APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The captioned executrix has appealed from a non-jury judgment of the Chancery Court that a will dated April 6, 1989 is the true, whole and last will and testament of Jennie Mai Jackson, deceased.

This appeal involves a prison inmate’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole him, the inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking review of the board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the inmate appealed to this court. We have determined that the board has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The captioned plaintiff has appealed from the non-jury dismissal of its suit to enforce restrictions and has presented the following issues for review:

The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the Parole Board’s denial of parole. We affirm because we find that the petition in the lower court does not contain any  allegations which show that the Board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or in excess of its jurisdiction.

This is an appeal by petitioner, Harlan White, from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

This is an action for misrepresentations and inducement of breach of contract relating to the trial and settlement of a personal injury case. The original plaintiffs and a co-defendant have sued the other defendants for misrepresenting or concealing material facts which (1) induced the plaintiffs to settle their original claim for less than its worth, and (2) induced the defendants’ insurance company not to represent the other defendant. The Circuit Court of Putnam County granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party with a derivative claim - loss of consortium - is entitled to challenges under the peremptory jury challenge statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105.

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of the jury challenge statute provides additional peremptory challenges to a party with a derivative claim,1 and that a new trial is required because the denial of that statutory right constitutes prejudice to the judicial process. In the interest of judicial economy, since a new trial is required, we have also decided that under comparative fault principles, the recovery of a spouse claiming loss of consortium will be reduced in proportion to or barred by the fault of the physically injured spouse. We, therefore, affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding for a new trial.

I concur in the dissent of Justice White.

We granted the application of Terry E. Wood, the defendant, for permission to appeal in order to resolve an issue of first impression in Tennessee: whether the return of a sealed presentment 1 engages an accursed person's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough examination of the reocrd and careful consideration of the issue, we conclude, for reasons appearing below, that the reutnr of a presentment, whether sealed or unsealed, whether the accompanying capias is executed or unexecuted, is a formal accusation that engages constitutional speedy trial provisions. Thus, we must apply the criteria of Barkery.Wingo 2 and state b. Bishop 3 to determine whether the thirteen-year delay in this case deprived the appellant of this constitutional speedy trial rights. We find that there was no such deprivation and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint.

In this property confiscation case, the Court must decide whether a direct  appeal was timely and whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act's1 twelve-month statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-20-305(b) applies to bar plaintiff's claim for damage to and loss of personal property seized by police officers employed by defendant, the City of Columbia. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the appeal was timely and that plaintiff's claim is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 and is, therefore, not barred.

This suit was filed by Plaintiffs Giles E. Roberson and his wife Hazel B. Roberson against Defendants Mary Margaret (Darwin) Wasson and Pug Martin, individually , and D/B/A Century 21 Pug Martin Realty. The Plaintiffs sought to have the Court declare that a strip of land approximately 18 feet in width, titled in the name of Mrs. Wasson, which lay between separate tracts owned by them (see appendix) "to have been abandoned and to be non-existent." The complaint was later amended to advance the theory of adverse possession, and still later to add as parties Defendant Stephen N. Snyder and wife Barbara L. Snyder, who had purchased the property from Mrs. Wasson.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, Lisa and Ricky Prince, are  husband and wife. Lisa Prince ("Plaintiff") was injured during out-patient surgery, allegedly as a result of improperly administered anesthetic.  Initially, the suit was brought against Coffee Medical Center, Dr.  Ramprasand (the surgeon), and Michael Cruz (the nurse anesthetist).  Dr. Ramprasand and Cruz settled with Plaintiffs and were dismissed prior to this action. Plaintiff alleges on appeal that Coffee Medical Center ("CMC") was negligent in failing to establish adequate anesthetic policies and procedures and in failing to enforce its own anesthesia policies and procedures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CMC and Plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.

This is an appeal of a nonjury action in chancery form originally brought to rescind a contract for the sale of real estate and for damages to real property. The complaint was filed on January 22, 1 1991. Four separate hearings have been held in this cause. The first hearing was held without intervention of a jury. The second and third hearings were heard in the presence of a jury, and the fourth hearing in this cause was held without a jury. Following the fourth trial in the Chancery Court of GilesCounty, Tennessee, the chancellor entered a judgment against appellant for $22,279.59. The defendant, Earl Laursen, timely filed a notice of appeal from the final order entered January 9, 1995. The defendant, Delorita Laursen, did not perfect her appeal by filing a notice of appeal and is not before this Court. See, e.g., Town of Carthage, Tennessee, et al. v. Smith County, Tennessee, No. 01-A-01-9308-CH-00391 (Tenn. App., March 8, 1995). The appeal by the defendant/appellant, Earl Laursen, has been perfected and is properly before this Court. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in not having a jury hear the fourth case and in assessing damages to the real property. We reverse and remand for reasons that will hereinafter be shown.

The husband of a woman who suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after being discharged from a hospital emergency room filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating doctor and the medical group for which he worked. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant doctor because the plaintiff failed to obtain service on him. A summary judgment was subsequently granted to the defendant medical group on the ground of the plaintiff’s failure to produce a qualified affidavit on the proper standard of care and on causation, as is required by the Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We affirm the trial court.

he plaintiff/ex-husband has appealed from the dismissal of his post-divorce decree
petition seeking relief from child support and change of custody.

The captioned petitioner has appealed from the dismissal of his suit to enroll and modify a foreign divorce decree.

This appeal involves a marriage that failed in less than three years. The husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County seeking a divorce and the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The wife also requested a divorce and challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (1991) and upheld the prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the parties their personal property and directed the husband to assume certain credit card indebtedness and to provide the wife medical insurance for up to thirty-six months. Both parties take issue with various portions of the final divorce decree on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to consider the husband’s income earned during the marriage as marital property. Accordingly, we modify the division of marital property and the award of spousal support.

The appellant, Barry Hughes, challenges, by extraordinary appeal, the trial court's judgment affirming the district attorney general's denial of his application for pretrial diversion. The appellant sought to divert two counts of official oppression, one count of official misconduct, and one count of fabricating evidence. The charges stem from allegations that, while performing his duties as a police officer, he planted cocaine in a civilian's car. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.