APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Seth Powell, of possession
with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture 15 grams or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of
a park; possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture fentanyl within 1,000 feet of
a park; possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture .5 grams or more of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a park; three counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go
armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; three counts of possession of a firearm
with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been
previously convicted of a dangerous felony; and evading arrest. The trial court merged
various convictions and imposed an effective 16-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred
in failing to exclude inadmissible hearsay evidence, that his separate convictions for
possession of heroin and fentanyl should be merged because they were contained in the
same mixture, and that his firearm convictions should be merged into one conviction.
Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand to the trial court for
entry of judgments in Counts 8, 10, 14, and 16 through 21, showing that the charges for
those counts were dismissed by the State.

Employee sought worker's compensation benefits based on hearing loss allegedly caused by continuous noise exposure during her employment with Employer. Employer denied the claim, asserting Employee failed to give timely notice of injury. After a compensation hearing, the trial court rejected Employer's notice defense and awarded benefits to Employee. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board reversed the trial court's finding that Ernployee gave timely notice; vacated the order awarding benefits; and remanded the case for a deterrnination of whether Employee had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice or whether Ernployer was prejudiced by the failure. On remand, the trial court again awarded benefits, concluding Employee did not offer a reasonable excuse but Employer failed to establish prejudice. In a second appeal, the Appeals Board construed the notice statute and concluded the clairn should have been denied and disrnissed. In this appeal, Employee argues the Appeals Board erred in its conclusion that Employee failed to satisfy the statutory notice requirement. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Suprerne Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Defendant, Robert L. Cody, III, was convicted of conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone (count one); possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count three); and the jury found that Defendant committed a criminal gang offense (count ten) enhancing count one to a Class A felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-three year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss counts two and three for failure to charge an offense, and count ten of the presentment for failure to give proper notice of the gang enhancement; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after the State read the presentment to the jury; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding Investigator Jinks from the Rule of Sequestration; (4) that the trial court erred by admitting text messages that were not properly authenticated; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction in count one; (6) that the criminal gang enhancement violated double jeopardy and the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant under the prior version of the Drug-Free Zone Act; and (8) that this court should resentence Defendant under the 2022 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce, the trial court evenly divided the marital estate and denied the wife’s request for alimony. It also ordered wife to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of a third party. On appeal, the wife challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. After a thorough review, we find that the court erred in not dividing the profit from a business the husband created during the pendency of the divorce as marital property. And the court erred in ordering the wife to pay attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in all other respects.

This case originated in general sessions court with the filing of a pro se civil warrant. The
defendant also filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s civil warrant was
quickly dismissed in the general sessions court. The defendant/cross-plaintiff eventually
obtained a judgment against the plaintiff/cross-defendant. The plaintiff/cross-defendant
promptly filed a notice of appeal. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal of the
dismissal of his civil warrant due to his notice of appeal being untimely. The trial court
also dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal of the judgment on the cross-complaint for failure to
prosecute. We reverse both rulings and reinstate the plaintiff’s appeal.

Defendant, Willie Locust, was convicted after a bench trial in Count 1 of possession of
more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; in Count
2 of possession of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or
deliver, a Class B felony; in Count 3 of simple possession of Xanax, a Class A
misdemeanor; in Count 8 of unlawful possession of brass knuckles, a Class A
misdemeanor; in Count 9 of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
felony, a Class D felony; and in Count 10 of possession of a firearm by a convicted violent
felon, a Class B felony. For these convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective
twenty-eight years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court
erred by denying his pretrial motions to suppress the evidence obtained from a search of
his hotel room; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial
court erred by ordering partial consecutive service of his sentences. After a thorough
review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial
court erroneously merged Counts 9 and 10, we order the trial court to reinstate the judgment
in Count 9 and to impose a sentence on that count. We also remand for correction of a
clerical error in the judgment in Count 3 to show the conviction offense as Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-17-418 rather than section 39-17-417.

The petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error
coram nobis, which petition challenged his 2013 Madison County Circuit Court jury
convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that he is entitled
to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their three children.
The trial court found, relying on the doctrine of res judicata, that the ground of severe child
abuse supported termination and concluded that termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Mother and Father challenge the trial
court’s determination that the best interest factors support termination. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

A Franklin County jury1 convicted Robert J. Whittenburg, Defendant, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the State did not present sufficient evidence of premeditation; (2) the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction on premeditation; (3) the trial court improperly addressed concerns about irregularities during jury deliberations; and (4) the trial court impaired the jury when it briefly prohibited smoke breaks and then changed its mind. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for resolution of procedural issues related to the change of venue and entry of revised judgments.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 17, 2023. The notice of appeal was
not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until June 5, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice
of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Ray L. Morehead, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition. 

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a putative father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother and putative father appeal. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services concedes some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that five grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the
mother and that three grounds along with the putative father grounds were sufficiently proven against the father. We conclude that these remaining grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, and we conclude that termination was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part, with respect to one ground for termination of mother’s parental rights and three grounds for termination of the putative father’s parental rights, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights.

The Defendant, Ambreia Washington, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; resisting
arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving with a canceled, suspended or revoked license
(second offense), a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective fifteen-year
sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2018) (subsequently amended) (unlawful
possession of weapon), 39-16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (canceled,
suspended or revoked license). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress, failing to dismiss the indictment due to missing
evidence, admitting certain photographs into evidence at trial, and denying a motion for a
mistrial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. The Defendant also contends that the
cumulative nature of the errors warrant relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrance Lawrence, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, domestic assault, driving while his license was suspended, and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, for which he is serving an effective sixty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Giorgio Jennings, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of six counts of
aggravated rape, five counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault,
three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault, three counts of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
felony. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to an effective sentence of one hundred and
thirty-two years in confinement. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s imposition of partial
consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, William James Andrews, guilty of two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, two counts of vehicular homicide by recklessness, two counts of reckless aggravated assault resulting in death, and two counts of vehicular homicide with a prior DUI conviction. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon twenty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of drugs in his blood, contending that he did not give consent for a blood draw. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an action against the former attorney-in-fact of the decedent for breach of fiduciary
duties and conversion. The trial court granted summary judgment against the attorney-infact
and awarded damages to the estate. The attorney-in-fact appeals, contending the trial
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matters at issue because the power
of attorney was based on Texas law and the actions alleged in the petition were performed
in Texas, where he was a resident; however, he does not challenge the court’s personal
jurisdiction over him. He also contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because
material facts were in dispute. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Jerome Nchiyako Dooley, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s partial
revocation of his probation. He argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court revoked
Defendant’s probation on grounds not alleged in the warrant, in violation of due process;
(2) the State failed to prove that Defendant violated the terms of his probation; and (3) the
trial court violated Defendant’s due process rights by failing to act as a neutral and detached
magistrate. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Alan Stephenson, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for
(1) possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; (2) possession
of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (3) possession of a firearm after
having been convicted of a violent felony; and (4) possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. He pled guilty to counts one and three of the indictment and agreed to concurrent
ten-year sentences with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Counts two and
four were dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The trial court sentenced Defendant to
serve the ten-year concurrent sentences in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation. Following our review of the
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court but remand for entry of judgment forms for the counts dismissed pursuant to the plea
agreement.

A limited liability company filed suit in relation to a piece of real property for which the company had executed an agreement to purchase. Although closing did not occur by the time stated in the executed agreement, the trial court ultimately held that the opposing side in this case was estopped from denying that the contract had been extended. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Cantrell Devon Hodges, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, two counts of possession of
marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia
after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence recovered from his home. As
part of his plea agreement, he reserved a certified question of law for appeal, challenging
the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the certified question is not dispositive of the
case as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), we dismiss the
appeal.

In denying appellees’ motion to remove an estate’s personal representative, the trial court
adopted appellees’ proposed findings of fact verbatim and proposed conclusions of law “to
the degree they [were] not in conflict with [the] court’s order.” The proposed findings and
conclusions were signed by the trial court judge and attached to the order. Because we
cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s order represents its independent judgment, we
vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is
the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

In this will contest initiated by four of the testator's grandchildren, the trial court determined that the execution of the testator's will met the statutory requirements for admitting the will to probate and, accordingly, dismissed the will contest. The grandchildren-contestants appealed. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dariun Bailey, of second-degree murder,
aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to twentytwo
years of incarceration. State v. Bailey, No. W2015-00542-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL
3645141, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).
This Court affirmed his convictions on appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for
post-conviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant to this appeal, that his trial counsel:
failed to adequately review and inspect discovery, coerced the Petitioner into testifying,
and failed to adequately meet with the Petitioner to review the evidence and prepare him
for trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this child custody case, the record transmitted on appeal creates significant doubt as to whether the trial court’s final order represents its own deliberations and decision. Due to this concern, and because the judge who previously presided over this case has since retired from the bench, we vacate the appealed judgment and remand for a new trial.