APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Varion Johnson, of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Quincy Mills, appeals the trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s probation for failure to comply with the terms of release. The appellant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to reduce its findings to writing and by admitting unreliable hearsay at the revocation hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Nakia Bohanan, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403 (2006), and the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 15 years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in its application of an enhancement factor to determine the length of his sentence. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence but that the trial court erred at sentencing, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and modify the sentence to 14 years’ incarceration.

The Petitioner, Lisa Marie Butler, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. On appeal, she contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to exclude irrelevant evidence of the victim’s earlier injuries and that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue on appeal that the evidence should have been excluded. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Mike Settle, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a complaint on April 22, 2010, in which he sought injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The defendants, MTMHI and former Chief Executive Officer, Lynn McDonald, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal.

The appellant contends that the trial court made several serious errors, by inter alia, dismissing her claim for child support arrearages, reducing the father’s child support obligation, and denying her numerous motions to alter the agreed order after its entry, etc. The problem with these allegations is that they are wholly unfounded because the appellant agreed to settle and/or voluntarily dismiss all of her claims following the third day of trial, prior to the end of the trial. As for her claim that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney’s fees against her, we find this argument is also frivolous for she was discharged of this specific obligation in bankruptcy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects. Further, upon the finding this appeal is frivolous, we remand with instructions for the trial court to award the appellee his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs against the appellant.

The defendant, James Michael Wise, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of solicitation to commit rape, thirteen counts of rape, and thirteen counts of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective forty-eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentences imposed. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to impose the minimum sentences within the range and in its application of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed

The petitioner for an order of protection appeals the trial court’s decision dismissing her petition. While we reject most of the assignments of error identified by the petitioner, we agree that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as now required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff’s action was filed beyond the limitations period. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm summary judgment on the basis of standing and ripeness.

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of employment for a term of three years, wherein plaintiff would prepare tax returns for defendant tax firm. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment before the three year term had expired and plaintiff appealed to this Court to reverse the Trial Court's finding of breach of contract and award her damages for the breach. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that the employer had just cause to terminate plaintiff. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Rickie Sipes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marquis Devereaux Hall, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, possession of cocaine, simple possession and casual exchange of marijuana, and theft under $500. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years on community corrections. After his arrest for possession of a weapon,felon carrying a firearm, and theft, his supervisor filed a violation warrant. The trial court held a hearing and concluded that Appellant had violated the conditions of his community corrections sentence. The trial court imposed Appellant’s sentence of ten years. Appellant appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Appellant’s community corrections sentence.

Defendant Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Plaintiff Father primary residential parent, the award of child support, and assignment of debt. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part and remand.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Derek Williamson, of first-degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by commenting on possible sentencing options during voir dire, that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial based on prejudicial testimony from a witness, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the responding police officer about the appearance of evidence found at the scene, that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two autopsy photographs, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court improperly denied his request for a self-defense instruction, and that he is entitled to a new trial because of cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. The husband claims his inability to pay outweighs the wife’s need for spousal support. After reviewing the record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to award spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. Therefore, we affirm.

This case arises from the circuit court’s execution of judgment. Following dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the general sessions court, the circuit court specifically affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court, issued execution thereon, and denied Appellant’s motion to quash the execution upon its finding that the ten year time period for collection of judgments, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-110, ran from the date of the circuit court’s order. Upon review, we conclude that, by affirming the general sessions court’s judgment, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to execute the judgment, and that the ten year time period for collection of the judgment ran from the date of the circuit court’s order and was not expired when levy was made. Affirmed.

The Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Smithville suspended and ultimately terminated the chief of police because they were unhappy with his efforts to combat the drug and crime problems in the City. The police chief filed a writ of certiorari and asked the trial court to order the City to reinstate him because he was terminated without cause. The trial court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the City’s decision and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The police chief appealed, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari.

In late 2007, the defendant Bill Heath built a fence on a line running generally east and west, said line having been established by surveyor Bill Parsons in 1990 and then re-staked in 2007 by surveyor Dennis Fultz. The plaintiff Glenn Cupp, an adjoining landowner to the south of Heath, hired surveyor Mark Comparoni to establish his northern line because Cupp believed Heath had built the fence much too far to the south. Marjorie Keck, who joins Heath on her northern boundary and Cupp on her western boundary, also commissioned Comparoni to survey her land. Comparoni’s survey confirmed that Heath’s new fence incorrectly encompassed approximately 35 acres of Cupp’s land and approximately 6 acres of Keck’s land. Cupp and Keck filed this action against Heath in 2008 to establish their northern boundary with Heath and the Cupp/Keck common boundary as surveyed by Comparoni. The trial court found that the Comparoni survey correctly established the boundary lines of all the parties. Heath appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a chiropractor before the Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The allegations originally involved a single incident of solicitation that occurred in 2000, in which Dr. Byrd telephoned a car accident victim just two days after her accident in violation of the Board’s rule governing telemarketing or solicitation. The notice of charges was later amended to include additional allegations regarding Dr. Byrd’s use of an office in Florida to telemarket Tennessee accident victims in violation of the aforementioned rule. Dr. Byrd admitted that telemarketing was being conducted by the Florida employees. However, he claimed that a corporation was responsible for conducting the telemarketing, rather than himself, and he argued that the corporation was not subject to the Board’s telemarketing rules. The Board found Dr. Byrd guilty of several violations and revoked his chiropractic license. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm.

In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010). Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant’s community. In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the claimant’s two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.

On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh (“the Driver”), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh (“the Owner”). Seay’s insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay’s name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post judgment relief. We affirm.

We originally granted the application for permission to appeal in this case to address a question regarding summary judgments in medical malpractice cases that was left unanswered in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). That question is whether a defendant in a medical malpractice case who does not present evidence that his or her conduct complied with the applicable standard of care is entitled to a summary judgment when he or she demonstrates that the expert witness or witnesses the plaintiff plans to present at trial do not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (Supp. 2010).

The Defendant, Kenneth James Watkins, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress identification, (3) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his nickname, and (4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding threats against a witness and witnesses’ fear of reprisal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BSG, LLC introduced CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers. In 2005, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into an agreement whereby CheckVelocity provided check collection services. BSG, in accordance with its agreement with CheckVelocity, was to receive compensation for its introduction of CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers in the form of residual fees during the time of the CheckVelocity - Weight Watchers agreement and any renewal agreements. In 2008, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into a new agreement in which credit card collection services were added and the check collection services were continued unchanged. CheckVelocitystopped paying the residual fees because it considered the Weight Watchers agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal of the old one. BSG sued. The trial court considered the 2008 agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal, and ruled for CheckVelocity. BSG appealed. We reverse.