sufficient and
affirm the convictions.

A member of a limited liability company (“LLC”) brought a suit on behalf of the LLC
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and constructive fraud by another member in regard
to transfers of LLC property. The plaintiff admitted that no demand for corrective action
was made on the defendant, nor was any demand made on the other members of the LLC
to join in the litigation. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding
both that the plaintiff’s complaint was outside the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the derivative action. We agree with the trial court that the
plaintiff’s complaint was subject to dismissal because his complaint did not include
allegations sufficiently particular to excuse his failure to meet statutory demand
requirements. The remaining issues are therefore pretermitted.

Defendant, Michael Dewayne Fisher, appeals his Lawrence County conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed structural constitutional error when it denied his motion for recusal. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Branden Brookins, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-petition relief from his 2019 convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, two counts of criminal attempt first degree murder, employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury
convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana
with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, theft, driving on a revoked license,
and violation of the window tint law, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. The defendant also raises the issue of merger, arguing that the trial court
properly merged his convictions. Because the trial court erred by merging certain firearm
convictions and because the judgments contain clerical errors, we reverse the improper
mergers and remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments. We affirm the trial
court’s judgments in all other respects.

Defendant, Timothy Potts, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for two counts of
aggravated rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal,
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss based upon
the statute of limitations and due process and that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Keith L. Farmer, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Upon review of the motion filed by appointed counsel, and in light of the record on appeal, the Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, the defendant, Justin Darnay Graves, argues the trial court erred
in imposing partial consecutive sentences and ordering restitution in his three cases. After
our review, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences, but we determine the order of restitution was in error. Therefore, we affirm the
sentences imposed by the trial court, vacate the orders of restitution and remand for entry
of corrected judgments.

Following a hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees resulting from a discovery dispute, the trial judge or his office contacted an attorney for the defendants to obtain certain discovery responses that had not been filed with the court. The defendants’ attorney responded by email with the requested documents, carbon-copying plaintiffs’ counsel on the email. The trial court then entered an order awarding the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in which the fees awarded were only a small portion of those requested. The plaintiffs filed a motion to recuse, citing the communication between the defendants’ attorney and the trial judge. The trial court denied the motion for recusal. We agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that recusal was not required.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding in which the appellants filed a complaint to set aside a trust established by the ward, along with a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial judge entered orders dismissing the complaint, resolving various other matters, and closing the conservatorship, without entering any order mentioning the motion for recusal. We vacate the orders entered by the trial court while the recusal motion remained pending and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.

Following a trial, the jury convicted Wendolyn Lee, Defendant, of rape, statutory rape by
an authority figure, and incest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced
Defendant to twelve years with 100% service for rape and five years as a Range I standard
offender for both statutory rape by an authority figure and incest. The court ordered the
sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-two years,
and ordered Defendant to be on community supervision for life for the rape and incest
convictions. The court also sentenced Defendant to a consecutive term of 210 days for
multiple counts of direct criminal contempt of court. On appeal, Defendant claims that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, that Tennessee courts lack territorial jurisdiction
to try the indicted offenses, that the rape charge was untimely because “adult rapes must
be reported within three years,” that he did not receive a speedy trial, that the jury was
prejudiced because Defendant’s other stepdaughter testified in rebuttal that she was raped
by Defendant, and that the court erred by not allowing Defendant to represent himself.
After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children
upon the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds
of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to visit,
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, putative father
grounds, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and
financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interest. We reverse the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home and persistent conditions. We also reverse the ground of abandonment by
failure to visit and the putative father ground of failure to seek reasonable visitation as they
pertain to the child, Samyra. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the
father’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the
father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

This appeal involves a dispute over a testamentary trust, which was established by the will
of the decedent’s husband. Upon her husband’s death, the decedent became a life income
beneficiary of the trust. Upon the decedent’s death, the corporate trustee distributed the
remaining corpus in equal shares to the remainder beneficiaries, which were two nieces of
the decedent’s husband and a nephew of the decedent. The plaintiffs in this case—a niece
and the surviving spouse of the other niece—filed a complaint to set aside the probate of
the decedent’s will and for an accounting of distribution of trust assets. They alleged that
the decedent’s will should be declared null and void for various reasons. They also alleged
that the testamentary trust was improperly invaded by the decedent’s nephew. However,
the plaintiffs later sought to voluntarily dismiss their complaint insofar as it pertained to
setting aside the probate of the decedent’s will, which the probate court granted. They then
amended their complaint and no longer contested the will. Instead, they alleged, among
other things, that the corporate trustee failed to prevent the improper invasion of the
testamentary trust, thereby breaching its fiduciary duties. The corporate trustee filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Ultimately, the probate court granted the
motion finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against the corporate
trustee of the testamentary trust. The court explained that the plaintiffs were neither
beneficiaries under a will of the decedent nor heirs at law entitled to take in the decedent’s
estate through intestate succession. The court further explained that the testamentary trust
was never a part of the decedent’s estate and that the plaintiffs could have brought their
claims in the estate that created the testamentary trust, which was the estate of the
decedent’s husband. Additionally, because the court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing,
it found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion
to transfer the case to the estate of the decedent’s husband finding that it had no authority
to transfer the case to a closed estate in its court. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the
decision of the probate court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Brandon Richmond Bowling, Petitioner, was charged in a twelve-count indictment with
six counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count
of first degree felony murder, and one count of first degree premeditated murder for his
role in the death of H.M.1, a 22-year-old woman. The State filed an intent to seek a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Prior to trial, counsel for Petitioner filed a motion
to suppress video evidence of an incident found on Petitioner’s phone. The motion was
never litigated. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape and one count of
second degree murder in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. As a result,
Petitioner received an effective sentence of 40 years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition
for post-conviction relief raising the issue that trial counsel’s failure to advise him that the
search warrant justifying the search of his cell phone was constitutionally defective
rendered his guilty plea involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied
relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed
to satisfy the burden to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Furthermore,
the record establishes that trial counsel’s strategy of filing the motion, initiated negotiations
that resulted in a very favorable resolution for Petitioner. Accordingly, the judgment of
the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the summary dismissal of his third untimely
petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review, we affirm.

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights on the ground that she was not properly served with the termination petition. Because the record raises substantial questions as to whether the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services exercised diligence in its attempt to locate and serve Mother with process, we vacate the termination of her parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Michael Nyok Lueth, was convicted as charged by a Davidson County
Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), sixth offense (Count 1); DUI per
se, sixth offense (Count 2); and driving on a revoked license (Count 3). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six-year sentences
for the DUI convictions, merged the DUI convictions, and imposed a concurrent sentence
of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the conviction for driving on a
revoked license. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in telling
prospective jurors that an interpreter had been provided for the Defendant “out of an
abundance of caution”; (2) the trial court erred in providing a special instruction to the jury
that it was not allowed to consider the Defendant’s lack of fluency in English when
assessing the evidence in the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s
motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, relying on the trial court’s proposed special
instruction, stated during its rebuttal closing argument that the jury could not allow the
Defendant’s failure to speak English fluently to affect how the jury viewed the evidence;
and (4) he was improperly sentenced as a second offender for his conviction for driving on
a revoked license. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the
case for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 3 reflecting that the conviction offense
is driving on a revoked license, first offense, a Class B misdemeanor, and that the
Defendant’s sentence is six months, served concurrently with the sentence in Count 1.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother and father appeal the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights, arguing that there was not clear and convincing
evidence to support termination. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

This third appeal in a long-running landlord/tenant dispute presents the question of the proper amount of an attorney’s fees award. The tenant, John T. Rochford, III, and several business entities owned or controlled by Mr. Rochford (collectively “Rochford”), sued the church now known as Green Hills Community Church (“Church”), claiming among other things that Church breached a lease agreement. Following a second appeal in which this Court held that an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Church was warranted, the trial court awarded Church $343,535.07 in attorney’s fees and expenses, which reflected a rate of $295 per hour. The trial court declined Church’s request for 10% yearly interest starting from the date of the filing of the complaint, July 30, 2015, finding it unwarranted by the terms of the lease. Church appeals, arguing that it should have been awarded attorney’s fees at a rate of $450 per hour and interest. We affirm.