APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se petitioner, Efrain Huerata Orduna, appeals the Circuit Court for Franklin County’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2007, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On April 4, 2011, almost four years after the judgments were entered, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings and that other constitutional rights were violated. He failed to state any factual basis in the petition to explain its untimely filing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This appeal arises from a judgment for arrears in child support. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner (“the State”) filed a civil contempt petition against Jamie Reed (“Reed”) in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered Reed to pay $75 per month towards satisfying his $17,330 in arrears. The minor child at issue had attained majority age by the time of these proceedings. The Juvenile Court found Reed to be in substantial compliance with his payments, and he was given an opportunity to comply with the Court’s order. The Juvenile Court rejected Reed’s demands for a jury trial and for discharge of the arrearage. Reed appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The plaintiffs in this matter, the city and a redevelopment group, filed this action against the defendant entities involved in the design and construction of a large municipal project on the city’s waterfront. Also named as a defendant was the development manager for the project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-105. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner, Nathan Cordell Burkeen,appeals the denialofhis petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion affirming the Trial Court's granting of summary judgments to all defendants. In my view, the record in this case does not demonstrate that this case is ripe for summary judgment.

A Humphreys County jury convicted the Defendant, Tina M. Dixon, of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone and of possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the attachment order upon which she was arrested was unlawfully issued; (2) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside her verdict because she was not properly charged with the crimes for which she was convicted; (3) she was denied due process of law because the presiding trial judge had previouslyprosecuted her for burglary and felony theft charges; (4) she was denied due process of law because the Assistant District Attorney General who prosecuted her case had previouslybeen her public defender when she was convicted of burglaryand felonytheft charges; and (5) the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Tavaris Cantrell Brooks (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, and reserved a certified question regarding the legality of the search that led to his arrest. The State concedes that the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress and that his convictions must be reversed. We agree. Based on the illegality of the search leading to his arrest, and the necessary exclusion of the resulting evidence, we are constrained to reverse the Defendant’s convictions.

Jonathan W. Stephenson (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, challenging his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition on the merits, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is facially void because his 1994 guilty plea rendered his 1990 jury conviction a nullity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner’s first degree murder conviction stems not from the 1994 guilty plea but from the 1990 jury verdict that was affirmed on direct appeal. Accordingly, the 2002 judgment sentencing the Petitioner to death on his underlying jury conviction for first degree murder was not facially void. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Lonnie Payne (“the Defendant”) was convicted of violating a protective order, aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. He received an effective sentence of five years plus eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The Defendant filed a petition seeking to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a suspended sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Wife filed a complaint against Husband seeking a legal separation or, in the alternative, an absolute divorce. Husband counter-claimed for a divorce. Both Wife and Husband alleged the other had engaged in marital misconduct. The trial court awarded Wife a legal separation for two years, ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,500 per month as alimony during that period, and divided the marital estate between the parties. The trial court refused Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to award her alimony in futuro, a larger portion of the marital estate, and her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. First, the statute addressing legal separation directs the trial court to make a final and complete adjudication of the parties’ support rights following the parties’ legal separation when the court awards the parties an absolute divorce. Thus, Wife’s request for alimony in futuro is premature. Second, Wife failed to show the court’s division of marital property was inconsistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4121(c) or was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Third, Wife failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney’s fees.
 

Eddie Wayne Shelton (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, one count of possession with the intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years to be served in community corrections. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The employee alleged that he injured his right shoulder while working for the employer. The trial court found that the employee’s thoracic outlet syndrome stemmed from a congenital abnormality and not a work-related injury. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, JeffreyB. Johnson, Jr., was tried on two counts of first degree (premeditated) murder,and after a jury trial was found guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter,Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years on each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years. The defendant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court, claiming error in the trial court’s application of certain enhancement factors, its failure to apply certain proffered mitigating factors, and its decision to order the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively. Considering the State’s concession that the trial court’s application of two of the enhancement factors was error, the trial court’s failure to consider all of the evidence that was presented at trial during sentencing, and the state of the record before us, we conclude that this case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother argues that the evidence presented to the trial court did not clearly and convincingly establish that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Doyle Everette Haney, was convicted of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony, and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the consistency of the verdicts, the jury instructions, and sentencing. All of his issues could be treated as waived for failure to comply with the requirements for appellate briefs. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). However, after a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rivera Peoples (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for first degree felony murder. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Landowner owns property that was once part of a single parcel of land. The only way she can access her property is over a gravel roadway approximately nine feet wide that crosses through her neighbors’ property. One of Landowner’s neighbors erected fence posts near the roadway that Landowner alleges interfere with her ability to pull her horse trailers back and forth to her property. Landowner filed a complaint alleging she has the right to a forty foot easement across her neighbors’ property. After Landowner presented her proof at trial, Defendant neighbors moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s complaint. We reverse the dismissal as to the Landowner’s claim for interference with her use and enjoyment of the easement because she presented evidence to establish the elements of that claim. We also reverse the dismissal of the claim for damages resulting from the interference. Dismissal of the other claims by Landowner is affirmed. We remand this case for further proceedings.
 

A Crockett County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Jerry L. Crawford, Jr., for one count of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury found him guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of four years for statutory rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim “knowing” that she was under the legal age of consent; and (2) whether appellant possessed knowledge of the victim’s age simultaneously with the intent to engage in intercourse with her. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Jeremy Antwan Bryant, pled guilty to possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years but suspended the sentence and placed appellant on supervised probation. After appellant had been on probation for almost three years, the trial court revoked his probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation because the State did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellant committed new criminal offenses while on probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff was severely injured while working on the premises of his employer. Because the employer was immune from liability in tort under the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the employee’s negligence suit named as defendants two other companies whose equipment was implicated in his injury. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the employer was solely at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, resulting in no award. The plaintiff then filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion ten months after it was filed, declaring that in his capacity as the thirteenth juror he had found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The case was tried before a second jury, which reached a different verdict, finding that one of the defendant companies was 90% at fault for the plaintiff’s injury while the plaintiff himself was 10% at fault. The net verdict for the plaintiff amounted to $2,925,000. The defendant company argues on appeal that the trial court erred in vacating the first jury verdict, that the second jury verdict was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” and that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment based on it.
 

A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Harvey Brian Cochran, of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Cochran argues that the trial court erred at sentencing by allowing the State to introduce unreliable hearsay as proof of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, by failing to consider the relevant mitigating factors, and by denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review we reverse the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence and order Cochran to serve a sentence of split confinement, with ninety days to be served in periodic confinement at the county jail and the remainder of his three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation with the terms of his probation and periodic confinement to be determined by the trial court. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On January 10, 2002, the defendant, Sonny Coulter, pled guilty to one count of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years, to be served at 100%. The trial court entered a corrected judgment in 2008 in which it set forth the defendant’s supervision for life requirements. In 2011, the defendant filed a motion to “quash” the modified sentence, alleging that he had not been advised of the supervision for life requirement when he pled guilty. The trial court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief that alleged that the defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. It then summarily dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred on multiple grounds when it denied his motion, each of which is discussed below. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute over the decedent's Codicil to his Will. The Codicil divided decedent's real property between decedent's daughter and Jeff W. Powell. When decedent was on his death bed he asked a lawyer to prepare the Codicil, which described where certain property lines between the parties would be drawn, and the Codicil essentially gave 45 acres to decedent's daughter and 55 acres to Powell. During the administration of the Estate, the parties employed a surveyor to survey the property lines for the purpose of preparing the respective deeds. The surveyor determined that the description of the boundaries in the Codicil gave Powell 80 plus acres and the decedent's daughter 19 plus acres. Essentially, the Trial Court held that the descriptions created patent ambiguities, but he also concluded that even if the ambiguities were latent, extensive governance would be required to validate the Codicil, which is not appropriate. Accordingly, he voided the Codicil altogether. Powell has appealed. We reverse the Trial Court and hold that the decedent's intent was to give his daughter 45 acres and Powell 55 acres, and we reinstate the Codicil with directions to the Trial Court to direct the surveyor to reconfigure the boundaries to carry out the intent of the testator.

The defendant, James Michael England, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. The trial court held a hearing on March 30, 2011, during which the defendant acknowledged his absence from his house during the home visits and his failure to report to the community corrections office. The court found the defendant in violation of his sentence to community corrections and ordered him to serve his remaining sentence in confinement. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the defendant was in substantial compliance with the terms of his community corrections program. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner-Appellant, John R. Green, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the court treated as a motion to reopen his first petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner does not address any of the procedural issues for which the post-conviction court denied the second petition. He instead argues, as he did in his first petition for post-conviction relief, that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on a failure to communicate a plea offer and to present a defense at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.