APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Weldon Christopher Frazier, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his initial statements to the police, (2) not granting a mistrial after a witness for the State mentioned polygraphs, plea negotiations, and used the word “confession” to characterize the Defendant’s statements to the police, and (3) refusing to give a jury instruction regarding his not fleeing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dwight Randy Rowe, pled guilty to sale of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone and to possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly advised him of parole eligibility and failed to throughly investigate the case or prepare a defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was severely injured when a padlock, which was allegedly thrown from a City of Memphis mower, broke through her vehicle window. Plaintiff and her husband successfully sued the City. On appeal, the City argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of the Public Duty Doctrine. Because the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to amend fails to explain the basis for its denial, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a reasoned explanation of its actions regarding the City’s motion to amend its answer.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to continue and awarded summary judgment to Defendant Bank. We affirm.

Wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and its division of marital property following the parties’ divorce. She also argues that Husband failed to demonstrate his need for spousal support and that the award exceeds Husband’s actual need. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. We find it appropriate to award Husband his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of such fees reasonably incurred.

The Defendant, Jacob Aaron Faulkner, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Under the terms of the agreement, he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he violated the “move over law.” After our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and there is no reason justifying waiver of the filing requirement.
 

An employee filed a motion requesting that a former employer be ordered to provide postjudgment medical treatment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the employee’s motion. The former employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting the employee’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Edward Niles, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. On appeal, Niles argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his ex parte motion for funds for a psychiatrist. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2).
 

The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction.
 

The petitioner, Melvin J. Reed, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations in his case. Because we agree that the petitioner alleged grounds for due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, we reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand the case for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.
 

The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects
 

Following his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, assault, and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, the Montgomery County Circuit Court sentenced the defendant, Vincent D. Steele, as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years, 11 month and 29 days, and 11 years’ imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive both in length and manner of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Edward Jerome Harbison, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his 1983 convictions for first degree murder, second degree burglary, and grand larceny. Petitioner claims that an order of a previous coram nobis court establishes a new predicate for review. Petitioner also claims that a statement of a prosecutor during a previous hearing constitutes “new evidence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court.

Following a short marriage, the parties were divorced. The issues raised in this appeal by the husband pertain to the marital classification and valuation of the husband’s gun collection, the award of one year of transitional alimony to the wife, and the award of $15,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees. For her part, the wife contends the husband has not paid the judgment for her portion of the marital estate, $8,065.94, and that she is entitled to post-judgment interest. We find no error with the valuation of the marital estate or the award of transitional alimony and attorney’s fees and, thus, affirm the trial court. As for the wife’s claim for postjudgment interest on any portion of the marital estate which the husband has not paid, it is an issue for the trial court to determine whether the husband has failed to timely pay any portion of the judgment and, if so, to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 & -122. The wife also seeks to recover attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. We find she is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.
 

The defendant, Tracy Direll Woodard, entered open guilty pleas to three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(c)(2)(A); three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see id.; sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(1); and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(2). At sentencing, the trial court merged each delivery conviction into the corresponding sale conviction and imposed an effective sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentences are excessive. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of sale and delivery.
 

Former client filed a pro se complaint for legal malpractice against her former attorney. She had previously filed a complaint against the attorney with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, and that matter had been resolved in the attorney’s favor nearly two years before she filed the malpractice complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for malpractice, finding it barred by the one-year statute of limitations for such claims. The former client appealed. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Bedford County denying the appellant leave to proceed in that court on a pauper’s oath. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

Appellant, Terry Bonds, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation because his sentence had expired. Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The State contends that this court should dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely and deficient in form. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.