APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect, which petition was dismissed by consent of the parties. The juvenile court then proceeded to determine custody pursuant to its authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f). When custody was placed with Father/Appellee, Mother/Appellant appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. The Circuit Court determined that the Tennessee Court of Appeals was the proper appellate court and entered an order transferring the appeal to us. Mother appeals that transfer. We affirm.

The matters at issue arise from a contract for the sale of a residence and the buyers’ refusal to close on the purchase of the residence. The seller, the trustee of a family trust, and the buyers entered into a contract for sale of a residence. Prior to closing, the buyers discovered that elaborate audio-visual equipment, that was material to them, had been removed by the husband of the Trustee. The buyers considered this a material breach and refused to close; as a result, the seller filed suit against the buyers for breach of contract. The buyers counter-claimed alleging the seller breached the contract first and that the seller, through its real estate agent, had made fraudulent misrepresentations to induce the buyers to sign the contract, specifically that the audio-visual equipment was part of the sale and that the previous resident, who died inside the home after being shot by his wife in the bedroom closet, had not died in the home. The buyers also filed a separate action against the seller’s real estate agent alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The buyers’ claims against the seller were summarily dismissed upon findings by the trial court that the contract was valid and that the buyers breached the contract by failing to close. The real estate agent was summarily dismissed upon a finding that the buyers could not establish actionable misrepresentations. The buyers then filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for breach of contract, contending the contract afforded the seller the option of electing liquidated damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, in the amount of the earnest money and that the seller had made that election by retaining the earnest money. The trial court summarily ruled that the seller had elected to receive liquidated damages as its exclusive remedy. The buyers appeal the summary dismissal of their claims against the seller and the seller’s real estate agent. The seller appeals the summary ruling that it elected to recover liquidated damages in lieu of compensatory damages. We have determined the real estate agent was not entitled to summary judgment as material facts are in dispute concerning whether the agent made material misrepresentations to induce the buyers to enter into the contract. We have determined the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability for the buyers’ alleged breach of the contract because material facts are in dispute concerning whether the buyers are entitled to rescission of the contract based on the agent’s alleged misrepresentations and whether the seller breached the contract prior to the buyers’ alleged breach by removing components from the integrated television system, which the buyers contend was a material part of the contract. Due to our ruling that the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, the seller is not entitled to damages for breach of contract, and it is premature to determine which party may be entitled to damages and in what amount. Accordingly, the award of liquidated damages in favor of the seller is reversed.

Twenty-six years after his retirement, the employee sought workers' compensation benefits from his employer for hearing loss. The trial court denied the claim. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the holding of the trial court as to causation, the judgment is affirmed.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the decedent, Floyd Evans, Sr., possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute a power of attorney naming his brother as attorney-in-fact, which was subsequently used to change his life insurance and investment account beneficiary from his daughter to his wife. Additionally, we are asked to determine whether a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and his wife such that his wife exerted undue influence upon him in having his beneficiaries changed just prior to his death. We affirm the trial court, finding that the decedent possessed the requisite mental capacity and that the presumption of undue influence was rebutted through independent advice.

This is a medical malpractice action filed against individual Defendants/Physicians and Defendant Hospital. Following Plaintiffs’ second Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 voluntary dismissal of individual Defendants, Defendant Hospital moved for summary judgment. The trial court awarded Hospital summary judgment upon concluding that the evidence demonstrated negligence on part of one Defendant/Physician only, and Plaintiffs had failed to assert a claim of vicarious liability against Hospital for the alleged negligence of its agent, Defendant/Physician prior to twice dismissing Physician. The trial court determined Plaintiffs’ cause of action had been extinguished where the statute of repose applicable to claim against Physician had expired, and that Plaintiffs had conferred on Physician an affirmative right not to be sued again. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and affirm the award of summary judgment to Defendant Hospital.

The defendant, Bruce Warren Scarborough, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of sixty years as a career offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the in-court and out-of-court identifications of him and his tattoos, (2) failing to grant a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, (3) classifying him as a career offender, and (4) ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a father’s petition to modify a parenting plan due to an alleged material change in circumstances. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be named primary residential parent. The trial court awarded the father his attorney’s fees. Mother appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Purchasers brought this action against sellers, realtor, and realty company of home that they purchased, alleging fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act. We affirm summary judgment for realtor and realty company, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to sellers.

The defendant, James Terry, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Defendant, Anita Kay Broughton, of one count of premeditated first degree murder. The trial court sentenced her to life in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence of premeditation; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it did not admit a DVD video of the crime scene; (3) the trial court erred when it did not admit prior inconsistent statements of witnesses; and (4) the prosecuting attorney improperly argued that the Defendant had previously raped one of the witnesses. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this action plaintiff sued for money owed under its subcontract with the defendant contractor. The defendants’ contractor denied liability, raised as affirmative defenses, waiver/estoppel, unclean hands and breach of contract, filed a counter-claim alleging that plaintiff failed to complete its work in a timely and proper manner and permitted the roof to be harmed by others during the construction and generally failed to cooperate. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge determined that both parties had breached the contract, that plaintiff was guilty of unclean hands, denied both parties any recovery and dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendants, Eric D. Turner and Robert Dee Scribner, II, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment for rape of a child, a Class A felony, with Scribner charged with two counts and Turner charged with one count. Following their jury trial, Scribner was convicted of one of the two counts with which he was charged and sentenced as a child rapist to sixteen years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. Turner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Turner additionally argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child, and Scribner argues that the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence without a proper chain of custody, by not granting a requested special jury instruction, and by enhancing his sentence beyond the minimum in the range. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves two brothers and their mother’s estate. One brother filed suit against the other, claiming that the defendant brother and his family members wrongfully converted certain assets belonging to his mother and obtained other assets through undue influence. The trial court found no conversion or undue influence. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employee contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee’s permanent partial disability award should be capped at one and one-half times his medical impairment rating. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Harvey L. Webb, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Harvey Baker, appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the trial court. Petitioner contended that the indictment on which his conviction was based was duplicitous, vague, ambiguous, faulty, and incomplete. As a result, Petitioner contended that the indictment was void. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action brought under Tennessee’s False Claims Act, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to set aside its offer of judgment and strike the relator’s notice of acceptance. The relator subsequently abandoned the case, and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the results reached by the trial court.

This appeal involves a contract dispute arising out of the Lennox Lewis/Mike Tyson prize fight in Memphis, Tennessee. The defendant/appellee investment firm agreed to provide financing to guarantee minimum ticket sales for the prize fight. If ticket sales for the fight were below the minimum requirement, the investment firm would pay the difference, but if ticket sales exceeded the minimum, the investment firm would profit. The investment firm solicited the plaintiff/appellant sub-investor and other sub-investors to provide back-up financing, so that the investment firm would not bear the entire risk of loss in the event that minimum ticket sales were not met. The plaintiff sub-investor would also participate in the profits if ticket sales exceeded the minimum. Under the alleged agreement between the investment firm and the sub-investor, the sub-investor was to post a letter of credit in order to obtain his interest in the potential profits and liabilities. As the ticket sales were ongoing, the plaintiff sub-investor arranged for the required letter of credit to be issued, but needed information from the investment firm in order to get it issued. The investment firm did not provide the information to the sub-investor. Meanwhile, the ongoing ticket sales reached (and ultimately exceeded) the minimum requirement. At that point, the investment firm no longer faced a risk of loss and told the plaintiff sub-investor that it no longer needed sub-investors and would not go through with the agreement. The sub-investor never posted a letter of credit and the investment firm did not pay the sub-investor a percentage of the profits. The sub-investor then filed the instant lawsuit against the investment firm, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant investment firm filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no enforceable contract because the sub-investor never posted the letter of credit, and dismissed the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they were derivative of the breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the trial court granted the investment firm’s motion for summary judgment. The sub-investor now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding that there was no enforceable contract between the investment firm and the sub-investor, finding that the investment firm had an implied duty to cooperate in the sub-investor’s performance of its contractual promise. Finding an enforceable contract, we also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Reggie Carnell James, of one count of first degree murder and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and ten years as a Range II, multiple offender, for the evidence tampering conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael H. Palmer, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petitions for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. He claims to have entered guilty pleas to reckless endangerment and telephone harassment and to have entered a nolo contendere plea to assault. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitions without appointing counsel and in refusing to rescind the order dismissing the post-conviction petitions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Having determined that the trial court properly denied the petition, this Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded appellee Sharon Clark’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits and held appellant Sprint PCS liable rather than Clark’s successor employer, appellee Convergys. The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against Sprint. Sprint contends that the trial court erred in (1) holding it rather than Convergys liable for Clark’s claim; (2) relying on medical depositions taken while Sprint was not a party; and (3) assessing discretionary costs against it. After our review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment against Sprint and order judgment against Convergys. We remand
this matter for the reassessment of discretionary costs.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was an LPN for a nursing home. She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in 2003. She was terminated, for reasons unrelated to her work injury, in 2005. She began working in a similar job for a second nursing home. In September 2006, she had surgery to treat her condition. She sued the earlier employer, but not the latter employer, seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court applied the “last day worked” rule, and found that the injury occurred while she worked for the second employer. The lawsuit was dismissed. The employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of the date of her injury. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Curtis Palmer, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective as follows: (1) counsel admitted the petitioner’s guilt during the trial without the petitioner’s consent; (2) counsel failed to adequately investigate possible grounds for a speedy trial; (3) counsel failed to challenge invalid indictments; and (4) counsel failed to properly litigate the suppression of evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction
relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerome Bond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, the petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an alibi witness at trial. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.