APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action was brought against Michael McCommon and Memphis Light, Gas, and 2 Water (MLG&W) for personal injuries sustained when McCommon, an employee of MLG&W, struck plaintiff with his vehicle. McCommon was dismissed from the suit prior to trial. Following a bench trial, the lower court held that plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of the defendant and that plaintiff proximately caused her own injuries. Because we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination, we affirm the judgment dismissing plaintiff's case.

After a thirty year marriage,1 Waymon Frederic Axley (Husband) and Beverly Anne Mallette Axley (Wife) were divorced by final decree entered by the trial court in August 1994.2 This appeal concerns the trial court’s award to Wife of $1,500 per month as alimony in futuro and, as additional alimony, $177.62 per month for 36 consecutive months to continue Wife on Husband’s health insurance through his employer. Wife seeks an increase in the award as well as her attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. She frames the issues as follows: I. Did the trial judge err by awarding Wife only $1,500 per month in periodic alimony? II. Should this Court remand this matter to the trial court with the instruction to set a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for this appeal?

The defendant, Danny R. Morris, was convicted at a jury trial of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to a term of confinement of twelve years in the Department of Correction.

After a thirty year marriage,1 Waymon Frederic Axley (Husband) and Beverly Anne Mallette Axley (Wife) were divorced by final decree entered by the trial court in August 1994.2 This appeal concerns the trial court’s award to Wife of $1,500 per month as alimony in futuro and, as additional alimony, $177.62 per month for 36 consecutive months to continue Wife on Husband’s health insurance through his employer. Wife seeks an increase in the award as well as her attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. She frames the issues as follows:

I respectfully dissent.

The crime committed by the appellant, Danny R. Morris, was despicable. I am sure that the jury, like myself, was enraged as the evidence unfolded. This atrocious crime was committed in the jury’s home county by two inmates who escaped from a prison in an adjoining county. Morris and Barrett were much younger than the victim. They feigned illness and acted as if one of them needed assistance. When the elderly victim stopped to lend assistance, Morris and Barrett took advantage of the victim’s act of kindness. Nevertheless, we as citizens must not lose sight of the fact that ours is a Nation of laws. These laws govern the conduct of every citizen. As this Court said in Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied (Tenn. 1973): “[O]dious individuals are not governed by one law and the remaining citizens by another; all are protected by the same general law.”

This is a domestic relations case with an unusual twist. On May 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Chester County seeking a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the same time, plaintiff filed a marital dissolution agreement (“agreement”) executed by the parties on May 2, 1994. The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, then ages 13 and 15, with the children residing with plaintiff. No child support was to be paid by either party. In addition, the agreement did not make any allowances for alimony and purported to divide the real and personal property between the parties. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time the parties executed the agreement, but defendant was not. Shortly thereafter, defendant employed counsel and on June 3, 1994, filed a motion to set aside the agreement. In her motion defendant contended that she was forced to sign the agreement under duress and fear of bodily harm. She also contended that the agreement did not adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the parties’ minor children or make an equitable settlement of the 2 parties’ property as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) (1991). Defendant’s motion asked the court to set the agreement aside and allow the parties to proceed with the divorce as if the agreement had never been executed.

This matter arose out of a personal injury action brought against Fayette County 2 Board of Education by plaintiff, Joyce Ann Neal, as parent and next of kin of Brandon Neal, a minor. Brandon, age eleven, was injured while playing basketball when his finger became caught in the goal. Reasoning that the goal was neither dangerous nor defective and that Brandon caused his own injuries through his misuse of the goal, the trial court held in favor of the school board. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination that the goal was not dangerous or defective. Plaintiff further alleges that the trial court erred in failing to find that the school board was negligent. For the reasons stated below, we find these contentions to be without merit; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The captioned defendant has appealed from a partial judgment which resolved some, but not all, of the issues in this divorce case. The judgment is not a final judgment appealable as of right, and is subject to revision by the Trial Court at any time before all issues are determined. T.R.A.P. Rule 3(a).

The captioned executrix has appealed from a non-jury judgment of the Chancery Court that a will dated April 6, 1989 is the true, whole and last will and testament of Jennie Mai Jackson, deceased.

This appeal involves a prison inmate’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole him, the inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking review of the board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the inmate appealed to this court. We have determined that the board has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.