APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In February 2011, the Petitioner, Fred Ratliff, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his 1976 conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner claimed that he had “compelling” new evidence of his innocence because the State failed to disclose a key prosecution witness’s juvenile record in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court first dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that due process did not require tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Then, addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s Brady claim, the coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the new evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Randy Bray, appeals from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. In this appeal, Bray argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to file motions to suppress (1) a shotgun, (2) his statement to police, and (3) a 911 call. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This common law writ of certiorari was filed by an inmate, who asserted that the parole board violated his rights by returning him to jail for violating his parole. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice because the inmate failed to pay any portion of the initial filing fee or to issue a summons to the parole board. Affirmed.
 

The defendant, Terry Maurice Thomas, appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Dontrel D. Pittman, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order revoking his 12-year community corrections sentence and ordering service of the sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections. He argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order and that the sentence imposed is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Horace Hollis, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged the convictions of aggravated sexual battery into the convictions of rape of a child and imposed a sentence of 40 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An employee was terminated by a local power board after a detective sent his employer a letter stating the employee sold narcotic drugs from the truck the employee used during his shift and that the employee admitted selling the drugs. The employee denied selling illegal drugs or making such an admission to the detective, but the administrative law judge in charge of the evidentiaryhearing determined the statements inthedetective’sletterweretrue. The employee later filed suit against the detective who authored the letter, his supervisors, and the county employing the individual defendants. The former employee asserted causes of action fordefamation,negligence,false lightinvasionofprivacy,and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. The trial court concluded the former employee was collaterally estopped from relitigating the veracity of the statements in the detective’s letter leading to the former employee’s termination and dismissed the complaint in toto. We affirm. All of the employee’s causes of action were based upon statements the detective made in his letter to the employer, which the employee alleged were false. Because the employee is estopped from denying the truth of those statements, he has no basis on which to pursue any of the causes of action set forth in his complaint.
 

This case involves the sufficiency of notice given to an incarcerated party in a divorce proceeding. Wife filed for divorce and sent Husband notice of a hearing for approval of Wife’s temporary parenting plan. Although Father was not present at the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife, assigning the majority of the marital debt to Husband. Husband appealed, asserting that he was not properly notified that the hearing would concern issues other than a temporary parenting plan. Vacated and remanded.

This is a medical malpractice case wherein a patient suffered permanent neurological impairment after delay of surgery to correct a ruptured disc in her spine. The patient sued the doctor who treated her at a minor medical clinic, and a neurological clinic, alleging that both failed to ensure that the patient was treated promptly. The jury found that the doctor did not breach the standard of care, but awarded damages against the neurological clinic. The neurological clinic moved for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the patient failed to prove causation. The trial court granted the motion, as well as a conditional motion for new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The trial court concurred in the jury verdict in favor of the doctor. We reverse the grant of the motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict and affirm the grant of a new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The jury verdict in favor of the minor medical clinic doctor, as concurred in by the trial court, is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This appeal involves an unlawful detainer action. After foreclosure, the defendants refused to leave the subject property. The plaintiff filed this unlawful detainer action against the defendants, and ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, the defendants, acting pro se, filed documents suggesting fraud and/or unlawful foreclosure practices. The defendants filed no evidence to support their claims and no other response to the plaintiff’s motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Department of Children's Services filed a Petition inter alia, to terminate the mother's parental rights to her three minor children. Following trial on the issues, the Trial Court ruled there were several statutory grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights, including that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements, and abandonment of the children. The Court also determined that the evidence established that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The petitioner, Bruce S. Rishton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted rape and incest convictions, arguing that (1) he was constructively denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary pleas; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing; and (5) the trial court denied him a speedy trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

On March 20, 2009, the defendant, Jonathan Wade Rosson, was convicted of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to two years, with 120 days to be served in confinement in the county jail and the remainder to be served in community corrections as a condition of probation. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial by the State’s failure to preserve all of the videotape footage taken byall of the surveillance cameras located in the building where the incident occurred on the day in question; (3) the trial court erred by admitting copies of videotape footage preserved from two surveillance cameras into evidence; (4) the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to him; and (5) a state law rendering him ineligible for work release programs while serving his sentence that was enacted after the commission of his offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution by virtue of retroactively increasing the punishment for his crime. After carefully reviewing the record, the relevant laws and precedent, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Javoris Sparkman, of one count of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder,and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. For the first degree murder in count one, Sparkman received a sentence of life. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder in count two with the first degree murder in count one. For the first degree felony murder in count four, Sparkman received another life sentence, to be served consecutively to the sentence of life for the first degree murder in count one. For each attempted first degree murder, Sparkman received a sentence of fifteen years, to be served concurrently. In total, Sparkman received two sentences of life plus 15 years. On appeal, Sparkman argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to charge the jury with self-defense; (2) refusing to allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors; (3) refusing to excuse a juror with prior knowledge of the case; and (4) denying a motion for change of venue. Upon our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed, except for counts one and two which are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of counts one and two.

The petitioner, Nichlous Maxwell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue for a jury instruction on facilitation of a felony. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Romalis Gray,pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court and Motions. On April 19, 2012 this Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed and recites that the record reveals that the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days following the Final Judgment in the Trial Court.

The defendant, Ruby Graham, appeals from her White County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of morphine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(3), claiming that the trial court erred by denying her request for a mistrial and by refusing her bid for judicial diversion. Because the defendant failed to prepare an adequate record for review of either issue, we must presume that the rulings of the trial court are correct, and we affirm.

Father filed petition to modify custody, and maternal grandmother objected to Tennessee court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she had cared for child in Indiana for preceding thirty months. Grandmother also sought to intervene in father’s action. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a) because both parents reside in Tennessee and the child has significant contact with Tennessee. The trial court allowed Grandmother to intervene only to protect her visitation rights. Grandmother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Grandmother’s only rights with respect to the child are any visitation rights she may be entitled to under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306.
 

The Defendant, Kevin Fritz Edwards, was indicted by the Unicoi County Grand Jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a)(4). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-504(a) (4). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false accusation of sexual battery; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of other prior allegations of sexual abuse and sexual abuse counseling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412; (4) that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to impeach the testimony of the victim’s mother; and (5) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence because it considered a psychosexual evaluation which was based on “unreliable scientific tests.” Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court. We will also address the remainder of the Defendant’s arguments so as not to pretermit his remaining issues. See State v. Parris, 236 S.W.3d 173, 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (following a similar procedure).

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to transfer his petition to modify custody to a Florida court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Matthew Edwin Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103,-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years’ confinement for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricardo Davidson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess over 300 grams of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, and conspiracy to possess and deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in a Drug Free School Zone. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that he says was obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a house Wife owned prior to the marriage and a house purchased during the marriage. Following the grant of Wife’s request for divorce, the trial court classified the pre-marital house as Wife’s separate property and the house purchased during the marriage as marital property. The court ruled that Husband had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of the pre-marital house and ordered Husband to reimburse Wife. The court awarded Wife two-thirds of the equity in the marital house, leaving one-third of the equity to Husband. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leroy Dowdy, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years and six months for the vehicular homicide conviction, two years for the leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.