APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the fivecount
indictment against him on denial of speedy trial grounds. Following a thorough
review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we reverse the trial
court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reinstate the indictments against the
defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the defendant, Mark Ketron, pled guilty to
driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, and violation of the light law, for which
he was sentenced to an effective term of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended
to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. On appeal, the defendant asserts that,
as part of his plea, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and the oral arguments of the parties,
we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law pursuant to Rule
37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, this Court is without
jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Omerrieal Dywane Woods, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal
Court jury of one count of facilitation of reckless homicide, two counts of facilitation of
attempted aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to
go armed. The defendant was sentenced to an effective six years in the Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

A Washington County jury convicted the defendant, Joshua M. Hammonds, of first-degree
murder in perpetration of a felony, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than
$60,000, and evading arrest with risk of death. After a sentencing hearing, the defendant
received a sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder in
perpetration of a felony. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Belinda LeMaire ("Employee") sustained an injury to her right foot while working for
Lowe's Home Centers, LLC ("Employer"). The claim was accepted as compensable, and
the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") entered a compensation order
awarding permanent-partial disability benefits along with future reasonable and necessary
rnedical benefits. Employee subsequently filed a petition for benefit determination stating
that she had been discharged by her treating physician, and Employer was refusing to
provide additional medical treatment. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Employer
to provide Employee with a new panel of physicians qualified and willing to treat her workrelated
injury. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals l3oard") affirmed.
Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached
Appendix.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the sale of certain real property by a custodian for the benefit of two minor children pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The custodian sold the property without having it appraised, hiring a real estate agent, or listing the property for sale on the open market. Rather, the custodian reviewed an appraisal published by the county’s property assessor and then sold the property for a price slightly exceeding the listed value. The children’s mother filed a lawsuit on their behalf, alleging that the custodian breached his fiduciary duty of care. The trial court determined that the mother failed to prove that allegations and dismissed the case. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Gloria Juanita Milton (“Milton”) hired attorney Thomas J. Tabor, Jr. (“Tabor”) to defend her as an appellee in Milton v. Powell.  After successfully defending her in the appeal, a disagreement arose between Tabor and Milton over the attorney’s fees she owed him.  Tabor filed a complaint in the General Sessions Court for Claiborne County (“the General Sessions Court”), which found that Milton owed Tabor $10,030 in unpaid attorney’s fees.  Milton appealed to the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”), which came to a different conclusion than the General Sessions Court.  The Trial Court determined that any remaining amount owed by Milton above and beyond what she already had paid was excessive and unreasonable.  Tabor appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

The Defendant, Aaron Joseph Couvertier, entered an open plea to one count of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction at 100 percent service. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action. Because Appellant has not complied with appellate briefing requirements, we dismiss this appeal.

The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of her personal injury negligence action against a social services organization.  The trial court found that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations and that the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations.  Because the plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before she filed the lawsuit, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted.  Accordingly, we affirm. 

Matthew Long applied for disability pension benefits from the Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund. After a hearing by the Fund’s Board of Trustees, his application was denied. Mr. Long sought judicial review. The trial court reviewed the denial of benefits under Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) and held that the Board’s interpretation of the Pension Benefits Policy was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by sufficient and material evidence. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision and awarded Mr. Long benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals found the Policy ambiguous and construed it liberally in favor of Mr. Long. On appeal to this Court, the Fund challenges the reversal of the Board’s decision. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the Policy ambiguous and in construing it liberally. We hold that under a fair reading of the Policy, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by sufficient and material evidence, or otherwise reversible under the UAPA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case clarifies who may be “the claimant authorizing the notice” under the health care liability pre-suit notice statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B). Ashley Denson died after being admitted to the hospital. Her mother Bobbie Jo Denson took in Ashley’s two minor children and obtained legal custody of them. Bobbie Jo sent pre-suit notice to defendant health care providers identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B). She subsequently filed suit on her own behalf and on behalf of the minor children, ultimately pursuing the claim solely on behalf of the minor children. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing Bobbie Jo did not comply with pre-suit notice requirements because she did not identify the children as the claimants. The trial court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss but granted their motion for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Bobbie Jo did not comply with pre-suit notice requirements because the children were the claimants but not identified as such. We now reverse. Bobbie Jo Denson is “the claimant authorizing the notice” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(B), as minor children cannot authorize pre-suit notice and file suit on their own behalf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court.

In May 2023, the Greene County Grand Jury issued a presentment against Defendant, Jacob Columbus Deal, charging him with three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and three counts of aggravated statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape to be sentenced out of range at ten years as a Range I offender at thirty percent with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Phillip Warren Trotter, of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and attempted incest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On August 8, 2025, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgments. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 seeking review of the trial court’s order denying bail pending appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144. The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Upon full consideration of the motion, the response, and the applicable legal authority, the Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

Appellee was injured in an automobile accident where Appellant’s, a governmental entity, employee was 100% at-fault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Appellant’s governmental immunity had been removed; (2) admitting testimony from two of Appellee’s treating physicians; and (3) admitting certain medical billing records. Appellees ask this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court order and deny Appellees’ request for appellate attorney’s fees.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from a search of his vehicle. The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable harm and to prevent needless and protracted litigation. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) and (2). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application. Following our review, the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED.

This is the second appeal by a mother and a father of the termination of their parental rights. We have concluded that the juvenile court correctly determined that a ground for termination existed as to the father. Regarding Mother, we find that the court erred in its analysis finding a ground for termination. We also conclude that the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the ground for termination and vacate this portion of the order and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact in its best interests analysis regarding Father. Therefore, we also vacate this part of the order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an order that makes sufficient findings.

Father appeals the trial court’s order changing his children’s surnames from his surname to another family name. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not address four of his stated issues. As to his final issue, because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we have no evidence to review. Accordingly, we must presume that the evidence presented at the final hearing supports the trial court’s conclusion that the name change was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order suspending a mother’s parenting time until she completes a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 mental health evaluation. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Rodney Miller, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated statutory rape, and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner initially argues that the order of the post-conviction court is insufficient for appellate review. He further claims that each of his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the State’s improper voir dire, in failing to effectively cross-examine the victim at trial, and in failing to adequately advise the Petitioner of his right to testify. Finally, the Petitioner asserts that the cumulative effect of trial counsels’ deficiencies deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this conservatorship action, the trial court’s appointment of the ward’s stepdaughter as conservator has been appealed by the ward’s nephew and ostensibly the ward herself. Because the record leaves us unable to discern the basis of the trial court’s decisions, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for the entry of an appropriate order.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. 

Ambreia Washington (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of, among other offenses, unlawful possession of a firearm. Before trial, the Defendant moved to suppress the firearm a law enforcement officer seized from the vehicle the Defendant was driving. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments, including the trial court’s ruling on the suppression issue. We granted permission to appeal to determine the legality of the officer’s warrantless seizure of the firearm. We hold that the seizure was constitutionally permissible under the plain view doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I fully join the majority’s opinion upholding seizure of the handgun under the plain view doctrine. I write separately to further address the plain view doctrine’s “immediately apparent” requirement that has caused confusion and consternation among both federal and state courts.