APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Francisco R. Liriano, of conspiring to deliver more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony. He received a community corrections placement of fifteen years following one year of confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence sufficiently established that Liriano was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Michael Clark, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced to fifteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to another sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence, and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Matthew C. Welker, appeals from the Stewart County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Welker pled guilty to residing with a minor as a sex offender, and he received a suspended sentence of two years following 90 days of confinement. On appeal, Welker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a conversion case. The appellant bank perfected its security interest in collateral for a loan by filing a UCC-1 statement. The debtor subsequently sold the collateral to appellee third parties, representing that there were no liens on the collateral. The appellee third parties later sold the collateral. The debtor defaulted on the loan to the appellant bank, and the bank obtained a default judgment against the debtor. The debtor then filed bankruptcy. The appellant bank filed this lawsuit against the appellee third parties for conversion, seeking the proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court also adjudicated the bank’s claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. The bank now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding on its subject matter jurisdiction, vacate its rulings on the claims for attorney fees and punitive damages, and remand.

This is an action for rescission of a release and settlement agreement based on fraud. The plaintiff was involved in a vehicular accident with a commercial driver. She and her husband filed a personal injury lawsuit against the driver and his employer. The parties settled the case for the limits of the defendants’ automobile liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs signed a release that included not only the defendants, but also the defendants’ attorneys and the insurance company. The plaintiffs later discovered that the defendants had a substantial general liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit against the defendants’ attorneys, seeking to rescind the release based on the attorneys’ fraud, and a declaratory judgment that the general liability policy covered the plaintiffs’ injuries. In addition, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages from the attorneys for all damages resulting from the fraud and for punitive damages. The attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Based on the language in the release, the trial court refused to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants.

This case involves a dispute between G. Perry Guess (“the Executor”),Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard (“the Deceased”), and the Executor’s sister, Elizabeth G. Finlay (“the Survivor”), regarding the ownership of funds, following the death of the Deceased, in several bank accounts and certificates of deposit. The trial court awarded the bank accounts to the Executor and the CDs to the Survivor. The Executor claims he is also entitled to the CDs while the Survivor argues that she should have received all of the funds. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the bank accounts to the Executor. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor so as to award to her all of the bank accounts as well as the CDs.

In this consolidated appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his requests for pretrial diversion in both Maury County and Rhea County, the denial of his motions for writ of certiorari by the Maury County and Rhea County trial courts, and the denial of his motion for interlocutory appeal by the Rhea County trial court. He also argues that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense. After review, we affirm the denials of pretrial diversion and motions for writ of certiorari. We also conclude that the Rhea County trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion for interlocutory appeal but such error is of no effect in light of this court’s grant of an extraordinary appeal. We further conclude that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense charged in the same indictment.

Father and Mother were divorced in 2001 and Father was ordered to pay child support. The parties reconciled in 2002 and began living together but did not remarry. They had another child in 2004. They shared a bank account during their period of reconciliation into which Father deposited his paychecks and from which Mother paid the family’s living expenses, including the children’s expenses. The parties separated again in 2006. Father did not give Mother child support payments during their four years of living together, but resumed paying child support once they separated again in 2006. Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and Mother filed a counter-petition seeking child support payments for the period from 2002 through part of 2006 when she and Father resumed cohabitation. The trial court gave Father credit for the necessaries he paid for the children’s support during the reconciliation period but ordered Father to pay Mother $32,886 for child support payments that accrued during that time as well as health insurance premiums and medical expenses that Mother paid over that period. Mother appealed the trial court’s refusal to award her child support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, and Father appealed the trial court’s refusal to give him more credit for his contribution to the children’s necessaries during the reconciliation period. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Mother’s request for support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, but reverse the judgment ordering Father to pay child support during the time the parties were living together as a family unit.
 

The trial court granted a divorce to the mother of two children, named her as their primary residential parent, and awarded the father temporary visitation with the children. The father subsequently entered into an agreed order that suspended his visitation, with a provision that visitation was to resume only upon the recommendation of the children’s counselor. The mother eventually filed a motion to terminate the father’s visitation, while the father filed a petition for contempt against the mother and also sought to have his visitation restored. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended against resuming visitation between the father and his children. By that time, the father had not seen his children for over four years. The court dismissed the father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for a prompt evidentiary hearing on the father’s petition.
 

This post-divorce appeal arises from an action to modify the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, permanent parenting plan, and to award child support. The permanent parenting plan provided that the father’s child support obligation would not become effective until certain real property was sold; however, because the property had not been sold, the father never started making child support payments. Several hearings were conducted; at the final one, the mother also sought permission to move out-of-state with the minor children. The trial court denied the relief sought by the mother. The father was named the primary residential parent, and the mother was ordered to pay child support. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Webb Creek Utility District (“WCUD”) is a public utility district that, for the most part, furnishes potable water to its customers and processes their sewage. One of its customers is the plaintiff, Outdoor Resorts at Gatlinburg, Inc., the operator of a large campground for ampers and recreational vehicles (“RVs”). Outdoor is somewhat unique in that it has its own water supply. It is a “sewer only” customer. From 1985 until 2008, the rate WCUD charged Outdoor was set by contract, which either party could terminate with sufficient notice. In 2008, WCUD terminated the contract and notified Outdoor that it would be charged based upon the number of campsites multiplied by a standard minimum rate per campsite. Outdoor objected to the rate. WCUD held a hearing and adopted the proposed rate over Outdoor’s objection. Outdoor asked for a hearing before the Utility Management Review Board (“the UMRB”). While the matter was pending before the UMRB, WCUD conducted a rate study, following which it proposed still another rate for Outdoor that was less than the objected-to rate, but more than the rate Outdoor had been paying under the terminated contract. The UMRB approved the new rate. Outdoor demanded a refund of overpayments made by it under the higher rate; the UMRB denied Outdoor’s request, stating that it lacked authority to order a refund. Outdoor also asked the UMRB to compel the individual who prepared the rate study to appear for a deposition. The UMRB denied the discovery request upon concluding that it did not have the authority to order such a deposition. Outdoor sought review in the trial court by way of a common law writ of certiorari on several grounds, including lack of material evidence to support the new rate, denial of due process in not compelling a deposition, and its characterization of UMRB’s action as illegal and arbitrary. The trial court allowed Outdoor to take the deposition of the author of the rate study; the court later admitted the deposition testimony into evidence. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the UMRB’s decision was supported by material evidence and dismissed Outdoor’s complaint. Outdoor appeals. We hold that Outdoor was not denied due process, but we vacate the trial court’s judgment because we hold that neither the first post-contract rate established by WCUD nor the newly adopted rate approved by the UMRB is supported by material evidence.

I concur with most of the majority’s thorough opinion. I must dissent from the majority’s decision to suggest a remittitur of the jury verdict, from a total $43.8 million to $12.9 million. Respectfully, nothing in the majority opinion states a basis under the law for such a remittitur. In the absence of a basis under the law for remittitur, I believe that the majority’s decision amounts to a policy determination, limiting the size verdict a jury may award. It may be that our Legislature can appropriately make such a policy decision, but the courts are not authorized to do so.

Following a seven week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in this products liability action. The jury awarded compensatory damages in excess of $43 million, and assessed 15 percent fault against Defendant car manufacturer. Defendant appeals. We affirm the jury verdict with respect to liability but remand with a suggestion of remittitur.

I concur with most of the majority’s thorough opinion. I must dissent from the majority’s decision to suggest a remittitur of the jury verdict, from a total $43.8 million to $12.9 million. Respectfully, nothing in the majority opinion states a basis under the law for such a remittitur. In the absence of a basis under the law for remittitur, I believe that the majority’s decision amounts to a policy determination, limiting the size verdict a jury may award. While our Legislature may appropriately make such a policy decision, the courts are not authorized
to do so.

The State of Tennessee, through the Office of the Attorney General, has filed an application for an extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, seeking review of the trial court's order granting the Defendants new trials on grounds that: ( I ) former Judge Richard Baumgartner, who presided over each of the Defendants' trials, committed "numerous egregious actions" in violation of both the criminal law and the Code of Judicial Conduct while presiding over the cases resulting in structural error that denied these Defendants their rights to fair trials; and (2) former Judge Baumgartner did not discharge his duty as the thirteenth juror in these cases before leaving the bench and the successor judge on these cases "is unable to serve as thirteenth juror" given "the numerous issues concerning the credibility of both certain testifying witnesses and the trial judge."

Michael L. Johnson and Tammy K. Johnson (“Plaintiffs”) purchased from Todd Ford (“Defendant”) real property located in Athens, Tennessee containing a house constructed by Defendant (“the House”). Shortly after purchasing the House, Plaintiffs began to experience problems with a leaking and flooding basement. Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging, among other things, breach of contract, negligent construction, misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Prior to trial, the Trial Court partially granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment finding that Defendant had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Trial Court held, however, that whether the violation caused damages to Plaintiffs would be submitted to the jury for its determination. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendant breached the parties’ contract, and that Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages of $50,000 for the breach. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the jury’s failure to find in Plaintiffs’ favor with regard to the claims of misrepresentation, damages for Defendant’s violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, punitive damages, and rescission, among other things. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the filing of a Petition in the Chancery Court requesting relief pursuant to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5, to increase the community spouse’s Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance and Community Spouse Resource Allowance.The trial court made the finding that the community spouse had not demonstrated “exceptional circumstances resulting in significant financial duress;” nevertheless, the court granted the community spouse the requested relief and awarded her the entirety of her husband’s income and the couple’s assets. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appealed contending the community spouse must demonstrate “exceptional circumstances resulting in significant financial duress” as a condition precedent to being entitled to the relief. We agree. Finding that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the relief, we reverse.

The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury in October 2005 and that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. It also found that the employee’s hospitalization in November and December 2009 was related to her work injury and ordered her employer to pay associated medical expenses. On appeal, her employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled and that the 2009 medical expenses were related to her work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff homeowner appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint, in which the court found the defendants’ farm activities were protected from the application of the local zoning laws by the Tennessee Right-to-Farm Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 43-26-101, et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to intervene as untimely. We affirm.

The trial court determined that Petitioner’s petition to turn over assets was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting the lethal injection protocol used to carry-out the death penalty in Tennessee violated constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. While the matter was pending in the Tennessee Supreme Court, the State revised the protocol. The supreme court remanded the matter for further proceedings. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the State. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Natasha D. and Antywon M. B. to their four oldest children. The trial court terminated Antywon M. B.’s parental rights to all four children. The court terminated Natasha D.’s parental rights to all but the oldest child, Jaiwon B. Natasha D. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The General Sessions Court of Shelby County found the petitioner, Michelle Lambert, in contempt for failing to comply with the orders of the court and sentenced her to five days in jail. Rather than filing a direct appeal, the petitioner responded by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging that the judgment was void for two reasons: first, because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-103, which lists the punishments under the general contempt statute cited by the general sessions court in its order, limits the power to impose jail time to circuit, chancery, and appellate courts and; second, because the general sessions court failed to afford her notice or a hearing prior to finding her in indirect contempt. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court granted the writ by vacating the judgment and remanding to the general sessions court for “further proceedings not inconsistent” with its order, including the initiation by the general sessions court of the proper notice and hearing required for a finding of indirect contempt. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas court lacked the authority to remand the case to the general sessions court upon granting the writ of habeas corpus. We conclude, however, that the petitioner failed to show that her judgment was void, rather than merely voidable. Thus, she should have sought relief through a direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court granting the writ of habeas corpus.

Plaintiff brought this action claiming, inter alia, that it was entitled to a mechanics' lien on the subject property. Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss, one ground being that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Trial Court subsequently ruled that the Complaint did not establish a cause of action to entitle plaintiff to a lien on the property. Plaintiff has appealed and we hold that upon review of the Complaint, and applying the rules governing the test of the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint, that the Complaint states a cause of action. We vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for further proceedings.