APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jonathan Duncan, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery by the Wilson County Grand Jury for his involvement in the death of Ellis Sanders, the victim. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, arguing: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; 2) Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because jurors slept during trial, the trial court required the jury to work “extensive and unreasonable hours,” and the trial court interfered with the jury by holding ex parte meetings; and 3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of uncharged bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect merger of the first degree murder and felony murder convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Harry Raymond Coleman, Jr., of second degree murder, among other offenses. The trial court sentenced him to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, the Petitioner argued that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense centered around his post-trial diagnosis of Bipolar I disorder. He also claimed that trial counsel failed to call witnesses who would have supported his claim of self-defense. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, G’Andre Fields, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s DNA. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The record and the Defendant’s brief have been filed. For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby suspends the requirement of a responsive brief by the State and affirms the trial court’s order pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Alexander Friedmann, of vandalism of property over $250,000, for which he received a sentence of forty years in confinement at 35%. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the indictment is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the costs to rekey the jail and review surveillance footage; (3) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the product of a judicial subpoena; (4) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (5) the State failed to timely provide evidence to which the defendant was entitled; (6) improper argument by the State affected the verdict; (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (8) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence; and (9) cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Denver Richardson, as charged of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly admitted four of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in denying jury instructions on self-defense and defense of another; and (5) cumulative error requires reversal of his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case is about a court’s authority to modify a final criminal judgment. Nearly four decades ago, Pervis Payne received two death sentences for brutally murdering a single mother and her two-year-old daughter. Because of the possibility that the death sentences might be commuted to life sentences in future proceedings, the court aligned the sentences to be served consecutively. Years later—after this Court held that the execution of persons with intellectual disabilities violates the federal and state constitutions, see Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 812 (Tenn. 2001)—the Tennessee legislature established a procedure whereby certain death-sentenced inmates could receive an intellectual disability determination to evaluate the constitutionality of their sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g) (2021). Payne made use of that pathway and was adjudicated intellectually disabled. The trial judge presiding over that adjudication vacated Payne’s death sentences and imposed two life sentences in their place. But the court did not stop there: it also revisited the earlier consecutive sentencing determination and ordered that Payne’s sentences be served concurrently instead, which would make Payne eligible for parole in 2026. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to realign Payne’s sentences. Once a criminal judgment becomes final, it may not be modified unless a statute or rule authorizes its modification. The trial court had authority to adjudicate Payne intellectually disabled under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(g). It also had authority to vacate Payne’s death sentences and substitute sentences of life imprisonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-205(e) (1982). No statute or rule, however, gave the trial court authority to realign Payne’s sentences, so we vacate that part of the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Matthew Saunders, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of judicial diversion and entry of judgments of conviction in two cases. Specifically, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his diversion by failing to timely disclose multiple social media accounts when he registered as a sex offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brent Paul Moon, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective three-year probationary sentence for felony evading arrest, simple possession of methamphetamine, and driving on a revoked license. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated and, as such, the probation violation should be dismissed. Next, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements at the revocation hearing because no “good cause” existed for the statements’ entry and that the statements were not reliable. Lastly, he claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and running the revocation sentence consecutively to the sentence for his new criminal convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of a clerical error on the Defendant’s judgment form for simple possession of methamphetamine.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, was convicted by a Smith County Criminal Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving while in possession of methamphetamine, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding photographs relating to his passenger, Natasha Jordan, in violation of the Defendant’s due process rights to present a defense; (2) whether the trial court erred in preventing a defense witness’s testimony about her knowledge of Ms. Jordan; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding impeachment evidence relating to an arresting officer’s employment history in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him; (4) whether the State violated State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), for failing to preserve the patrol vehicle video recording of the Defendant’s traffic stop; (5) whether the Defendant is entitled to a resentencing hearing due to the trial court’s admission of a video recording at sentencing of the Defendant that was not beforehand disclosed by the State; (6) whether the trial judge erred by not recusing himself; and (7) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors rendered the Defendant’s trial unfair. Based on our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. However, pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015), we remand for the trial court to enter a corrected judgment in count three to reflect that the sentence imposed for the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction of possession of methamphetamine while driving was merged into the felony possession of methamphetamine conviction in count one.

The tenants appeal from the judgment in this action involving a lease with a purchase option for real property. We vacate the attorney fee award to the landlords. We affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects.

This appeal stems from the trial court’s granting of Appellee’s petition for an order of protection against Appellant. We do not reach the merits of Appellant’s argument because her brief does not comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee—most notably by failing to include a statement of issues presented for review. This appeal is therefore dismissed.

In 2024, the Defendant, Dana Kelly Teasley, pleaded guilty to eighteen counts of theft and fraud-related charges, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of twelve years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns a homeowner’s attempt to vacate an arbitration award entered after a dispute arose regarding the homeowner’s contract with a construction company to build a deck on the homeowner’s property. We have determined that the trial court properly confirmed the arbitration award and that the contractor waived any argument that the trial court erred by not awarding the company its attorney’s fees at the trial level. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of the contractor’s reasonable appellate attorney’s fees.

In 2019, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Andre Bowen, of facilitation of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of seventy-two years of incarceration. On appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Bowen, No. W2019-01210-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1400929, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2021). The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought relief pursuant to a writ of error coram nobis. Bowen v. State, No. W2022-00229-CCA-R3-ECN, 2022 WL 17408878, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2023). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appeals offering multiple grounds for a due process tolling of the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Fernando Ballard, appeals the trial court’s decision to fully revoke his probation. He contends that the trial court did not have authority to fully revoke his probation because there was insufficient evidence to find that Defendant committed a non-technical violation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a petition to determine custody and establish parenting time. Following a two-day trial, the court ruled that the parents shall have joint legal custody of their two-year-old child and that the mother shall be the primary residential parent. The court also established a parenting schedule, pursuant to which the mother was awarded more parenting time than the father. The father appeals the designation of the mother as the primary residential parent and the allocation of parenting time. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Trameisha L. Farris, of first degree felony murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. More specifically, she argues that (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that a robbery occurred; and (2) even assuming that a robbery occurred, the State failed to prove that she participated in that crime. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff homeowners’ association filed this lawsuit against certain defendant homeowners who owned homes within its subdivision, seeking to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rentals.  After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment that focused on interpretation of the association’s restrictive covenants with respect to short-term rental properties.  Following a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant homeowners and concomitantly denied the association’s motion.  The trial court concluded that the language of the restrictive covenants was ambiguous as to short-term rentals and therefore unenforceable to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rental properties.  The association has appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Defendant, Clayton Nelvis, was arrested in January 2023, and 1st Out Bonding Company secured his release by executing a bail bond as surety. After the Defendant failed to appear for his initial arraignment, the trial court issued a conditional judgment forfeiting the bail bond. After 180 days, the trial court entered a final judgment of forfeiture when the surety failed to appear for the scheduled hearing. Two weeks later, the surety moved to set aside the final judgment, asserting that it was not liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-139(d), which relieves a surety of liability where the defendant is not timely entered into a state or federal fugitive database following a failure to appear. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the request for relief was untimely. On appeal, the surety contends that the statute extinguished its liability and that the trial court had no authority to enter a final forfeiture. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Monroe County jury found the Defendant, Russell Matthew Morgan, guilty of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape and solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528 prohibits solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Plaintiffs in this case, who live in the Dominican Republic, were allegedly injured by toxic herbicides used in the sugar cane industry. Following the Plaintiffs’ filing of a lawsuit against the Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, pursuant to the Tennessee Products Liability Act, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case on several grounds. Although the trial court rejected the viability of a number of these defenses asserted by the Defendant at the motion to dismiss stage, the trial court concluded that the case should be dismissed on the basis that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application.” The trial court also opined that, “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic” but noted that the Plaintiffs “have only set forth a specific claim under the TPLA.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case.