APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and Father, the divorced parents of two minor children, filed a joint motion in the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court denied the joint motion and Mother appeals.

A pro se litigant failed to pay the court costs resulting from complaints he had filed, and the Circuit Court entered an order in 2006 that allowed it to refer future complaints by that litigant to a Special Master for screening. The court’s order directed the Special Master to determine whether the court costs had been satisfied and to file a written report recommending whether the complaint should be allowed to proceed or be dismissed. The trial court was empowered to dismiss the complaint without a hearing if the recommendation of the Special Master was that the case not proceed. In the appeal before us, the litigant appealed from a general sessions judgment that denied him any relief for the purchase of a lawn mower that he alleged was defective. The Special Master’s investigation revealed that the litigant had failed to pay any of the court costs previously assessed against him and that additional costs had accrued since then. In accordance with the Special Master’s recommendation, the court dismissed his complaint. We find that the trial court acted within its authority, and we accordingly affirm.

In this dispute over child support arrearage, father argues that the trial court erred in increasing the amount of his monthly payment. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Angelica S. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Irene S. (“Mother”) and Jose S. “Father”). When the Child was five, Mother left her with Father. Mother never returned. Father, an illegal immigrant, subsequently married Melissa S. (“Stepmother”) and made her the Child’s legal custodian. In 2009, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took custody of the Child after the Child alleged that Stepmother had abused her. The following year, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the court granted 1 the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had abandoned the Child by failing to visit her in the relevant four-month time period and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the forfeiture of personal property seized in connection with a criminal investigation. The petitioner’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home. Items of his personal property were seized by authorities, and later forfeited and sold. The petitioner property owner filed this lawsuit, arguing that administrative protocols regarding forfeiture proceedings were not followed and contesting the forfeiture of his personal property. The administrative law judge held that the forfeiture and sale were valid, and the property owner appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed. The property owner now appeals to this Court. We affirm.
 

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy to commit that tort. Appellees were invitees, and there is no evidence that they exceeded the scope of the invitation despite the fact that Appellees had ulterior motives in procuring admission. Appellants failed to show that Appellees’ actions were objectionably unreasonable or highly offensive, which are essential elements of the invasion of privacy tort. Furthermore, in the absence of an underlying tort, there can be no conspiracy to commit the tort. Affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Courtney Watkins, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony of several witnesses, that photographs depicting the victim’s injuries were prejudicial, that the trial court erred by allowing him to be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A final forfeiture was entered against the Appellant, Gary’s Bonding Company, in the Marion County Circuit Court ordering the complete forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Judson Layne. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering a final forfeiture and in denying its petition for exoneration. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Dissatisfied with his conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Keith Lonell Richardson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. Discerning no error, we affirm

Husband filed a petition to modify the amount of alimony in futuro set in the divorce decree, asserting that health problems and a decrease in his income arising after the divorce constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of alimony. Husband appeals the denial of the petition and award of attorneyfees to Wife. Finding that Husband was entitled to modification and that the award of attorney fees was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the award of alimony.
 

The appellant, Markquitton Sanders,pled guilty to two felony drug offenses and was allowed to serve his sentences in community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of violating his community corrections sentences and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a term of incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Dwayne R. Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments in this case, and the State moves this court to affirm the circuit court’s order summarily via Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the circuit court’s order is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging defendant owed money on a loan. Defendant defended on the ground that the contract was oral and the statute of frauds barred any collection. The Trial Court awarded Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part. I agree with the majority that Tenny raised at trial the defense of the statute of frauds. I also agree with the majority that Tenny is liable to Sweeney in the uncontested amount of $4,500. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds as I find such reliance unnecessary. In my judgment, a writing was not required in this case under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2010) because we are dealing with an agreement that could have been performed within one year.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Marcos Enrique Collazo, Sr., of three counts of rape of a child, seven counts of rape by fraud, seven counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and seven counts of misdemeanor assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 130 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude pornographic videos found in his bedroom, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for rape by fraud and statutory rape by an authority figure, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s severance motion. However, the error was harmless. Finding no further error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father “as tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father’s death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father’s death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm.

Aggrieved by his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of ten counts of harassment, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, one count of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and one count of setting fire to personal property, for which he received an effective sentence of 19 years’ incarceration, the petitioner, Delmar Reed, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant’s property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm.

The Defendant, Joshua Lee Brown, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of felony murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-12-101 (2010), 39-13-403 (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each of the felony murder convictions, to twenty years’ confinement for attempted first degree murder, and to ten years’ confinement for attempted especially aggravated robbery. The attempted first degree murder conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to redact a portion of the video evidence; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole; (3) the trial court erred bydenying his motion to strike the felony murder aggravating circumstance from the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; (4) the trial court erred by granting the State’s requestto augmentthe pattern juryinstruction on the “heinous,atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred by rejecting his requested sentencing instruction regarding the statutorymitigating circumstance thathe acted underthe substantial domination of another person; (6) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court failed to give the jury meaningful guidance or directions as to their deliberations during the punishment phase of the trial; (7) the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to establish the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance as to one of the victims during sentencing. We conclude that although the trial court erred when giving a special jury instruction, the error was harmless in light of the whole record. Furthermore, we conclude that although the evidence was insufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance and the trial court failed to make the necessary findings when imposing consecutive sentences, the sentences imposed were appropriate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a modification of child custody case. Mother and Father entered into a consent order naming Father primary residential parent and giving Mother visitation. Mother petitioned the juvenile court to change custody. The court denied the petition to change custody, but modified Mother’s visitation. Mother appeals.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account.

The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court.

This case involves the plaintiff’s motion seeking an order holding her former husband in contempt for failing to make certain monthly payments of $1,071 from his military retirement as required by the terms of a marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the parties’ divorce judgment. The wife’s former spouse stopped making the payments after the wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that the payments in question were alimony subject to modification rather than a property distribution as the wife contends. The court held that Mr. Cornwell “properly” stopped paying the “alimony” when his former wife remarried. The wife has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the wife’s motion.

Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster “engaged in” an ultrahazardous activity or “participated” in a “drag race,” and we remand on these issues.