APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Cleotha Abston, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude reference to a firearm recovered from his vehicle following his arrest, (2) the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury regarding lost or destroyed evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate his charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals only the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.  Although Father does not appeal the termination of his parental rights, we are required to review that decision.  The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court also found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

A self-represented petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because the filing does not comply with Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a driveway easement. Robert Davis and Lala Davis (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued their neighbor Karen Edwards (“Edwards”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) to enforce an oral agreement whereby Edwards agreed to build her own driveway on her property. Edwards had been using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the terms of the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“the DEMA”), an express easement agreed to by Plaintiffs and Jeanette Schlaeger (“Schlaeger”), the previous owner of Edwards’ property. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Edwards had reached a verbal agreement with Plaintiffs to build her own driveway, and that she must build it. Plaintiffs filed a motion for additional findings asking that the DEMA be terminated even though that was not an issue at trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that the DEMA was meant to be temporary despite the DEMA’s unambiguous language to the contrary. Edwards appealed. Subsequently, Joe Hamby and Amber Hamby (“Defendants”) bought Edwards’ property and were substituted as appellants. We hold, inter alia, that the DEMA is permanent and runs with the land. The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for additional findings. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment nullifying the DEMA.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Mikel Cecil, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The
Defendant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse.

This is an action for breach of contract, unlawful procurement of breach of contract, and civil conspiracy arising out of a purchase and sale agreement related to real property in Moore County, Tennessee. The buyers, Karl and Beth Ann Kokko, alleged that the sellers, Thomas and Wendy Moore, breached the contract by failing to fulfill their obligation to close. The Kokkos further alleged that Gregg and Daffney Driver induced the breach by conspiring with the Moores to sell the property to the Drivers’ company, MOCAR Enterprises, Inc. The listing realtor, Crye-Leike of Nashville, Inc., intervened to collect a commission. The trial court took several actions that are at issue on appeal. First, the court granted the Kokkos’ Motion for Sanctions against the Drivers and MOCAR and entered a default judgment against them on the claims for unlawful procurement and conspiracy. Second, the court granted the Kokko’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered judgment against the Moores on the claims for breach of contract and conspiracy. Third, the court set aside the MOCAR deed and ordered specific performance of the contract. And fourth, the court granted Crye-Leike’s claim against the Moores for a commission. This appeal followed. We conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate on the Kokkos’ claim for civil conspiracy but affirm the trial court in all other respects. Thus, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated by the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of disciplinary proceedings held at Morgan County Correctional Complex. Because the petition was not notarized and because a notarized petition was not filed within sixty days of the denial of his administrative appeal of that decision, the trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error with the trial court’s decision, we affirm

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Jordan Worthington, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to modify the conditions of his pretrial release. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. and Priest Baldwin Hutchinson (“Petitioners”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, James Robert Howell, of four counts of
sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of assault by offensive or provocative
touching, for which he received an effective sentence of four years and six months in
confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends that the trial court
erred in admitting hearsay evidence, in admitting evidence of prior abuse, and in imposing
an excessive sentence. Additionally, the defendant claims improper argument by the State
affected the verdict. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Brittany Faith Swafford, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that she received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner argues trial counsel’s failure to retain an expert witness favorable to the defense and to adequately investigate Petitioner’s then undiagnosed mental health condition constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. She further argues, in the context of her ineffective assistance claim, that trial counsel’s failure to investigate her undiagnosed mental health condition prevented her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the fivecount
indictment against him on denial of speedy trial grounds. Following a thorough
review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we reverse the trial
court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reinstate the indictments against the
defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the defendant, Mark Ketron, pled guilty to
driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, and violation of the light law, for which
he was sentenced to an effective term of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended
to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. On appeal, the defendant asserts that,
as part of his plea, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and the oral arguments of the parties,
we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law pursuant to Rule
37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, this Court is without
jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Omerrieal Dywane Woods, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal
Court jury of one count of facilitation of reckless homicide, two counts of facilitation of
attempted aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to
go armed. The defendant was sentenced to an effective six years in the Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

A Washington County jury convicted the defendant, Joshua M. Hammonds, of first-degree
murder in perpetration of a felony, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than
$60,000, and evading arrest with risk of death. After a sentencing hearing, the defendant
received a sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder in
perpetration of a felony. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner, Baleke Kromah, of sexual battery by an authority figure. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. Kromah, No. M2011-01813-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 781600, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 1, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 17, 2013). In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which the coram nobis court dismissed as untimely. The Petitioner appealed, and after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal because the Petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

Belinda LeMaire ("Employee") sustained an injury to her right foot while working for
Lowe's Home Centers, LLC ("Employer"). The claim was accepted as compensable, and
the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") entered a compensation order
awarding permanent-partial disability benefits along with future reasonable and necessary
rnedical benefits. Employee subsequently filed a petition for benefit determination stating
that she had been discharged by her treating physician, and Employer was refusing to
provide additional medical treatment. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Employer
to provide Employee with a new panel of physicians qualified and willing to treat her workrelated
injury. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals l3oard") affirmed.
Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached
Appendix.

This appeal arises from the sale of certain real property by a custodian for the benefit of two minor children pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The custodian sold the property without having it appraised, hiring a real estate agent, or listing the property for sale on the open market. Rather, the custodian reviewed an appraisal published by the county’s property assessor and then sold the property for a price slightly exceeding the listed value. The children’s mother filed a lawsuit on their behalf, alleging that the custodian breached his fiduciary duty of care. The trial court determined that the mother failed to prove that allegations and dismissed the case. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Gloria Juanita Milton (“Milton”) hired attorney Thomas J. Tabor, Jr. (“Tabor”) to defend her as an appellee in Milton v. Powell.  After successfully defending her in the appeal, a disagreement arose between Tabor and Milton over the attorney’s fees she owed him.  Tabor filed a complaint in the General Sessions Court for Claiborne County (“the General Sessions Court”), which found that Milton owed Tabor $10,030 in unpaid attorney’s fees.  Milton appealed to the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”), which came to a different conclusion than the General Sessions Court.  The Trial Court determined that any remaining amount owed by Milton above and beyond what she already had paid was excessive and unreasonable.  Tabor appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

The Defendant, Aaron Joseph Couvertier, entered an open plea to one count of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction at 100 percent service. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of her personal injury negligence action against a social services organization.  The trial court found that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations and that the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations.  Because the plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before she filed the lawsuit, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted.  Accordingly, we affirm. 

Matthew Long applied for disability pension benefits from the Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund. After a hearing by the Fund’s Board of Trustees, his application was denied. Mr. Long sought judicial review. The trial court reviewed the denial of benefits under Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) and held that the Board’s interpretation of the Pension Benefits Policy was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by sufficient and material evidence. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision and awarded Mr. Long benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals found the Policy ambiguous and construed it liberally in favor of Mr. Long. On appeal to this Court, the Fund challenges the reversal of the Board’s decision. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the Policy ambiguous and in construing it liberally. We hold that under a fair reading of the Policy, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by sufficient and material evidence, or otherwise reversible under the UAPA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.