APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In April of 2018, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) conducted a foreclosure sale on a piece of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. The property was subsequently sold to a third party. The previous homeowner, Reginald Hall (“Appellant”), initiated wrongful foreclosure proceedings against BOA, among others, in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (the “trial court”). BOA filed a motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting BOA’s motion. Appellant appeals to this Court. Because Appellant’s brief does not comply with the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing, the issues purportedly raised are waived. The trial court is affirmed.

Appellant appeals the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge on the grounds that the trial judge refused to explain the reasons other judges recused from the case, refused to hear evidence of misconduct against an attorney involved in the case, and allegedly ruled erroneously in several respects. Because we conclude that an ordinary person knowing all the facts known to the judge would not question the judge’s impartiality, we affirm.

This appeal followed the trial court’s certification of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we conclude that the trial court’s certification was improvidently granted, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal involves a mother’s post-divorce petition for modification of alimony and child support. Because the trial court has not disposed of all of the claims raised in the mother’s petition, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Husband and Wife divorced; the trial court divided their property. Husband appeals, asserting five errors. Two of those purported errors are related to continuances, and three are related to the trial court’s division of the couple’s property. With regard the property division, one purported error relates to the trial court’s division of certain vehicles and two purported errors relate to the trial court’s division of two parcels of real property. We conclude that both of Husband’s continuance arguments are waived. We also conclude that his property division argument as to the vehicles is waived. With regard to the real property division, we conclude the trial court made inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its decision as to both parcels, and we vacate and remand for the trial court to render further findings of fact and conclusions of law.

To collect on its judgment, Appellant judgment creditor served a levy on Appellee garnishee bank. Judgment creditor sought to garnish an escrow account that was subject to an escrow agreement between a third-party and judgment debtor’s representative. Garnishee bank initially responded that it did not have any funds to remit. Thereafter, garnishee bank filed an amended response and enclosed a cashier’s check for $731,598.51, the amount of funds in the escrow account; the check was made payable to the Williamson County Circuit Court. A few days later, garnishee bank filed a motion to return funds deposited into the Clerk’s Office. At trial, garnishee bank argued that it was not properly served with the levy and that, even if service was proper, judgment creditor had no right to collect the funds held in the escrow account. The trial court agreed. We conclude that garnishee bank waived any objection concerning whether the levy was properly served. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Martrice Thomas, of first degree
premeditated murder. The Petitioner appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment. State v. Thomas, No. W2017-02489-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL
6266277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 29, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 28,
2019). On April 6, 2020, more than a year after the final judgment, the Petitioner filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective, and the
post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had received the effective
assistance of counsel. The Petitioner appealed, and we remanded the case for consideration
of the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. After a hearing, the post-conviction
court determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations. The
Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of review, requesting this court complete review of
the appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction
relief.

Leonard John Clemons, Defendant, was convicted of attempted burglary, burglary,
vandalism, and two counts of theft. For those convictions, Defendant was sentenced as a
career criminal to a total effective sentence of 24 years, 11 months, and 29 days. After the
trial court denied his motion for new trial, Defendant appealed. On appeal, Defendant
argues that the trial court erred by denying a continuance based on discovery violations
and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Because Defendant has
waived his challenge to discovery violations and because the evidence is sufficient to
support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their health care liability claims against a hospital and two
doctors who treated their daughter on the day of her birth and tragic death. The trial court
reluctantly ruled that the plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and dismissed the claims as untimely. We conclude
that the plaintiffs met their burden to show substantial compliance with section 29-26-
121(a)(2)(E) as to the defendant hospital, but not the defendant doctors. We therefore
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a conservatorship case. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In 2013, the Petitioner, Marcus Anthony Robey, pleaded guilty to evading arrest and criminal impersonation in exchange for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. In a bifurcated proceeding, a jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated robbery following which he pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. For these convictions he received concurrent thirty- and fifteen-year sentences, respectively. State v. Robey, No. M2015-00306-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4487954, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2016). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction related to the indictment, and that the State withheld evidence resulting in prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Tailor James Simpson, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for aggravated burglary and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to
sell or deliver. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal follows the dismissal of the appellant’s claim for damages in the Tennessee
Claims Commission. The appellant, who was injured during a class she participated in
while enrolled as a student in the occupational therapy program at the University of
Tennessee Health Science Center, submits that the Commission’s failure to find her
professor negligent was in error. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s
summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for
aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his
effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred
by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, acting pro se, entered guilty pleas to various
felony offenses and received an effective sentence of six years’ imprisonment. A few
weeks later, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming they were
unknowing and involuntarily entered because he was not advised of the consequences of
the guilty pleas.1 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. For
the first time in this appeal, the Defendant claims that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; therefore, his subsequent guilty
pleas were constitutionally invalid. The Defendant additionally claims the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and determining
that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we
conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). We further conclude that the
Defendant failed to establish that manifest injustice required the withdrawal of his guilty
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the amount and duration of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife/Appellee. Husband also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s alleged failure to comply with discovery. We conclude that the amount of alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s need. As such, the award of alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall terminate upon Wife’s death or remarriage, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3). We vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

This is a post-divorce action in which both parents seek to modify the permanent parenting plan and the father seeks to reduce his financial support obligations. The mother filed her Petition to Modify Permanent Parenting Plan in which she requested, inter alia, a reduction of the father’s parenting time and that she be awarded sole decision-making authority for the non-emergency medical and educational decisions for the parties’ two minor children. The father filed his Counter-Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan seeking, inter alia, that he be awarded the tie-breaking vote for all medical decisions for the children; that joint decision-making authority for educational decisions be maintained between the parties; that his financial obligations be modified, including child support as well as previously agreed-upon additional educational and medical expenses; and that he be awarded more parenting time. Following a trial that spanned 10 days, the trial court found in a 53-page memorandum opinion and final order that neither party proved a material change of circumstance that justified modification of the parenting schedule. However, the court found the parents’ inability to successfully co-parent under the existing joint decision-making provision adversely affected the children’s non-emergency healthcare and educational needs. The court also found that it was in the children’s best interests that the “[m]other have sole decision-making authority over their non-emergency healthcare and day-to-day education, free of any interference or delays by the father and without being required to consult with him in advance.” The court denied the father’s request to modify child support as well as his request to modify responsibility for educational, medical, and extracurricular expenses. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that the mother is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in defending this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph Jerome Griggs, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated rape conviction, for
which he is serving a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the postconviction
court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Manning, of rape, attempted rape, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State’s expert was qualified and by allowing the expert to testify outside of her area of expertise. In response, the State argues, in part, that the Defendant waived any issue concerning the expert by failing to object at trial and by filing an untimely motion for a new trial. On our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. We also conclude that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal, and we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a petition to access public records filed against a private entity. David L. Hudson, Jr. (“Hudson”) and Public.Resource.Org filed a petition against Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”), in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“the TPRA”) seeking access to and a copy of the complete and current electronic version of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the TCA.”).1 The Tennessee Code Commission (“the Commission”) intervened on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright interest in the TCA. The Trial Court held that the TCA is exempt from disclosure because Tennessee law provides a separate avenue for publication of the TCA. In addition to its dispositive ruling, the Trial Court held that Lexis operates as the functional equivalent of a governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson appeals. Lexis and the Commission raise issues as well. We hold, inter alia, that Lexis is a private company performing specific services for the state on a contractual basis. It has not assumed responsibility for public functions to such an extent as to become the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Tharpe, was convicted at a bench trial of burglary of a
vehicle, retaliation for past action, theft of property, assault of an officer, evading arrest,
and coercion of a witness. In this consolidated appeal, he challenges: (1) the legal
sufficiency of the evidence supporting four of his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s
imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

I would also affirm the dismissal of the petition for access to public records and to obtain judicial review of denial of access. But I would do so only “on the threshold issue” identified by the trial court. The trial court framed the issue as “whether Tennessee Code Annotated constitutes a document required for public access under the Public Records Act.” On that threshold issue, I reach the same conclusion as the trial court and the majority. State law otherwise provides for access to Tennessee Code Annotated, so Tennessee Code Annotated is not a “state record” subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2023) (making all state records “open for personal inspection by any citizen of this state . . . unless otherwise provided by state law”); see also Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 485 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tenn. 2016) (recognizing Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7- 503(a)(2)(A) as “a general exception to the Public Records Act, based on state law”). The trial court recognized that resolving the threshold issue was “dispositive, making it unnecessary to decide the other two defenses asserted.” Yet, “in the interest of avoiding a time-consuming and expensive remand” in the event of a reversal on the threshold issue, it also ruled on the other defenses.

This case involves a protracted and contentious child support action, which began when
the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition for child support in
2005 against the father for financial support of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the
parties filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt
for failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation for the
child, objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests
to rehear many of the motions and petitions. The trial court addressed each of these
motions and pleadings as they were filed. On September 1, 2020, a magistrate judge
entered an order ruling on all of the mother’s outstanding motions for rehearing in the case
but reserved the mother’s outstanding petition for contempt against the father for failure to
pay the child’s medical and dental expenses and the mother’s petition for rehearing of a
motion to modify child support. Those matters were set for hearing on November 24, 2020,
before a special judge. At that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court had issued a standing
order that all in-person hearings and trials were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic;
therefore, the November 24, 2020 hearing was set to be heard remotely via “Zoom”
technology. The mother objected to the virtual hearing on grounds that the notice was
insufficient and accordingly sought a stay of the pending matters via a motion filed on
November 23, 2020. Neither party appeared for the Zoom hearing on November 24, 2020,
and the special judge dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The mother then filed
a motion for rehearing and a motion to alter or amend the judgment, both of which were
heard and denied by the special judge. The mother has appealed the trial court’s dismissal
of the child support action. The father has not appeared or filed a responsive brief. Upon
thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues raised by the mother on
appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamil Toure Holloway, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder causing serious bodily injury, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.