APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Joshua Terelle Gaines, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense and received an effective sentence of life plus five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by redacting his psychological expert’s report and by limiting the expert’s testimony. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm.

The trial court approved a parenting plan jointly proposed by an unmarried Mother and Father, who at the time were living together. Their relationship, subsequently, deteriorated, and each parent later sought modification of the existing plan. With some minor alterations, the trial court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. Father appeals. We affirm.

Kentrel Moragne, Defendant, appeals from his conviction for unlawful exposure for which he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve fourteen days in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence on probation. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in this timely appeal. Because the statute is not ambiguous and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Antonio James, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because the sufficiency of the evidence was not challenged on appeal. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ivan Antjuan Burley, appeals from his Sumner County conviction for attempted possession with the intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his contemporaneous drug-related activities in Davidson County in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Additionally, the Defendant raises several other constitutional and evidentiary claims. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kyler Michael Price, was convicted by a Warren County jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and driving without a valid license, a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of thirty days for the misdemeanor conviction and two years as a Range II offender for the felony conviction, with six months to serve in the county jail. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain his reckless endangerment conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing irrelevant and prejudicial testimony by a police officer about the officer’s encounter with a different motorcyclist; and (3) whether the trial court erred by ordering confinement without correctly considering alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kejuan King, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine witnesses, investigate prior altercations and present evidence thereof, and argue for proper jury instructions. After review, we remand this case to the post-conviction court for entry of a written order that sufficiently addresses all grounds presented by Petitioner and states the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each ground as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b).

The Defendant, Isaiah French, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of attempted premeditated first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, two counts of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in prison without parole as a repeat violent offender plus 120 years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the remaining counts of the indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Joshua Wilson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s decision to deny judicial diversion in his guilty-pleaded conviction of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-503. Following our review, we affirm.

This is an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance that restricts customer visits to some home-based businesses but not others, which the plaintiffs contend are similarly situated in all material respects in relation to the purpose of the restrictions. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the restrictions were constitutional because they were rationally related to the city’s interest in preserving the residential nature of neighborhoods. Thus, the court granted Metro’s motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The plaintiffs appeal, contending that the trial court reached the incorrect conclusion because the plaintiffs presented evidence that their home-based businesses have no greater impact on the residential nature of neighborhoods than the exempt home-based businesses. We agree with the plaintiffs. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

On or about July 31, 2025, the Defendant, Martin Aron Harasim, filed a pro se notice of appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). He simultaneously filed a pro se motion seeking review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the sentence he received for his misdemeanor convictions in this case. Tenn. R. App. P. 8. As reflected in the judgment sheets, on July 25, 2025, the Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401), attempted assault on a first responder (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-116), and resisting arrest (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16- 602), all of which are misdemeanors. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation after service of sixty days in jail.

The Defendant is currently represented by appointed counsel and his case is still pending in the trial court, however. Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is premature. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) and (d). Moreover, it has long been the rule that a defendant may not be represented by counsel and simultaneously proceed pro se on appeal. State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).

Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice. At the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court, the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, may pursue an appeal to this Court, if appropriate. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b).

The pro se Rule 8 motion is denied for the same reason. Counsel may file the appropriate motion for review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the Defendant’s sentence, if necessary. According to the statements by the Defendant in 08/04/2025 2 his motion, the trial court ordered him to begin serving his sixty-day sentence on August 1, 2025. If that is true, the Court makes the following observations for the benefit of counsel and the trial court.

Subsection (b) of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-116 provides that the trial court may revoke bail immediately upon conviction, in applicable felony cases, “notwithstanding sentencing hearing[s], motion[s] for a new trial and related post-guilt determination hearings.” The Sentencing Commission Comments to that section advise that “[t]he standards for revocation of bail are set forth in Section 40-26-102.” Section 40- 26-102, entitled “Bail in felony cases,” governs admission to bail pending appeal. Subsection (e) of Section 40-26-102 provides that “[t]he setting of bail or release upon recognizance is a matter of right for one convicted of a felony and sentenced to confinement for less than one (1) year.” As discussed above, however, the Defendant in this case was convicted of misdemeanor offenses. The Sentencing Commission Comments to Section 40-35-116 further advise that bail in misdemeanor cases is addressed in Section 40-26-104. Both that statute and the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant has the right to bail pending appeal in misdemeanor cases. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-104; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(1). Section 40-26-104 provides: “In all misdemeanor cases, the judge or court shall direct the clerk of the circuit or criminal court to admit the defendant to bail in a sum prescribed by the judge or court, with sufficient sureties for defendant’s appearance at the circuit or criminal court in which judgment was rendered against the defendant, at the next term after the decision of the cause by the supreme court, to answer the judgment of the court.” Rule 32(d), which is titled “Release After Conviction, Pending Further Proceedings,” discusses release following conviction in both misdemeanor and felony cases. Subsection (d)(1) of Rule 37, which covers misdemeanor cases, provides simply: “A person convicted of a misdemeanor has a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.” Accordingly, it is clear the legislature intended those defendants convicted of a misdemeanor to be entitled to bail pending the exhaustion of post-trial and appellate remedies.

The Clerk shall forward a copy of this order to the Defendant, counsel of record, and the trial court clerk. Because the Defendant was declared indigent by the trial court, costs are taxed to the State.

This appeal arises from a chancery court petition for interlocutory judicial review of an intermediate agency decision in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance. The petition sought judicial review of the administrative law judge’s denial of a motion to dismiss. The department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The chancery court construed the challenge as a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and determined that an adequate remedy would be available to the petitioners in the form of subsequent judicial review of a final administrative decision. Accordingly, the chancery court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appeal. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert Lee Ream, pleaded guilty to two counts of arson, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay $75,000 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in ordering restitution. Upon our review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and therefore, his issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Oscar Hernandez, of three counts of rape of a child and five counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-three years for each of the rape of a child convictions and to ten years for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions. The trial court ordered the three thirty-three-year sentences to run consecutively and the remaining sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of ninety-nine years’ incarceration. In his direct appeal, the defendant contends the effective sentence is excessive. We affirm.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Eric Orlando Carter, appeals from the Circuit Court of Davidson County’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

After the decedent’s most recent will was admitted to probate, the decedent’s grandson moved to certify standing for a will contest. The grandson claimed standing as a beneficiary of a prior will. After a couple of hearings, he came forward with signed copies of several prior wills that named him as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled the grandson lacked standing because he failed to produce an original instrument or establish a lost will. We conclude that the copies of the prior wills, standing alone, were insufficient to establish standing. So we affirm.

The Defendant, Kenneth Shane McDonald, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination of one of his codefendants regarding sentencing exposure. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Byron Lewis Black, a death-row inmate scheduled for execution on August 5, 2025,
challenges Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol. He asserts that the protocol, which uses a
single dose of pentobarbital, is unconstitutional as applied to him because it does not
account for his individualized medical condition that necessitated an implantable
cardioverter-defibrillator (“ICD”). Due to the impending execution, Mr. Black sought a
temporary injunction in the trial court requiring the defendants to deactivate the ICD prior
to the execution. He argues that the effects of pentobarbital will trigger the device and
result in the infliction of extreme pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After a
hearing, the trial court granted the temporary injunction, directing the defendants to arrange
for qualified medical personnel to deactivate the ICD moments before administering the
lethal injection. The court subsequently modified the injunction to permit the defendants
to transport Mr. Black to a hospital to deactivate the ICD “as early as possible” on the
morning of the execution. The defendants filed an application for extraordinary appeal in
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
asking the intermediate appellate court to vacate the temporary injunction. This Court
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(3) and
ordered Mr. Black to file an answer. Upon review, we grant the application and conclude
that the trial court erred in granting the injunction. Accordingly, we vacate the temporary
injunction.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s final order entered on February 7, 2025. The notice of appeal was not mailed to the Appellate Court Clerk via certified mail until May 9, 2025, more than thirty days from the final order’s entry date. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this health care liability action, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice upon finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Ronald C. Wade brings this appeal challenging the Tennessee Claims Commission's denial of his motion to compel medical benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because we conclude that the Claims Commission's two grounds for denying benefits are incorrect, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A mother and a father challenge the juvenile court’s finding of two grounds for the termination of their parental rights and its finding that termination was in the best interests of the two children. We find that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient findings regarding one ground and vacate that ground. We affirm in all other respects.

The plaintiff sued a third party in North Carolina. During that litigation, the plaintiff learned that a Tennessee business might have information relevant to the lawsuit, so the plaintiff obtained a subpoena in North Carolina and, under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, received a corresponding subpoena from the Circuit Court Clerk for Knox County, Tennessee. After serving the subpoena on an agent for the defendant, the plaintiff heard no response. He then brought a petition to enforce the subpoena against the company and its agent. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions, which the trial court granted. Because we find that the trial court did not adequately explain its decisions to dismiss the petition, grant attorney’s fees, and order Rule 11 sanctions so as to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.