APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Todd Allen Burrows, Jr., appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

This action involves the trial court’s denial of a petition for termination of a biological
father’s parental rights to his minor child. We now affirm.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Cordero Klein Blake, of driving while
under the influence (“DUI”) of marijuana, first offense, possession of a handgun while
under the influence, driving on a suspended license, speeding, violation of registration law,
and violation of financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed a total effective
sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to community corrections
supervision following service of seven days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI and possession
of a handgun while under the influence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a Rule 10B interlocutory appeal of the denial of a second recusal motion. We find, as the trial court did, that the second motion is repetitive of the first and should be denied. We further grant attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal.

Seventeen-year-old Antonio Demetrius Adkisson (a.k.a. Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.) (“the Defendant”) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of two victims. The Gibson County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) held a transfer hearing and found it appropriate to transfer the Defendant to the Gibson County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to be prosecuted as an adult. After a jury trial, during which the Defendant’s videotaped statements were admitted into evidence, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See State v. Adkisson, No. W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2024). The Defendant requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging (1) the juvenile court lacked probable cause to believe he committed the charged offenses, as required for transfer by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his confession at trial because he did not validly waive his right to remain silent and his confession was involuntary. We hold that the Defendant was properly transferred to the trial court. We further hold that the Defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but his confession was unlawfully coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause and thus inadmissible at trial. Having found reversible error on that basis, we vacate the Defendant’s convictions of second-degree murder and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kenneth C. Davis, was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation and received a twelve-year sentence. The Defendant died while his motion for new trial was still pending, which prompted the Defendant’s counsel to file a motion to dismiss on the Defendant’s behalf, arguing that the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio should act to abate the Defendant’s entire case from the inception of the prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2019). The Defendant’s counsel filed an appeal from that decision pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the Defendant’s counsel contends that the trial court erred by relying on Al Mutory and declining to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio under these circumstances. Following supplemental briefing, we conclude that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3 to review the issue as presented. Further, we decline to extend the extraordinary judicial remedy of a writ of certiorari. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of a conservatorship proceeding against the petitioner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114. The petitioner sought a conservatorship for the respondent—the petitioner’s 84-year-old father—to protect his father and to prevent him from wasting his assets. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservatorship and that it was in the respondent’s best interest that the petitioner be appointed his conservator. But the court charged the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner rather than the property of the respondent. The court reasoned, inter alia, that the petitioner benefited from the conservatorship and that the respondent’s need for a conservatorship was “borderline” and “not clear cut.” The petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the trial court’s discretionary decisions pursuant to the three-part analysis set forth in Lee Medical Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010), we have determined that the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner was based on an erroneous assessment of the relevant facts and a misapplication of the relevant legal principles. Accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand with instructions to assess all the guardian ad litem fees against the property of the respondent, the amount of which has already been approved, and to assess against the property of the respondent the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs the petitioner incurred in the trial court and on appeal, the amount of which is to be determined on remand. The trial court shall also determine the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the attorney ad litem in this appeal and assess those charges against the property of the respondent.

The majority concludes that Antonio Demetrius Adkisson’s confession to law enforcement officers was involuntary and vacates his two convictions for second-degree murder. Whether Adkisson’s confession was voluntary under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions is a close question. But applying the same totality-of-the circumstances test as the majority, I conclude that the confession here was the product of Adkisson’s own free will, not police coercion. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of that issue and from the Court’s judgment vacating Adkisson’s convictions.

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro as well as attorney’s fees. Husband appealed. He argues the trial court’s award of alimony was error because the court miscalculated his income, because it errantly excluded certain evidence, and because it awarded the wrong type of alimony. He also argues that Wife’s attorney’s fees affidavit was insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

The Defendant, Roy Gene Nicholson, III, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of reckless aggravated assault, evading arrest, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-204 and that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to continue his trial, during which time the State procured a superseding indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three charges of criminal contempt. The appellant appeals those criminal contempt findings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal presents two issues: (1) whether Appellant preserved his evidentiary issues
concerning the trial court’s admission of video evidence in a jury trial, and (2) whether,
following a bench trial, the trial court made sufficient findings under Rule 52.01 when
rejecting Appellant’s COBRA claim. Because Appellant failed to include the evidentiary
issues in a motion for new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e),
and because Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 13(b) and 36(b) are not applicable,
we conclude that Appellant waived the evidentiary issues. Further, because the trial court’s
order does not make sufficient findings, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the
COBRA issue, and we remand for compliance with Rule 52.01.

This matter is before the Court upon the pro se petition of the Defendant, Patrick Jayson Reeners, for an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s order denying the pro se motion to recuse herself. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Sec. 1.

The trial court determined Defendants/Appellants were liable for damages arising from
negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. We reverse.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bradley Michael Lesniewski, was convicted of possession of a handgun by a felon; possession of a firearm by a felon-prior felony drug conviction; false imprisonment; evading arrest; possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Heroin); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (0.5 grams or more of Methamphetamine); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Fentanyl); possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving while license is suspended, cancelled, or revoked. For these offenses, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand for the merger of two counts and the entry of corrected judgment forms.

This appeal involves a long-running custody dispute between unmarried parents. In this
latest chapter of the litigation, the father filed a petition to modify, seeking to be named
primary residential parent and/or increase his parenting time. The mother filed a counterpetition,
seeking only a change in decision-making authority. The trial court denied the
father’s petition but did make several changes to the parenting schedule. The trial court
also granted the mother’s request to be named sole decision-maker for educational and
extracurricular decisions and allowed her to obtain passports for the children. Finally, the
trial court ordered the father to pay the mother’s attorney fees. The father appeals. We
vacate in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Bernard Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrianne Smith, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated domestic assault following a bench trial. The Defendant represented himself at these proceedings, although he was appointed an attorney as “counsel to assist,” also known as “standby counsel.” On appeal, the Defendant contends, inter alia, that he did not ask to represent himself, even with the aid of standby counsel, and that the trial court improperly required him to do so against his expressed wishes. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the Defendant that he was denied his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction petitioned for a writ of mandamus. On its own motion, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We affirm.

The decedent left a will in which he directed the majority of his property into a trust. The
trust named his wife as the trustee. The trust made several specific distributions to wife
effective upon the decedent’s death, including the grant of life estate interests in certain
assets. Several other beneficiaries were designated to receive distributions from the life
estate assets upon wife’s death. The trust directed its remaining assets into a separate
marital trust which provided that all income generated by its property would be distributed
to wife. It also provided that the trustee would be required to distribute as much of the
principal of the marital trust to wife as she requested in writing and granted her a power of
appointment. Several of the remaining trust beneficiaries filed a petition to construe the
trust in the Shelby County probate court. They sought an order declaring that the remainder
interests of assets in which wife had been granted life estates did not pass into the marital
trust. The probate court held that the remainder interests did not pass into the marital trust
and wife could not alter or destroy them. Wife appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

Petitioner, Kevin Waggoner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) the trial court participated in an ex parte jury proceeding which violated hisright to an impartial jury; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attend the jury proceeding at the local high school; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to remove a juror who admittedduring trial that she knew one of the State’s witnesses; (4) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to request a subpoena duces tecum for a single record from a juror’s Facebook record; (5) the post-conviction court erred in denying a subpoena duces tecum for the juror’s Facebookaccount; and (6) the cumulative errors undermine confidence in the verdict. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination:
abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the
child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The
mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination
relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did
not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s
determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best
interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough
analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

This appeal involves a grandmother and grandfather’s petition to terminate the parental
rights of a father to two of his children. The petition alleged the following grounds for
termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, (2) abandonment by failure to support,
and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court
held that each ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also
determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The father appeals. We ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights but
must vacate the trial court’s determination regarding the failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume

Petitioner, James Hudgins, was convicted in 2014 of first degree murder. State v. Hudgins, No. E2015-01363-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4413281, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016). His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that Petitioner’s mother told multiple people she drugged him with Xanax on the day of the shooting.Hudgins v. State, No. E2019-02173-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 7589670, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2020), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Apr. 7, 2021). Petitioner was unsuccessful in pursuingpost-conviction relief. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence existed to show that his mother drugged him on the night of the shooting. In a supplement to the petition, Petitioner acknowledged the petition was untimely but claimed that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. After a hearing, the coram nobis court issued an order denying the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.