APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This interlocutory appeal involves the right of a party to discover the appraisal report of a testifying expert in a condemnation case. The Circuit Court for Sumner County denied the property owners’ request for the appraisal report in order to prepare to depose the appraiser on the grounds that the report is “privileged, as work porduct [sic]” but granted the property owners permission to apply for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation in this case. Because the application and the response thereto fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits in order to save the parties additional time and expense.1 We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case with instructions to enter an order compelling the production of the testifying appraiser’s reports.
 

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Antonio Sweatt, from an order of the Davidson County Chancery Court dismissing Appellant’s petition against respondents/appellees Robert Conley, William Calhoun, Dale Basham, Shelia Roberts, Hattie Moore, Edna Freeman, and Dr. Harold Butler. The chancery court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice after determining Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

The plaintiffs, Ginger C. Snead and James D. Snead, sued the defendant, Lois A. Metts as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on July 22, 1994. It is undisputed that the car driven by Ms. Metts struck the car driven by Ms. Snead in the rear while the Snead vehicle was stopped at a stop sign. Ms. Snead sued for injuries and damages and Mr. Snead sued for loss of consortium.
 

This case involves a petition for the modification of alimony payments. The ex-husband
appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to reduce his alimony obligations to his ex-wife. We
affirm.

Defendant, Austin Kipling Stratton, seeks review of his consecutive sentences totaling twenty (20) years for various drug offenses. The sentences resulted from a plea of guilty. We find that the notice of appeal was untimely filed, and no relief is merited under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This suit involves an action for the redemption of preferred stock. The trial court found that the stock could be redeemed even though the redemption would render the corporation unable to pay its debts in the normal course of business. We reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Willie Demorris Locust, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post conviction relief. Locust is incarcerated in the Department of Correction for his convictions of aggravated sexual battery and aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective ten year sentence that he is serving consecutively to a twenty year sentence for aggravated rape and aggravated burglary and an assault sentence of undisclosed length. See State v. Locust, 914 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (aggravated sexual battery and aggravated burglary), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1995); State v. Willie Demorris Locust, No. 02-C-01-9404-CC-00075 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Oct. 5, 1994) (aggravated rape and aggravated burglary), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). In this appeal, he claims the lower court erred in denying him relief on three issues:

1. Whether the indictment is defective and his conviction of aggravated sexual battery is therefore void.
2. Whether the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.
3. Whether he was afforded the effective assistance of counsel at his trial and on direct appeal.
 

Following a review of the record, we affirm the lower court's dismissal of Locust's petition.
 

Defendant William Mark Yates (Husband) appeals the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Plaintiff/Appellee Janice Blalock Yates (Wife), ordered the Husband to pay child support and alimony in solido to the Wife, and distributed the parties’ real and personal property. We affirm.

Plaintiff-Appellant, John H. Fournier (“Fournier), appeals the order of the trial court entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees, M. V. Tichenor (“Tichenor”) and Bowling, Bowling & Associates (“Law Firm”), on Fournier’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

This case involves a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, filed by a state prisoner against employees of the Tennessee Department of Corrections. One defendant is a physician employed by Department. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims against all defendants. We affirm.

This case presents for review the decision of the Chancery Court of  Decatur County finding that the Defendant, Robert Barton (“Father”) did not  abandon his son, Chad Andolino (“Son”) and, therefore, dismissing  Plaintiffs’, Charles and Lorena Mix (“Mixes”), petition for adoption. The Mixes appealed. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns an action by the appellant, John Brown (Brown), to recover workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, the appellee, County of Shelby (County), who has not elected to come within the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Brown alleges that he sustained on-the-job injuries while employed by the County as a counselor at the Shelby County Jail. The record reflects that the County has implemented its own policy whereby it compensates its employees for on-the-job injuries and relies to some extent on the Workers’ Compensation Act as a guide in determining benefits. At trial, it was established that under said policy, the County had paid Brown’s temporary disability benefits and that Brown sought only permanent disability benefits and the medical expenses incurred from Dr. John P. Howser. The trial court awarded a permanent partial disability of 7% to the body as a whole and entered a judgment for Brown in the amount of $5,863.68. No award was made for Dr. Howser’s expenses. Brown appeals, identifying the issues for review as follows:

Plaintiff/Appellant, Annette Dubose (“Dubose”), appeals the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for a new trial and specifically finding that the jury verdict and the judgment previously entered in this case were proper and correct. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee (state) appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court suppressing evidence seized by law enforcement officers from the person of Norman Curtis without a search warrant, and the residences of the Chamberses and Curtis under color of a search warrant. Two issues are presented for review. The state contends there were exigent circumstances which permitted officers executing the search warrant at the Chamberses’ residence to enter the dwelling without complying with the “knock and announce” requirement. The state further contends the search of Norman Curtis’s person when he arrived at the Chamberses’ residence while the officers were executing the search warrant was reasonable. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The State of Tennessee has failed to illustrate why the evidence contained in the record preponderates against the findings made by the trial court.

The appellant, Ryan Moran (defendant), was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant entered a no contest plea to attempted first degree murder and guilty pleas to the remaining charges. The trial court found the defendant was a standard offender and sentenced the defendant to the following Range I sentences: for attempted first degree murder, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, for especially aggravated robbery, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, and for assault, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days. The trial court ordered that the sentences for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery should be served consecutively. The sentence for assault is to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The effective sentence is confinement for seventy-five (75) years in the Department of Correction.

I concur, in principle, with Justice Reid’s dissent. I would, however, increase the pool of similar cases to include all cases in which a trial judge’s report is required by Supreme Court
Rule 12.1 The majority chose to exclude from the proportionality review pool all cases in which the State did not seek the death penalty and all cases in which no capital sentencing hearing was
held. In my view, this exclusion discourages a more meaningful proportionality analysis.

In this capital case, the defendant, Andre S. Bland, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder.1 In the sentencing hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance: “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(I)(5) (1991 Repl. & 1996 Supp.). Finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution.

The defendant, Dmitri Johnson, appeals as of right from the twenty-year sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for his conviction upon a guilty plea for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly relied upon facts not in evidence in its sentencing decision. He also contends that the trial court improperly applied three enhancement factors and refused to apply two additional mitigating factors. We believe that the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.