APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Amanda Helena Rogers, appeals her Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, facilitation of vandalism of property in an amount of $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, and two counts of reckless endangerment for which the trial court imposed an effective term of 10 years and six months to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of facilitation of attempted first degree murder and that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Hank Cooley, Jr., appeals from his best interest, guilty-pleaded
convictions for felony evading arrest risking death or injury, driving on a revoked license
(second offense), reckless driving, disobeying a traffic signal, violation of the light law,
speeding, and failure to exercise due care. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b)(3)(B) (2018)
(subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (driving on a revoked
license), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-8-110 (2020) (subsequently amended)
(disobeying a traffic signal), 55-9-402 (2020) (subsequently amended) (violation of light
law), 55-8-152 (2008) (speeding), and 55-8-136 (2020) (failure to exercise due care).
The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A homeowner, displeased with the work performed by a handyman, brought suit, seeking
damages and relief under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The handyman
counterclaimed for the value of the oral contract for services, asserting the homeowner
breached the contract by improperly terminating it. The circuit court denied relief to both
parties, and the parties appeal. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining
that there was no enforceable contract, precluding relief for the handyman. Likewise, the
homeowner is not entitled to relief because the evidence does not preponderate against the
circuit court’s finding that there was no misrepresentation and that the handyman rendered
services to earn certain prepaid amounts. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Martin Walker (“Petitioner”), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner seeks review of the decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“Board”) to deny him parole. He raises numerous challenges to the propriety of the Board’s action and procedures. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her two children. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that six grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appeals. Of the six grounds the juvenile court found had been proven, we affirm four of them but reverse two. We also affirm the determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of her parental rights.

Father appeals the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination of his parental rights, as well as its finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim after falling off his own ladder while at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to warn and could avoid liability under principles of comparative fault. The Plaintiff countered that the Defendant was actually his employer and that the Defendant’s decision not to provide workers’ compensation insurance prevented the Defendant from being able to raise a comparative fault defense. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did have a duty to warn. The trial court granted the Defendant summary judgment finding no duty to warn and that even if a duty existed that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law based upon comparative fault principles. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We affirm.

Neighbors sued to invalidate zoning ordinances that would allow two real estate development projects to be built at significantly taller heights than prior zoning regulations allowed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim in part because it found that the passage of two zoning ordinances gave the developers vested property rights under the Tennessee Vested Property Rights Act of 2014 (VPRA). We conclude the trial court erred in its application of the VPRA, but we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

This is an appeal from a case arising in the Shelby County General Sessions Environmental Court. For the reasons stated herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal. Moreover, we are unable to transfer this appeal because it was not timely filed for the appropriate court that has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it is, therefore, dismissed.

The State of Tennessee appealed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her car.  On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because probable cause existed to search the Defendant’s car based on a police dog’s signal for the presence of narcotics.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reinstatement of the charges.

I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion based on the narrow issue raised by the parties and the existing law in Tennessee.  I write separately, however, to highlight how the legalization of hemp has fractured the foundation underlying the rule that a drug detection dog sniff is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.  In my view, the cases before this court thus far miss the primary issue—whether a drug detection dog sniff that no longer discloses only contraband is itself a search that must be supported by probable cause.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on four grounds. The Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services does not defend two of the four grounds, so we reverse
as to those grounds. We affirm the ground that Mother is unable to parent the children due
to her present mental condition. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient
findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s findings that the mother failed to manifest a
willingness and ability to parent and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher James Funk, Sr., of driving
under the influence of an intoxicant and possessing a firearm while under the influence of
alcohol. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months
and twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying both his motion to suppress and his
subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal. The State asserts that the Defendant waived
any issue regarding his motion to suppress by failing to file a motion for a new trial. It also
argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct
appeal. On our review, we agree with the State and respectfully affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed appellant’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Glen Edward Miller, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year effective sentence, to be served on probation after one year of confinement. In response to the Defendant’s second proven probation violation, the trial court ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal from this judgment, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Nicole L. Lindholm, appeals the trial court’s imposition of an effective five-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for her convictions for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, which followed the trial court’s revocation of her probationary sentence on judicial diversion. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying her request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Defendant of patronizing prostitution from a minor, a Class B felony, in count one and solicitation of a minor to commit patronizing prostitution, a Class C felony, in count two. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight and three years, respectively, and merged the convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is sufficient to support only a conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, in count one and that the evidence is insufficient to support any conviction in count two. The State concedes that the Defendant committed a Class A misdemeanor in count one and, therefore, that both convictions must be modified to misdemeanors. We agree with the State; modify the judgment in count one to reflect a Class A misdemeanor conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor; modify the judgment in count two to reflect a Class B misdemeanor conviction of solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit patronizing prostitution; and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Richard Williams, III, of several offenses, including attempted first degree murder. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after finding that it was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court did not adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his ability to access the prison library and, therefore, to timely file his petition. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This lawsuit arises from a real property/boundary dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial court found that a prior circuit court condemnation judgment vesting title to the Knoxville Community Development Corporation “bars the claim of [the plaintiff] as an impermissible collateral attack upon the condemnation judgment.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the condemnation judgment barred the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court for Meigs
County, arguments of counsel, and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon
consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reversible error in the
trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce action, the court limited Wife’s proof at trial as a sanction for her failure to respond to pre-trial discovery. After the trial, the court granted the parties an absolute divorce, equitably divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan for their minor children, and declined to award Wife spousal support. Wife argues that the court erred in limiting her proof at trial, dividing the marital estate, and denying her request for spousal support. Discerning no abuse of discretion in these decisions, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The trial court found a material change in circumstances had occurred and it was in the child’s best interest to award custody to the father. Because the evidence does not preponderate against either finding, we affirm.

This case concerns the procedure used by the Tennessee State Board of Equalization when it determined the 2018 appraisal ratio for Shelby County. In 2017, Shelby County real property was reappraised. Accordingly, the Board of Equalization set the County’s 2017 appraisal ratio at 1.000. In 2018, the Board of Equalization used the 2017 reappraisal to set the Shelby County 2018 appraisal ratio at 1.000. Appellants—owners of commercial tangible personal property in Shelby County—challenged the Board’s methodology as violative of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 and unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Following review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the trial court determined that: (1) the Board did not violate Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 when it set the County’s appraisal ratio at 1.000 in 2018; (2) the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence; and (3) the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.