APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Washington County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Doris Ann Whaley, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 611(a) by convincing her son to testify against her, (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding a telephone conversation the appellant had with a witness after the appellant’s son testified, and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a flight instruction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Steven F. Smith, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of probation and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of insanity. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly revoked the Defendant’s probation. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defense of insanity does not apply to probation violations. I believe the defense can apply in certain cases.

The petitioner, Richard T. Hanke, Sr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court of Madison County. He pled guilty to simple robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon with intent to employ during the commission of a felony, retaliation for past action, and two counts of kidnapping. He received an effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal, he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel and requests a delayed appeal in which to challenge his sentence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and grant a delayed appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Albert Dorsey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Dorsey claims: (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the aggravating circumstance used to impose his sentence of life without the possibility of parole was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting several photographs of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Tracy J. Brooks, pled guilty in the McMinn County Circuit court to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail and the remainder on probation. As a condition of her plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Calvin Austin, was indicted for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court dismissed the employment of a firearm charge. Following a jury trial, the trial court declared a mistrial as to the aggravated burglary charge because the jury had failed to reach a verdict on that count. The Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to 14 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of robbery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jawaskii Williams, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. He was sentenced to twenty-one years for the murder conviction and five years for theaggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, John B. Alberts, for eight counts of rape of a child, one count of solicitation of a minor to commit rape of a child, and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered through the execution of a warrant to search Appellant’s car. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion based upon the conclusion that the search warrant was invalid. At the hearing, before the trial court announced its decision, the State argued an alternative theory that the search was valid as a warrantless search through an exception to the warrant requirement i.e., probable cause with exigent circumstances. The trial court declined to rule on the validity of the search based upon this alternative theory. The State asked for and was granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure to determine if the trial court can consider the alternative theory to uphold the search. We have concluded that the trial court should consider an alternative theory to determine if the search was valid as a warrantless search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances. We remand the case back to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, McArthur Bobo, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction at 100%. On appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a defense witness’s testimony by introducing a tape-recorded conversation between himself and the witness that took place during his pretrial incarceration; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress  evidence of a pretrial photographic lineup by which two eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter; and (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by a witness that the victim’s children were at the victim’s home at the time the victim was killed. Based on our review, we conclude that the defendant has waived consideration of the suppression issue by his failure to include an adequate record on appeal. We further conclude that the defendant has waived the emaining two issues by his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued Defendants for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court struck, from Defendants’ answers, allegations regarding the comparative fault of an unidentified nonparty. However, the trial court allowed references to such nonparty at trial, and the jury assigned no fault to Defendants. Finding no error in the trial court’s allowance, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Kenneth D. Kisamore, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for two counts of delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine, in two separate cases, numbered F-11092 and F11093. The cases were consolidated prior to trial. After a jury trial, Appellant was found not guilty of the offense in case number F-11092 and guilty of the offense, as indicted, in case number F-11093. As a result of the conviction, Appellant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed, presenting the following questions for our review: (1) whether it was plain error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to comment about the sentence received by a defendant charged along with Appellant thereby violating Appellant’s rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-201(b); (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the testimony of jurors regarding extraneous prejudicial information; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant waived the issue regarding the alleged violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-201(b) for failure to object at trial. Further, we determine that Appellant waived the issue regarding juror testimony for failure to submit an adequate record for review. Finally, after a review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The plaintiff filed this action against her brother alleging that he misused her power of attorney and that he stole some of her property. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the plaintiff failed to prove her claims, with the exception of her claim for theft of her automobile, and ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the vehicle. Plaintiff appealed; however, she failed to file a transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence for which we must accept the findings of the trial court as correct. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Carter, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Boyland, of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2)(2006); aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon, see id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B); and aggravated burglary, see id. § 39-14-403(a), and the trial court imposed an effective life sentence in the custody of the Department of Correction. In addition to attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) determining that he was competent to stand trial, (2) excluding evidence of a mental disease or defect that would have negated mens rea, (3) excluding evidence of a victim’s pending criminal charges, (4) denying his special requests for jury instructions concerning imperfect self-defense and passion, and (5) instructing the jury concerning flight. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. The appellant, Derek C. Freels, seeks to appeal from an order of the trial court entered February 22, 2011. That order is not final, and, hence, is not appealable as of right. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

This is an appeal of a dependency and neglect proceeding. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

In the parties' divorce in 2000, they agreed to a joint custody arrangement of their two minor children. This action was triggered in 2008 when the father advised the mother he intended to move to North Carolina and take the children with him. In the action brought by the mother, she asked to be designated the primary caregiver and custody of the children to remain in Hamblen County. Following a protracted evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court denied the father's request to give him custody and take the children to North Carolina, but awarded custody of the children to the mother with visitation to the father. The father has appealed, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The parents of two children were divorced in 2007, and Father was named the primary residential parent. Mother filed a petition in 2008 seeking a modification of the residential parenting schedule and requested that she be named the primary residential parent. The trial court found no material change of circumstance to warrant changing the primary residential parent from Father to Mother, but found it to be in the children’s best interest to modify the parenting schedule so that the children spent alternating weeks with Mother and Father. Father appeals, arguing the trial court had no grounds upon which to modify the residential schedule. We conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s decision that it is in the best interests of the children to spend alternating weeks with each parent. Under the relevant statute, that is sufficient to establish a material change of circumstance. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Devon M. Crawford, pled guilty to first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief requesting DNA analysis of unspecified evidence collected by police in his case, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to DNA testing under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record  and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this action the plaintiffs sued the substitute trustee who conducted a foreclosure sale, alleging that notice of foreclosure, as required by the Statute, had to be published in a newspaper located in the county where the land was located. The Knoxville News Sentinel intervened in the case since it had published the foreclosure notice, but the Trial Judge, responding to a motion for summary judgment, held that the Knoxville News Sentinel did not have a nexus to Roane County and that a proper notice would have been required to be placed in the Roane County newspaper. The Knoxville News Sentinel appealed, and on appeal we reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and hold that the statutorily required notice was properly placed in the Knoxville News Sentinel.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Jason Paul Sherwood, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-five years. This court upheld his convictions and sentences. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief. The petitioner appeals the court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant in the general sessions court. The defendant appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court, the plaintiff amended his complaint to add an additional plaintiff and an additional cause of action and to seek additional damages. Shortly before trial, the defendant filed a notice dismissing her appeal. The circuit court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-107 (2000). We hold that the circuit court properly dismissed the defendant’s appeal and affirmed the general sessions judgment. To preserve the plaintiff’s original cause of action after such dismissal, the plaintiff must perfect an appeal to the circuit court as prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108 (2000). We therefore affirm the judgment of the lower courts.

In separate trials, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape for an incident occurring in March of 1980 and of aggravated rape and robbery by use of a deadly weapon for an incident occurring in May of the same year. In 2007, the petitioner sought to have deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analysis performed on the remaining evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, arguing that exculpatory results would create a reasonable probability that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted on either charge. The petitioner contended that he could conclusively establish his innocence if the DNA profile developed from the evidence was uploaded into a DNA database and matched another profile in the system. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that DNA analysis was limited to a comparison between the petitioner’s DNA and that collected as a part of the evidence in the case. We granted the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal to determine (1) whether the General Assembly intended to permit petitioners proceeding under the Act to use DNA database matches to satisfy their burden and (2) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals’ interpretation of the statute served to preclude the development of scientific evidence supportive of actual innocence. We hold that the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act permits access to a DNA database if a positive match between the crime scene DNA and a profile contained within the database would create a reasonable probability that a petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained or would have rendered a more favorable verdict or sentence if the results had been previously available. Because the criteria for ordering DNA analysis under the Act are established, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the post-conviction court for entry of an order granting DNA analysis.

The petitioner, Misty Jane Brunelle, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, she contends that (1) she received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) the post-conviction court erred by denying her motion for further genetic testing on the victim; and (3) the post-conviction court erred by determining that newly discovered evidence does not exist in this case. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s ruling that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and the post-conviction court’s denial of the motion for additional genetic testing. However, the court’s determination that newly discovered evidence does not exist in this case is reversed because that issue should have been raised in a petition for writ of error coram nobis.