APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider whether the District Attorney General’s
Office should have been disqualified from prosecuting this case because the District
Attorney General previously served as counsel for the accused in a separate case. Second,
we consider the propriety of conducting a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory
that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. David Wayne Eady was
charged in one indictment with committing multiple robberies in Nashville over the course
of a month. Mr. Eady moved to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, primarily
because the District Attorney General had represented him in a criminal matter
approximately thirty years earlier. The prior matter resulted in a conviction that the State
sought to use in this case to qualify Mr. Eady as a repeat violent offender for sentencing
purposes. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify, noting the limited nature of the
District Attorney General’s involvement in this case and the “mandatory nature of the
repeat violent offender statute.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(g) (2019). Mr. Eady
also moved to sever the offenses, which the trial court denied upon finding that the crimes
were parts of a common scheme or plan and that the evidence of one offense would be
admissible in the trial of the others. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). Mr. Eady ultimately
was convicted as charged of eleven counts of aggravated robbery, two of which later were
merged, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. Upon Mr. Eady’s appeal as of
right, a divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Eady, No.
M2021-00388-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 7835823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2022),
perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2023). The intermediate appellate court was unanimous
in rejecting the challenge to prosecution of the case by the District Attorney General’s
Office. Id. at *34–35. After noting that there was “no real dispute between the parties that
[the District Attorney General] had an actual conflict of interest disqualifying him from
participating in [Mr. Eady’s] prosecution,” the court seemed to proceed on the assumption
that an actual conflict of interest existed but nevertheless held that this conflict did not
require disqualification of the entire office. Id. at *34. In addition, a majority of the court
upheld the denial of a severance. Id. at *28–30. One judge dissented, however, concluding
that the offenses should have been severed because the evidence did not reflect that the
offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Id. at *38–42 (McMullen, J., dissenting
in part). We granted Mr. Eady’s appeal to address both issues. As for the motion to
disqualify, we agree with the State’s argument before this Court that the circumstances do
not establish an actual conflict of interest for the District Attorney General, and we
conclude that the trial court correctly denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney
General’s Office. As for the motion to sever, we have determined that the record does not
establish that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Thus, we conclude that
the trial court erred in denying a severance. However, we find the error harmless as to all
convictions except the one in count eight. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals in part, reverse it in part, and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Ahmed G. Mohd Alkhatib, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to vacate his 2006 guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of facilitation of the delivery of marijuana, for which he received an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence.  The post-conviction court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition after determining it was untimely.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employer terminated an employee after she requested unpaid commissions pursuant to
her contract. The employee sued her former employer claiming breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, retaliatory discharge, and intentional misrepresentation. She also sought
punitive damages. The jury found in the employee’s favor on all claims and awarded
damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory discharge as well as
awarding punitive damages. The former employer sought post-trial relief, arguing the
jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and that the jury’s punitive damages award was in error
and excessive. The trial court concluded the verdicts were consistent but did reduce, while
not eliminating, the punitive damages award. The former employer appeals, challenging
the compensatory and punitive damage awards. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Omari Davis, pled guilty to possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to serve a term of eighteen years. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to seek a competency evaluation. At the hearing, the Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The post-conviction court denied relief as to the competency evaluation but did not address the continuance issue. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Father appeals the denial of his petition in opposition to a proposed relocation by Mother
and his petition to change custody of the children. After considering the testimony of over
ten witnesses, the trial court ruled that the children’s best interests were served by allowing
Mother to relocate and by her remaining the children’s primary residential parent. The trial
court also awarded Mother considerable attorney’s fees, including fees incurred in
defending against a dependency and neglect action that had eventually been dismissed,
with the related visitation and custody issues transferred to the trial court. Discerning no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions, we affirm. We deny, however, Mother’s
request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Defendant, Jennifer May Mahaffey, pled guilty to alternate counts of sale of
methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams” and delivery of methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams”1
in three cases, 20-027-2, 20-028-2, and 20-029-2. The trial court sentenced Defendant to
ten years imprisonment on each count, merged the alternate counts in each case, and ran
the ten-year sentences in two of the cases concurrently with each other, and the ten-year
sentence in the third case consecutively to the first two, for a total effective sentence of
twenty years confinement. The trial court also imposed fines totaling $6,100, and ordered
restitution in the amount of $563. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in
ordering restitution to the Henderson County Sheriff’s Department, in imposing fines and
restitution without determining her present and future ability to pay, and in imposing partial
consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the
applicable law, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s imposition of partial
consecutive sentences, but we determine the order of restitution was in error. Therefore,
we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court, vacate the orders of restitution, and
remand for entry of corrected judgments.

Defendant, Shundarius Turner, was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, especially
aggravated robbery, aggravated criminal trespass, aggravated assault, and reckless
endangerment. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years, eleven months,
and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in excluding a
photographic lineup where he was not identified by one of the victims, the evidence was
insufficient to support his felony convictions, the trial court’s sentencing decision violated
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the trial court erred in excluding a witness from
testifying on his behalf, the trial court erred in denying his right to strike a juror for cause,
and the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of
the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

A Shelby County Jury convicted William Heath, Petitioner, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgments of the trial court, and the Tennessee Supreme Court declined discretionary review. Petitioner then petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. While Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was pending, he moved for DNA analysis and post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby Marable II, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury
of aggravated kidnapping involving bodily injury, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault
by strangulation, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective thirty-five year
sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304(a)(4) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping involving bodily
injury), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2015) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault
involving strangulation or attempted strangulation), -(e)(1)(A)(ii) (classifying aggravated
assault involving strangulation as a Class C felony). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the trial court
erred in its jury instructions on aggravated kidnapping, (3) the court erred in allowing the
State to impeach the Defendant with his prior convictions under Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 609, (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the court’s errors,
and (5) the court erred in classifying him as a Range III, persistent offender for his
aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the trial court’s
judgment for aggravated kidnapping, and we remand the case with instructions for the trial
court to correct the Defendant’s aggravated assault judgment to reflect a ten-year sentence
as a Range II, multiple offender.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Kinney Louis Spears, was indicted by the Houston County Grand Jury for the first degree murder of his wife, Mia Donnita Spears. The Houston County Circuit Court granted Defendant’s motion for a change of venue and transferred the case to the Dickson County Circuit Court. A Dickson County jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years’ confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that several improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument constitute plain error, and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2000, the Scott County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Hubert Glenn Sexton, Jr.,
for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, and the Defendant was convicted of
both counts and was sentenced to death for each offense. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d
371, 378 (Tenn. 2012). Thereafter, this court granted the Defendant post-conviction
relief from these convictions and remanded his case for a new trial. Sexton v. State, No.
E2018-01864-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 6320518, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25,
2019). On retrial, the Defendant was again convicted of two counts of first degree
premeditated murder and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without parole.
In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred (1) by denying his constitutional
right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee State Constitution, and (2) by allowing several
witnesses to testify about allegations that the Defendant had sexually abused his stepdaughter
prior to the killings in this case. After review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found
by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that
termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appealed. On appeal, the
Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” three of the grounds that the trial
court concluded were established. We reverse these three grounds. Of the three remaining
grounds, which DCS maintains were sufficiently proven, we conclude that the ground of
substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing
evidence. We further find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
children. However, due to insufficiencies in the trial court’s findings, we vacate the
grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility against the mother. We reverse in part, with respect to three grounds for termination, and vacate in part, with respect to two grounds for termination, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights.

In 2013, the Defendant, Jordan Isaiah Mosby, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree
murder, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence suspended to supervised probation.
In 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant
had absconded. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated his
probation by absconding to Florida. The trial court ordered him to serve his ten-year
sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking to modify
the revocation order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On
appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence
in confinement, by not granting him credit for time he successfully served on probation,
and by ruling that the Defendant’s custody in the Tennessee Department of Correction
prevented the court from modifying the sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a suit brought by a homeowner’s association to enforce a property
restriction contained in its declarations against a resident subject to the declarations. After
the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the homeowner’s association, the
trial court granted it relief and entered an injunction against the homeowner. The
homeowner appealed. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the homeowner’s
association’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Douglas Edward Christian, appeals from the Coffee County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his drug-related convictions and his
effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction
court erred when it denied his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. We affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
An attorney negotiated a settlement on behalf of a client in litigation over the
administration of an estate. The same attorney subsequently assisted his client in the prior
litigation in filing a related suit in which the party obtained default judgment. The Plaintiff
in the present case is seeking to set aside that default judgment and to obtain other relief,
asserting the Defendant acted unscrupulously in filing a suit on matters which had
previously been settled. The trial judge reported the attorney, who is no longer the attorney
representing the Defendant, to the Board of Professional Responsibility based on the filing
of the suit which resulted in the default judgment. The Defendant seeks recusal of the trial
judge, asserting that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The judge
denied the motion for recusal, finding that he could be fair and impartial, had not prejudged
any matters, and that a person of ordinary prudence would find no reasonable basis
for questioning his impartiality. We affirm.

The defendant, Steven Ray Crockett, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by imposing a 12-year sentence, by ordering the sentence to run consecutively to his prior felony conviction from Virginia, and by accrediting only a portion of his pretrial time served in incarceration. Because the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was superfluous and because it failed to properly accredit the defendant’s pretrial jail credits, we reverse and remand for entry of a corrected judgment on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This is the second appeal concerning the trial court’s distribution of the divorcing parties’ marital property.  Following a prior appeal, this matter was remanded to the trial court to, inter alia, value and equitably divide the assets and debts contained in the parties’ marital estate.  The trial court appointed a special master to complete these tasks.  At the beginning of the special master’s hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation agreement concerning the values of certain marital properties, including their associated debts.  Upon the conclusion of the special master’s hearing, the parties stipulated to the special master’s findings.  The trial court subsequently conducted an additional hearing and entered its own findings, which it relied upon to formulate an equitable division of the marital estate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c).  The husband has appealed the trial court’s division of the marital estate, arguing that the court’s mathematical and other errors rendered the division of the marital estate inequitable.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified herein.  We decline to award attorney’s fees to the wife on appeal.

Defendant, Danny R. Weld-Ebanks, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of judicial diversion.  He argues that the trial court relied on unnoticed grounds and abused its discretion in revoking his diversion.  The State concedes on both issues.  We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Defendant’s diversion and therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal

Appellants Matthew Swilley ("Swilley") and Samuel Barr ("Barr") entered into two agreements to purchase mobile home parks from William Thomas ("Thomas"). The buyers had not secured financing in order to close on the originally agreed upon closing date. The seller granted the buyers a number of extensions of the closing date; however, the buyers were ultimately unable to obtain financing in time to close by any of the dates demanded by the seller. As a result, the seller rescinded the agreements and shortly thereafter sold the properties to unrelated third parties for a higher price than provided for in the agreements with Swilley and Barr. Swilley, Barr, and their purported assignee, SB Capital LLC ("SB Capital" or, together with Swilley and Barr,"Plaintiffs"), brought suit against the seller for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment as to the proper disbursement of the earnest monies held in escrow. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, finding that Plaintiffs were the first to materially breach the agreements. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert James Houston, of aggravated assault and simple assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Denny Kentra Reynolds, of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possession of one-half ounce to 10 pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective 12-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the length of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

The Chancery Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court") found in this divorce action that Michael Bryant Sexton ("Husband") was the sole owner of Furious Properties, LLC and that he had purchased two Knox County real properties and deeded thern to Furious Properties, LLC. The Trial Court accordingly found that the entire interest in Furious Properties, LLC constituted marital property subject to equitable division and awarded
the two Knox County properties to Louise Ann Sexton ("Wife"). The Trial Court ordered Husband or a representative of Furious Properties, LLC to convey the entire interest in the Knox County properties by quitclaim deed to Wife within thirty days of the entry of the judgment. Husband's issues relate primarily to the property division. To the extent the Trial Court awarded property of a non-party LLC to Wife, we reverse and remand for the Trial Court to clarify its award, while acknowledging that the Trial Court may have intended to award Husband's interest in Furious Properties, LLC, rather than the LLC's properties themselves, to Wife. We further modify the Trial Court's judgment to reflect that the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and to remove language granting the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. We affirm the balance of the judgment. We deny Wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal.