APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a final judgment in a divorce action without children. The wife appeals contending the trial judge was biased against her, the judge erred by denying her petition for divorce while granting the husband’s counterpetition for divorce, and the judge erred in allocating marital assets and debts. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We reverse, holding that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence in support of the alleged statutory grounds of termination.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final decree as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Nicol Cox, appeals from the Scott County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the postconviction
court erred in denying his petition in that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to object, move for a mistrial, or request a curative
instruction after a prospective juror stated she had previously “dealt with” the Petitioner
through her work with child protective services, (2) releasing an alibi witness from his
subpoena when he failed to appear at trial, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner
regarding his right to testify. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of trial
counsel’s errors entitles him to post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a second jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant, Alan Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced him to life for each murder conviction and merged those convictions. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years each for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions, Class A felonies, and ordered that he serve all of the sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) his second trial violated double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court committed plain error by allowing a medical examiner to testify about the victim’s autopsy report when the witness did not prepare the report; (5) the State’s prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination of the defense’s expert witness constituted plain error; (6) the trial court erred by not admitting his entire 911 call into evidence; (7) the trial court’s denial of his request to have retained counsel represent him on his motion for new trial violated his constitutional right to counsel of choice; (8) his effective sentence is excessive; and (9) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error.1 Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and that the trial court incorrectly ordered the Defendant to serve one hundred percent of his sentence for aggravated child neglect. Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect in count four is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for aggravated child neglect in count three. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and effective sentence of life plus fifty years are affirmed.

The Defendant, Marion Brock Foreman, was convicted at a bench trial by the Henderson County Circuit Court of twenty counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of a firearm); § 39- 17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). He was found not guilty of ten counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous offense involving the felony sale or delivery of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. After merger, he received an effective sentence of eight years with a 35% release eligibility for five counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the search of his property and home. We conclude that the trial court erred, reverse the judgments of the court, vacate the convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court allowed the mother’s counsel to withdraw from representation at the beginning of trial when the mother did not appear. On appeal, the mother asserts that she did not have prior notice of the trial date and that her attorney did not provide her with notice of an intent to withdraw from representation. Based on the circumstances presented and applicable law, we vacate the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights and remand for a new trial.

Marina Kotova (“Plaintiff”) and Thomas Kevin True (“Defendant”), who were formerly married, entered into an agreement whereby Defendant would purchase certain real property owned by Plaintiff pursuant to an installment purchase agreement. The agreement provided that, in the event of a default by Defendant, Plaintiff could sue for monetary damages, specific performance, or both. Additionally, an addendum to the agreement allowed Plaintiff to evict Defendant from the property if he was in default for more than thirty days. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sued him seeking possession of the property and monetary damages. The trial court instead awarded Plaintiff specific performance, which required Plaintiff to sell the property to Defendant upon Defendant curing his default. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s award of specific performance. We find that the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiff a remedy other than what she requested, and we reverse the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Dexter Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Sedrick Clayton, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Urshawn Miller, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This consolidated appeal is before this court on the Petitioner, Jason Lee Fisher’s, application for permission to appeal the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The Petitioner argues that the circuit court1 erred in denying both his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings based upon a claim of juror bias during his trial. He also raises constitutional challenges to the error coram nobis and motion to reopen post-conviction statutes. Finally, he contends that the circuit court erred by finding that he failed to establish prejudice on his juror bias claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and we deny the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

A plaintiff sued his son and daughter-in-law over, among other things, a warranty deed to disputed real property. The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint alleging several claims against the daughter-in-law’s attorney. The attorney filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s claims against her. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court found a father guilty of nine counts of criminal contempt based on his alleged violation of the trial court’s previous order addressing child support arrearage and the current child support arrangement for the father’s minor child. Because the order appealed from contains no findings on the essential elements of criminal contempt, on what evidence supports the judgment, or on whether the criminal contempt was initiated on proper notice, we vacate and remand to the trial court.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision that clear and convincing evidence established the existence of two statutory grounds for termination. Because the juvenile court’s order failed to make sufficient factual findings to support its best interest analysis, we vacate that portion of the court’s decision and remand for entry of an order making sufficient factual findings

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Lurry, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a four-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, attempted carjacking, and attempted theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. The Defendant pled guilty to the attempted theft and theft counts of the indictment, the State nolle prosequied the attempted carjacking count, and the Defendant went to trial on the first degree murder count. Following his jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder count of the indictment. He was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, ten years for the theft conviction, and two years for the attempted theft conviction. Finding the Defendant to be an offender with an extensive criminal history, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve all his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of life plus twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his first degree premeditated murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior domestic abuse incident between the Defendant and the victim, by not allowing the Defendant to introduce the victim’s complete Cellebrite cell phone records, by sentencing the Defendant to the maximum and ordering consecutive sentences, and by admitting expert testimony that was outside the scope of the witness’s expertise and when the Defendant was not put on notice of the witness’s proposed areas of expertise. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to consider the Defendant’s presentence report in determining whether the sentences should be served consecutively.

Plaintiff brought claims against Knox County and the County Clerk based on allegedly discriminatory employment practices. The trial court determined that Plaintiff committed serious discovery violations and imposed as a sanction the exclusion of certain evidence. With this evidence excluded, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the discovery sanction, the trial court’s conclusion under the Tennessee Human Rights Act that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply, the trial court’s conclusion that the Clerk was not individually liable, and the award of attorney’s fees against the Plaintiff and her attorney. We affirm.

Defendant, Ashley Dawn Boyce, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence following her guilty plea to driving under the influence. Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Upon review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the appellate record does not contain a copy of the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Johnny B. Brooks, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), eighth offense, driving on a revoked license due to a DUI, and a violation of the open container law. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Betty Sparks, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition alleging that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This case arises out of allegations that Appellees misappropriated Appellant’s inheritance funds for their own use. Appellant also alleges elder abuse based on the conversion as well as a physical altercation between Appellant and an Appellee. Appellees allege that Appellant gifted them the inheritance funds. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that: (1) because Appellant engaged in bad faith, the doctrine of unclean hands applied and barred her full recovery; (2) Appellees converted and misappropriated a portion of Appellant’s inheritance funds; (3) Appellees did not commit elder abuse; and (4) Appellant intended a partial gift of the inheritance funds to Appellees. Because the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised the affirmative defenses of bad faith and unclean hands, we reverse the trial court’s application of these doctrines to reduce the judgment awarded to Appellant. We also conclude that the trial court failed to consider the elements of elder abuse, the elements of a properly executed gift, and failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the same. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order as to Appellant’s elder abuse claim and Appellees’ gift claim. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment awarded to Appellant. The remainder of the trial court’s order is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Appellant’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is pretermitted.