APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found as grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, and (3) a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. We affirm as to the finding of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s
findings that the father failed to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. We also reverse the trial court’s use of the outdated best interest factors and vacate the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Priscilla Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) against multiple neighbors, including Michael and Sharon Berry. She sought access to her property by way of an undeveloped road called Hyder Lane. The Berrys’ garage was on the undeveloped road. After trial, the Trial Court determined that Hyder Lane was a public road and ordered the garage to be removed and the road opened for
Ms. Smith’s use and access to her property. The Berrys appealed. Having concluded thatcertain indispensable parties were never joined to the action, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder of these indispensable parties.

The plaintiff underwent surgery for a severe head injury. Due to various complications and infections, he required multiple follow-up procedures and treatments. The plaintiff filed medical malpractice claims against the hospital and doctors involved in his treatment over the course of an approximately five-month time period. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The trial court found that the plaintiff filed his lawsuit more than one year after his cause of action had accrued and that he was not entitled to an extension of the statute of limitations. It therefore dismissed the entire lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination of the accrual date for the plaintiff’s cause of action as to his initial medical treatment; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action as to allegations of medical malpractice as it relates to the plaintiff’s initial treatment. We reverse, however, the dismissal insofar as it
extends to later alleged incidents of malpractice, as they fell within the statute of limitations.

The Defendant, Christopher Guy, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective sixyear
probationary sentence for his convictions for two counts of misdemeanor domestic
assault and one count of felony vandalism. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because he had completed his probationary
period by the time the revocation warrant was filed and (2) the revocation warrant should
have been dismissed due to law enforcement’s failure to preserve evidence. The Defendant
also contends that he should have been granted an appellate bond during the pendency of
the appeal. The State responds that we should affirm the trial court’s revocation order and
that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on his appellate bond issue. Following our
review, we determine that the Defendant had completed the probationary periods on his
misdemeanor domestic assault convictions before the issuance of the revocation warrant
but that the revocation warrant was timely as to the probation for his felony vandalism
conviction. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for entry of an amended
probation revocation order and a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s felony vandalism
conviction in accordance with this opinion.

This appeal arises out of an incident where the plaintiff fell off a staircase and sustained
injuries. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, who owned the building,
alleging negligence and negligence per se based on a violation of a building code. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We
affirm.

In this breach of contract case, the trial court awarded Appellee damages for Appellant’s
failure to perform his obligations under a construction contract in a workmanlike manner.
Appellant appealed. Due to deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not reach the
substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.

A taxpayer appealed a County Board of Equalization’s property valuation to the State Board of Equalization. The State Board reduced the valuation. The County then sought judicial review. After a new hearing in which the trial court heard testimony from competing appraisers, it affirmed the State Board’s valuation. It also determined that the County’s request to reclassify the property was untimely. We affirm.

Defendant, David Lyndel Cochran, stands convicted of one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in allowing a sexual assault nurse examiner to offer expert testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the Defendant, Kim Owen Alley,1 by
presentment with one count of theft of $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, one count
of transacting business as an unregistered broker-dealer, and one count of fraudulent acts
or devices. A few months later, another presentment was issued charging the Defendant
with two additional charges: one count of money laundering and one count of theft of
$2,500 or more but less than $10,000.2 Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for
the theft count in the second presentment. Then, following the State’s proof at trial, the
trial court dismissed all three charges from the first presentment because the evidence
presented did not correspond to the dates alleged in the presentment. At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the remaining money laundering count, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’
incarceration with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues:
(1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his money laundering conviction; (2) the trial
court erred in providing a jury instruction for theft of property as a part of the jury
instruction for money laundering after all the theft charges had been dismissed; and (3) his
ten-year sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted Defendant, Gregory Ryan Webb, of one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at seventy-five percent service. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve body camera footage from the crime scene; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, John Butler, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of six years. The State subsequently alleged that the Appellant violated his probation, and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s diversion and entered judgments of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking the Appellant’s diversion and in ordering confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s judicial diversion probation and imposing a three-year sentence. I part ways with my fellow panel members in my reasoning for this conclusion.

In the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), Christina K. Collins sought
judicial review of a disciplinary order entered against her by the Tennessee Board of
Nursing (“the Board”). Finding that Ms. Collins’s petition for judicial review was
untimely, the Trial Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
matter and dismissed her petition. Ms. Collins has appealed the Trial Court’s order of
dismissal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Detrick Turner, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel. He argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate and
failing to raise additional issues on appeal. Following our review of the entire record,
including the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Rebecca F. B. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children Christabell B., Ashtynn B., Colton B., and Elan B. (Colton B. and Elan B. collectively, "Minor Children"; the Minor Children, Christabell B., and Ashtynn B. collectively, "Children").2 The Chancery Court for Maury County ("trial court") granted a default judgment against Mother and terminated her parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody. We conclude that the ground of abandonment was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore reverse the trial court's judgment as to that ground. However, we affirm the trial court's findings as to the other statutory grounds and its finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Minor Children's best interests.

The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, William Max Riden, stated that appellants were
appealing the judgment entered on May 24, 2023. As the order appealed from does not
constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiffs seek to establish that they have
an ingress and egress easement over the portion of a once public road that crosses over
their neighbor’s property. The plaintiffs contend that they have a prescriptive easement or,
in the alternative, a private access easement for ingress and egress because their properties
abut the once public road that runs through the defendant’s property. The chancery court
found that the plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress across the
defendant’s property. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiffs have an easement across the defendant’s property, albeit on different grounds.
We have determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove a prescriptive easement;
nevertheless, they have proven a private access easement over the defendant’s property
because their properties abut a once public road that passes through the defendant’s
property. Accordingly, we affirm as modified the decision of the trial court awarding the
plaintiffs an ingress and egress easement over the defendant’s property.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Albert Franklin Thompkins, Jr., of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-three years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also asserts that the trial court (1) violated “the spirit” of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when an African American juror was randomly selected and excused as an alternate juror at the end of trial; and (2) erred in failing to grant a mistrial and a motion for a new trial when defense witnesses failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to testify. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Rony Noe Ambrocio Cruz, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of
second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to serve
at 100%. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
second degree murder conviction. He also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing
when it applied an enhancement factor related to his immigration status. After a thorough
review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

John Earheart, Jr. ("Employee") filed a workers' compensation claim against Central Transport ("Employer") for temporary disability benefits. After initially denying the claim, Employer ultimately agreed to pay the requested benefits on the day before the scheduled expedited hearing. Following a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") ordered Employer to pay Employee's attorney's fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B). The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") affirmed. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

The Defendant, Timothy Hutcherson, was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment and received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder, that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police, and that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about his gang affiliation in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment in count nine.

The Defendant, Stephen Novatne, pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine in a drug-free zone and agreed to serve a sentence of eight years. He later filed a motion asking the trial court to resentence him in accordance with the 2020 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. The trial court declined to do so, finding that resentencing was not in the interests of justice, and the Defendant appealed. Because the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right from a denial of resentencing under the Drug-Free Zone Act, we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to intervene. John A. Watson, Jr. (“Watson”)
moved to intervene in a lawsuit filed by James L. Coxwell, Sr. (“Coxwell”), by and through
his attorney-in-fact, Cam Coxwell Shiflett, against Watco Communities, LLC (“Watco”)
and MountainBrook Assisted Living, LLC (“MountainBrook”) (“the Companies,”
collectively). Watson and Coxwell were once in business together but had a falling out.
Coxwell sued to recover money he had loaned the Companies. Coxwell and the Companies
reached a settlement, and an agreed order was entered to that effect. Watson’s motion to
intervene came after entry of the agreed order and his having known about the litigation
for many months. Watson objects to language in the agreed order between Coxwell and
the Companies providing for joint and several liability by the Companies, which he says is
unfavorable to his interests. The Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”)
denied Watson’s motion to intervene, citing untimeliness. Watson appeals. We find no
abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s denial of Watson’s motion to intervene. We affirm.

The defendants appeal a jury verdict rendered after several days of trial. The parties are former business associates, individuals and entities, who worked together in the manufacturing, importing, distribution, and sale of memory foam mattresses. When one of the plaintiffs withdrew from the business in 2016, he invoked a buyout provision in the parties’ operating agreement. The defendants disputed, among other things, the validity of the operating agreement and refused to pay the buyout. A protracted dispute followed, with both the plaintiffs and the defendants alleging several causes of action against one another. Following cross-motions for summary judgment in 2020, the trial court ruled that the operating agreement was not invalid for fraud or unconscionability. The case proceeded to trial on August 3, 2021. The trial lasted several days, and the jury returned a verdict largely in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, as well as almost a million dollars in attorney’s fees. The defendants appealed to this Court, raising a host of issues. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendants a mistrial on the first day of trial. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment entered in this matter and remand the case for a new trial.

In April of 2018, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) conducted a foreclosure sale on a piece of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. The property was subsequently sold to a third party. The previous homeowner, Reginald Hall (“Appellant”), initiated wrongful foreclosure proceedings against BOA, among others, in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (the “trial court”). BOA filed a motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting BOA’s motion. Appellant appeals to this Court. Because Appellant’s brief does not comply with the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing, the issues purportedly raised are waived. The trial court is affirmed.