APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct. After giving proper deference to the jury’s verdict, I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to support Mr. Mitchell’s conviction for disorderly conduct. Moreover, I conclude that Mr. Mitchell’s conduct was protected as free speech.

Plaintiff, an incarcerated prisoner, appealed a Circuit Court's decision dismissing his writ of habeas corpus to Chancery Court. The Chancellor held that an appeal from Circuit Court would not lie in Chancery Court which has no jurisdiction to try a writ of habeas corpus related to criminal proceedings. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court and remand.

The Petitioner, Fred Thompson, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of theft and theft of property valued less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of five years for the theft conviction. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Chattanooga City Police Department terminated petitioner for violation of policies, and the City Council upheld petitioner's termination. Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari in Chancery Court and the Chancellor upheld petitioner's termination. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court.

The Defendant-Appellant, James Rae Lewter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced Lewter as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Lewter argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence of eight years in violation of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007); and (3) the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See State v. James Rae Lewter, No. M2007-02723-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1076716, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2009), rev’d, 313 S.W.3d 745 (Tenn. June 4, 2010). Upon initial review, this court, after concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, reversed and vacated Lewter’s convictions and dismissed the indictment. Id. Following the reversal, the State applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and on August 17, 2009, permission to appeal was granted. Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 746 (Tenn. 2010). Consequently, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the remaining two issues: (1) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in violation of Gomez, 239 S.W.3d at 740; and (2) whether the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See Lewter, 313 S.W.3d at 751. On remand, we conclude that Lewter did not receive an excessive sentence pursuant to Gomez and that the State’s remarks during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, as to the issues remanded for our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Antonio Arnold, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of life in prison. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Plaintiff sought and obtained an Order of Protection from the trial court against defendant, Subsequently, following an evidentiary hearing, the Court found defendant in contempt of the Order of Protection, and sentenced him to 1830 days in prison. Defendant has appealed to this Court inter alia, seeking a reduction in the sentence. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court, but modify by reducing his sentence to 730 days.

This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,”  $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over  $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm.

The trial court allowed the mother of a twelve year old girl to move out of state with the child over the objections of the father and set out a generous visitation schedule so the father could maintain a close relationship with his daughter. Shortly after the move, the father filed a petition for contempt and for change of custody, alleging that the mother had deliberately thwarted his court-ordered visitation to defeat his parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the father had proved his allegations, and it transferred custody of the child to him. Since we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse and reinstate the parenting plan in effect before the father filed his petition and remand to the trial court for crafting of a transition plan.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Napoleon Stephan Meredith, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to be viewed from a close distance by the jury and that the error forced him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm.

The juvenile court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s failure to adhere to the parenting plan, thereby repeatedly frustrating and sometimes preventing Father’s visitation, and that it was in their child’s best interest to be placed in the custody of her father. I would affirm these rulings.

The Defendant, Deanna Machelle Fletcher, pled guilty to three counts of identity theft, a Class D felony; burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; three counts of forgery, a Class E felony; and three counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150, 39-14-402, 39-14-114, 39-14-103 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement for identity theft, four years’ confinement for burglary of an automobile, four years’ confinement for forgery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for theft, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentences and ordering confinement. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court found the Defendants, Elisha Tomlinson and Tommy Gregory, in contempt of court for their part in the depleting of $250,000 in certificates of deposit held as collateral for the bond writing ability of Aaron Bonding Company. On appeal, both Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain this finding. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury found that the Defendant, Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, violated the implied consent law. See T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006) (amended 2008, 2009, 2010). The trial court ordered that his driving privileges be revoked for one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting a witness’s opinion testimony into evidence and (2) the jury instructions for violation of the implied consent law were insufficient because the trial court failed to define “reasonable grounds.” Because the trial court failed to determine the issue of the implied consent violation, submitting it to the jury instead, we vacate the judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O’Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered that this sentence be served consecutive to a thirty-year sentence for case number 07-CR-461. On appeal, Wiggins claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the jury  instructions should have included the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the testimony of an expert witness violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; (5) his sentence was excessive; (6) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (8) cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing. Given that the Defendant does not raise any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to determine the implied consent law violation, that no prejudice has been demonstrated, and that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror, I would address the issues raised on appeal.

This appeal involves countless motions filed over a period of nearly nine years following the parties’ contentious divorce. The mother appeals, challenging numerous rulings by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Gregory D. Roberts, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of illegal voting, a Class D felony, for having intentionally voted in a November 2008 election knowing that he was ineligible to vote due to his felony convictions for infamous crimes. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to four years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended to fifteen days in the county jail with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to disregard a lay witness’s testimony regarding similarities in signatures; and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury to his back in 1988. The settlement of his claim included the right to future medical treatment. During the subsequent years, he received treatment from various physicians for his back. In 2006, his treating physician recommended a spinal fusion. His employer’s insurer, Liberty Mutual, denied that the proposed surgery was necessary for the treatment of the1988 injury. The employee filed a motion to compel the insurer to pay for the proposed surgery, which was granted by the trial court. The insurer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We affirm the decision.

I agree with most of the majority opinion in this case. I find I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the award to Father of statutory interest on Mother’s child support arrearage.

The defendant, Michael Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The aggravated assault conviction merged into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and the defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II offender on the attempted second degree murder conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the violation of an order of protection conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding injuries the victim’s grandparents sustained during the commission of the offense; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial was sufficient to justify a new trial; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because I am of opinion that the $900,000 placement fee was earned when Collateral Plus was successful in securing financial assistance for MAX Well and became payable in February 2008 when the remainder of MAX Well’s stock was purchased, I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that MAX Well is entitled to summary judgment.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a four year old girl on the ground of abandonment. The court also found that an additional ground that applied to the father was his failure to legitimate the child, and an additional ground that applied to the mother was her failure to remedy the conditions which led her to lose custody of the child, with little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied in the immediate future. Only the mother appealed. We reverse.

The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.