APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The majority concludes that venue was proper in Dickson County. I respectfully disagree. In finding venue in Dickson County, the majority, relying upon Girdley v. State, 29 S.W.2d 255 (Tenn. 1930), employs an agency theory to establish the appellant's constructive presence in Dickson County. I am unable to agree with the majority's rational for two reasons. First, in Girdley, the defendant was charged with the offense of uttering or attempting to pass a forged check. Had the appellant in this case been charged with uttering or passing a forged writing, I would agree that venue would have been proper in Dickson County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-114(b)(1)(D). However, as reflected by the indictment, the State chose to indict the appellant in Dickson County for forgery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-114(b)(1)(A).

Plaintiff Herbert Carson Branum appeals dismissal of his suit against the City of Maynardville and its Commissioners, seeing reinstatement to his position as Water Commissioner and damages for his wrongful discharge, both compensatory and exemplary. He also seeks an order enjoining the Defendants "from any further ultra vires acts against the Plaintiff" based upon his contention that they had violated certain of our State Statutes.

The appellant, Andrew R. Ewing, and his co-defendant, Derrick C. Brooks, were tried jointly by a jury for first degree murder. Ewing and Brooks were found guilty of felony murder for committing a murder during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary. Both men were sentenced to life in prison. Because Derrick C. Brooks’ appeal has been severed from Andrew R. Ewing’s appeal, we will address only the issues presented by Andrew Ewing in this opinion.

This case involves a chancery court review of a decision by a civil service commission. The
commission had ordered the reinstatement of a police officer. The chancery court reversed the
commission’s decision, upholding the termination of the officer’s employment. We affirm the
decision of the chancery court.

The plaintiff, Paul Farnsworth a/k/a Ronnie Bradfield, sued defendants Richard Kenya,1 Stephen Dotson and two John Doe defendants. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff is an inmate at the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility (LCRCF), Richard Kenyon is identified as an employee and Stephen Dotson as the associate warden at LCRCF. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was given permission to marry while incarcerated, wedding plans were formulated but, within less than 24 hours prior to the wedding, he was advised that the wedding was cancelled.

The appellant, Woody J. Dozier, appeals his jury convictions for the crimes of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Following these convictions, the Circuit Court of Dyer County sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences of eight years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated rape conviction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues:

I. Whether the Chancellor, sitting by interchange, had jurisdiction to try the case;
II. Whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial because ofalleged juror misconduct; and
III. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions foraggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping.

After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Eugene Baker, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and two counts of sexual battery. The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I sentences of nine years and one year, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the length of the sentence and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing.

The parental rights of Yvonne Bardin were terminated by the Juvenile Court of Hamilton County and she appeals. Four (4) children are involved. The issue presented for review is whether the evidence is clear and convincing. We find that it is and affirm.

This is a medical malpractice action brought by Deryl and Polly Glasner individually and as parents and next friend of Cody Glasner, who was born October 6, 1991.1 As winnowed by pleadings, the surviving claim is on behalf of Cody, who was born brain dead. The parents of Cody conceded that their individual claims were time-barred.  This condition is known as a prolapsed cord. His resuscitation is alleged to have been contrary to the prevailing standard of care in this jurisdiction, since he had no reasonable prospect for a qualitative life.

We accepted the State’s application for review in this cause in order to determine the validity of an indictment which charged aggravated rape.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals held the indictment void and the subsequent conviction invalid because the language of the indictment failed to allege a culpable mental state.

 Larry Wayne Stokes, the appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Williamson County of rape of a child, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522 (Supp. 1995). He currently serves a fifteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries allegedly occurring on April 9, 1993 in the early evening, when the vehicle operated by the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant. Upon trial, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff establishing damages at $8,445.00 and further determined that defendant was 51% at fault for the accident. The Trial Judge approved the verdict and plaintiffs have appealed.

This appeal is from a summary judgment granted to plaintiff against defendants by the Trial Judge. Essentially, defendants insist that the record contains evidence of misrepresentations of the value of the property by plaintiff’s agents, which was 1Triggs’ and Childers’ earlier affidavits apparently claim that Stooksbury showed them both Smith appraisals. Their later affidavits, however, refer only to the second Smith appraisal. 2 purchased by defendants, and that these representations are actionable under their counter-claims.

We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion1 in admitting testimony concerning the results of a certain method of DNA analysis. While we have previously considered the admission of the results of DNA analysis using the “restriction fragment length polymorphism” (RFLP) method, we address for the first time the admission of testimony regarding DNA analysis using the “polymerase chain reaction” (PCR) method. PCR is to be distinguished from RFLP, the method more statistically precise and firmly established in both the scientific and legal community. After a jury-out hearing, the trial court admitted expert testimony about the results of the PCR analysis performed on the defendant’s clothing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s determination.