APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and fraud against his former attorneys and the attorneys’ law firm. The defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and that the action was untimely. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and, having determined that the plaintiff’s action is untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(c)(1), we affirm.

Plaintiff’s attorneys appeal the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against them in the amount of $68,617.28 and the denial of their second motion to disqualify the trial court judge. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to impose sanctions, but we vacate the amount of sanctions awarded and remand for the trial court to calculate the reasonable amount of monetary sanctions in keeping with the procedures and considerations outlined in this opinion. We have determined that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ issue regarding the trial court’s denial of their second motion to recuse is moot. Finally, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

In this action initiated by the mother to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan for their minor child, the trial court limited the father’s co-parenting time to include no overnight visitation with the child after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had committed domestic abuse against two women whom he had previously dated. The trial court relied on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406 to restrict the father’s parenting time based on its determination that the father’s acts of domestic violence and hostility toward women had a negative effect on his ability to effectively parent the minor child. The father appealed, but this Court dismissed that appeal because the trial court’s order was not a final judgment. See McDonald v. Coffel, No. E2021-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4958475 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2021). On remand, the trial court addressed all pending matters and entered a final judgment, keeping in place the residential co-parenting schedule limiting the father’s parenting time to exclude overnight visitation. The father has again appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him overnight co-parenting time and by relying on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first
degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for
which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. He now
appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to: (1) subpoena records that might have shown the victim’s
intoxication; and (2) adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he
argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While a prior lawsuit was still pending on appeal, the Plaintiff filed a nearly identical lawsuit. The trial court dismissed this second suit based on res judicata. Although the second suit was not barred by res judicata because the first suit was not final for res judicata purposes, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine.

Five easement holders filed suit against two other easement holders and the servient estate owners seeking a declaratory judgment regarding whether the easements could be used for commercial logging activities. The trial court concluded that commercial logging activities were not a permissible use of the easements and entered an order restraining and enjoining use of the easements for such activities. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Kelvin Montgomery, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirtyseven
years’ confinement. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing
to provide the jury instruction required under State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 580-81
(Tenn. 2012), in connection with his aggravated rape charge; and (3) the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing the maximum within-range sentences and ordering that they be
served consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises from a pending petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. Two weeks after the maternal grandparents commenced their action to terminate the parental rights of the mother of their grandchild (the father being deceased), the paternal grandparents (“the Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of filing a competing petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; they also sought to set aside an order granting permanent guardianship over the child to the maternal grandparents previously issued by the juvenile court in a separate proceeding. The Intervenors also filed a motion for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for grandparent visitation. The maternal grandparents opposed all relief sought by the Intervenors. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order of permanent guardianship for lack of jurisdiction, and it denied the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption on the ground that the Intervenors lacked standing because they did not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(44). However, the court granted their motion to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. The Intervenors appeal the denial of the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption, and the maternal grandparents appeal the order granting the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. We have determined that the Intervenors have standing to file a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on that issue. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 19, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 7, 2023, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal, we address whether
the trial court erred in denying Appellant Town’s motion for summary judgment on
Appellees’ negligence and joint-venture claims. We conclude that the public-duty doctrine
shields the Town from liability, and the special-duty exception does not apply.
Furthermore, Appellees’ “joint venture” claims are simply additional negligence claims
seeking to hold Appellant Town liable for the alleged negligence of other defendants.
Because the Tennessee Legislature has not waived governmental immunity under such
circumstances, Appellant Town’s immunity was never removed as to the “joint venture”
claims. As such, the trial court erred in denying Appellant Town’s motion for summary
judgment as to Appellees’ negligence and “joint venture” claims.

A man sued his arresting officers and others.  He claimed he was neither drunk nor violent when he was arrested and charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer.  During discovery, the man claimed to have no communications between him and a companion that were not protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product.  When such communications were uncovered, the defendants moved for sanctions and attorney’s fees.  The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants and the companion.  And it dismissed the case as a sanction.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A Tipton County jury convicted Jeremiah Leavy, Defendant, of first degree murder, felony murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed Defendant’s convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied Defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Defendant then sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s dismissal. Defendant then moved to correct a clerical mistake that he was not on probation at the time of the offense. The trial court entered an order to correct the record accordingly. At issue here, Defendant subsequently moved under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct what he alleged was an illegal sentence, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case involving the defendants’ purported failure to pay amounts
owed under a Future Receivables Sale and Purchase Agreement. Due to Appellant’s failure
to file a timely notice of appeal, we do not reach the substantive issues and dismiss the
appeal

Defendant, Lanoris Cordell Carter, appeals his Lake County Circuit Court conviction for
tampering with evidence. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. Defendant asserts that throwing items out of a car window during an
attempted traffic stop such that law enforcement could not recover the items is “mere
abandonment” rather than concealment or destruction for purposes of the evidence
tampering statute. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Rusty Amos Long, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his conviction for burglary other than a habitation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his five-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a new sentencing hearing and by failing to consider whether revocation was in the interests of justice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father and stepmother appeal from an order dismissing their petition to adopt a child and to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her failure to support and failure to visit the child. However, the trial court found that the alleged ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child had not been proven. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a subcontractor’s claims for non-payment. The trial court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment against defendant Clark, the home owner, as not ripe because the plaintiff subcontractor had not exhausted its remedies against the party with whom it had contracted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff corporation filed this action against the defendant independent contractors, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants violated their contracts and covenants not to compete. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude an email sent to defense counsel that contains privileged information. The email was inadvertently attached as an exhibit on two separate briefs filed with the court by defense counsel and then repeatedly referenced by defendants in later briefs in response to a motion to disqualify counsel and for sanctions. The trial court held that the repeated disclosure of the email operated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We affirm the trial court.

The plaintiff in this action, alleging mutual mistake, sought rescission and nullification of a promissory note and deed of trust related to the plaintiff’s 2005 purchase of multiple parcels of unimproved real property. Upon the defendant bank’s counterclaim and motion for summary judgment, and following a hearing in which the plaintiff participated pro se after the court denied her motion for continuance, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and awarded a judgment to the bank in the amount of $306,392.14, inclusive of the principal owed on the promissory note, accrued interest at the time of the hearing, reasonable attorney’s fees, and expenses. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Percy D. Thompson, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for the attempted first degree murder (count one) and aggravated assault (count two) of his wife.  Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder in count one, and aggravated assault as charged in count two.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years for count one and ten years for count two and merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction.  Defendant appeals his convictions arguing the trial court failed to find him guilty of aggravated assault at the conclusion of the proof and therefore erred in sentencing him for count two and that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his convictions.  Following our review of the record, including the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from confirmation of an arbitration award. The appellants objected to confirmation, arguing that they lacked notice of the arbitration. One of the appellants also claimed that it never agreed to arbitrate. The winning party submitted that the objections were untimely and did not state a cognizable ground for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. We vacate and remand.

Following a Henderson County jury trial, Defendant, Trinces Eugene Hart, was convicted of three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand the case to the trial court for merger of the three counts into a single judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Seth Powell, of possession
with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture 15 grams or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of
a park; possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture fentanyl within 1,000 feet of
a park; possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture .5 grams or more of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a park; three counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go
armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; three counts of possession of a firearm
with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been
previously convicted of a dangerous felony; and evading arrest. The trial court merged
various convictions and imposed an effective 16-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred
in failing to exclude inadmissible hearsay evidence, that his separate convictions for
possession of heroin and fentanyl should be merged because they were contained in the
same mixture, and that his firearm convictions should be merged into one conviction.
Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand to the trial court for
entry of judgments in Counts 8, 10, 14, and 16 through 21, showing that the charges for
those counts were dismissed by the State.