APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to disassociate from The Diocese of Tennessee, causing the Diocese to file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it or the local congregation owned and controlled the real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped. The trial court determined that The Episcopal Church is hierarchical, and based on the canons and constitutions of the Church and its Diocese, ruled that the local parish held the property in trust for the Diocese. The church appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

A Carter County jury convicted the Petitioner, Connie Hughes, of first degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and forgery under $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the first degree murder and to two concurrent one-year sentences on the remaining convictions. The Petitioner appealed her convictions, and this Court affirmed her convictions. State v. Connie Hughes, No. E2006-00062-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1319373, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 7, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney at trial “opened the door” for the petitioner’s incriminating statements to be admitted into evidence at trial. The post-conviction court denied her request for relief after a hearing on the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed her petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A mother and father were jointly tried on two counts of felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse as a result of the death of their child. Only the mother testified in her own defense. During direct examination, the mother did not testify about prior incidents in which the father assaulted her. On cross-examination, father’s counsel asked the mother whether she believed the father was capable of “hurting” the victim. The trial court ruled sua sponte that counsel for the father had “opened the door” to cross-examination about the father’s assaults against the mother. The father was convicted of two counts of felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court merged the felony murder counts. The mother was convicted of two counts of facilitation of felony murder and two counts of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court merged the facilitation of felony murder counts. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed one aggravated child abuse count against the father but affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all other respects. Only the mother appealed. We hold that the evidence of prior assaults by the father was inadmissible and that the parties did not open the door to cross-examination about the father’s assaults against the mother. We reverse the mother’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
 

This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings regarding three minor children. The circuit court found all three children dependent and neglected, and it found the youngest child had been severely abused. We affirm the dependency and neglect finding and the severe abuse finding with regard to Mother. However, we reverse the severe abuse finding with regard to Father.

In this appeal we must determine whether the Statute of Frauds, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2101(a)(4) (Supp.2011),applies to a settlement agreement requiring the transfer of an interest in real property; and, if so, whether emails exchanged by the parties’ attorneys satisfy the Statute of Frauds under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-10-101 to -123 (2001 & Supp. 2011). We hold that the Statute of Frauds applies to settlement agreements requiring the transfer of an interest in real property and that the emails, along with a legal description of the propertycontained in the cross-claim, satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the settlement agreement.
 

The petitioner, Julius Perkins, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2002 jury conviction of first degree felony murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial court errors, and prosecutorial misconduct. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lakky Phosy, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee had degenerative disk disease for a number of years prior to April 2009, when she reported to her employer that she was experiencing significantly increased neck pain and symptoms, and she sought treatment. The employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court credited the testimony of the employee and of one of the treating physicians and awarded the employee 28.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appeals, asserting that the employee’s injury was not caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This interlocutory appeal concerns the question of whether a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds. Appellant farmer allegedly entered into an oral contract to sell his cotton crop to Appellee cotton company. The farmer failed to deliver the cotton and the cotton company sued for specific performance. The farmer defended the suit by arguing that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds. The cotton company countered that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the cotton company, finding that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. We hold that a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, the determination of which is a mixed question of law and fact. However, because the question of whether this particular farmer qualifies as a merchant raises genuine issues regarding the inferences to be drawn from the facts, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits.

The Defendant, Chelsy Marie Smith, pled guilty to theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a standard offender, to an effective sentence of one year in the Department of Correction followed by seven years on community corrections. After the Defendant’s release, a violation warrant was issued, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence, finding that she had violated the terms of her sentence and ordered her to serve the remainder of her eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her community corrections sentence and ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. Virginia Mise was admitted to Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge following complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. She was diagnosed with chronic renal failure. Several days later, she died following a medical procedure. Her sons filed suit, alleging that Virginia Mise’s treating physicians and nurses failed to comply with the requisite standard of care, causing her death. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge and the treating physicians filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. We affirm the grant of the motions for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Leon Goins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his Dyer County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and resulting 25-year sentence. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income, grant of alimony in futuro to Wife, amount of child support he was ordered to pay, and denial of the introduction of certain of Husband’s tax records; Husband also contends that the trial court erred in holding him in civil contempt for, inter alia, nonpayment of his spousal and child support obligations. We affirm the court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income and finding that Wife is entitled to alimony. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Wife cannot be rehabilitated, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand the case for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony. We also remand the case for the court to reconsider the amount of child support and, as necessary, to make findings required by the child support guidelines. We affirm the holding that Husband was in civil contempt, but vacate the sentence of 180 days imprisonment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
 

This is a divorce case of a marriage of approximately 34 years. After hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge awarded the divorce to the wife, "equally" divided the parties' marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife permanent alimony of $500.00 a month, and awarded the wife $10,000.00 in partial payment of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed and contended inter alia that the wife was not entitled to permanent alimony, nor was she entitled to have an award of attorney's fees against him. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Courtenay D. Robertson, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury convictions of attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated arson, and felony evading arrest on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We remand to the trial court for further findings.

Homeowner and Contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new house. The contract provided that no changes would be made to the terms and specifications of the contract without a writing describing the changes signed byboth parties. The parties ignored this provision and made changes without preparing change orders. Before the house was completed the parties had a dispute, and the homeowner contracted with someone else to complete her house. Homeowner alleged Contractor breached the contract by walking off the job and refusing to complete the house,and Contractor alleged Homeowner fired him and told him not to return to her property. Contractor sued Homeowner for breach of contract and sought to recover his damages, which included expenses he incurred for materials and labor that Homeowner refused to pay. Homeowner counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought to recover as damages the amount she paid other contractors to complete her house. The trial court found Homeowner committed the first breach and entered judgment for Contractor in the amount of $21,120.69. Homeowner appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the trial court’s judgment. Concluding the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
 

The Defendant, Scotty Lynn Edmonds, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -406. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 11 months and 29 days with all but 5 days to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Wicks, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination of a State witness, and the trial court’s imposition of a 25-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The Petitioner, James E. Kenner, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for five counts of aggravated burglary, five counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, for which he is serving an effective seventy-five year sentence as a career offender. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sustained injuries to his right hip, knee, and ankle as a result of a fall while employed as a truck driver. Although he received medical treatment and briefly returned to work, the employee continued to have pain and eventually required knee surgery. After the employee recovered from the surgery, the employer was unable to return him to work. The treating physician assigned a permanent partial impairment of 2% to the right lower extremity. The employee’s evaluating physician assigned a 13% impairment rating. The trial court awarded 45.5% permanent partial disability to the right leg. The employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by utilizing the evaluating physician’s impairment rating and that the award of benefits is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by the Tennessee Civil Service Commission to uphold the termination of her employment with the Tennessee Department of Labor. On motion by the petitioner, the entire administrative record was struck from the record in the judicial proceedings. Having no administrative record upon which to review the Department’s decision, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.
 

The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a notation in the prosecutor’s file written by an assistant prosecutor expressing her opinion as to the lack of credibility of two of the State’s witnesses is newly discovered evidence on which the defendant may base a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Over fifteen years after the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder became final, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had recently discovered a note written by the assistant prosecutor before his murder trial in which she expressed her opinion that it was a “good case but for most of Ws are juveniles who have already lied repeatedly.” The petition alleged that the note was exculpatory, newly discovered evidence and that the State’s failure to produce it before trial affected the outcome of the trial and undermined the reliability of the verdict. The trial court tolled the one-year statute of limitations on due process grounds, but summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s petition, concluding that the State had waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. We hold that the State did not waive the statute of limitations defense and that the trial court did not err in tolling the statute of limitations. We further hold that the handwritten note expressing the assistant prosecutor’s opinion as to the witnesses’ credibility was attorney work product. As such, it was neither discoverable nor admissible. Accordingly, the note was not newly discovered evidence on which a petition for writ of error coram nobis could be based. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is reinstated.
 

Mark Demcovitz (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to sell and received an eight year sentence. The trial court entered a judgment reserving two certified questions of law. On appeal, the Defendant asks that this Court answer the following certified questions: 1. Whether the stop of the defendant for “following too close” violated the
defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights when the statute is absent any objective criteria for the officer to base his determination on, thereby granting the officer unbridled discretion in determining when a violation occurs? 2. Whether the stop of a defendant for a minor “cite and release” traffic violation which provided for a fine only, the detention of the defendant exceeded the reasonable length and scope to effectuate the purposes of the stop, placement of the defendant in the secured area of the officer’s patrol car, the use of a drug dog “run” around the defendant’s vehicle, and the subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle violated the rights of the defendant under the federal and state constitutions and, therefore, all evidence resulting from the seizure and search should be suppressed? After a thorough review of the record, we answer each question in the negative and hold that the Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles E. Orange, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel or giving him an opportunity to amend his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.