APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Randy K. Wallace, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for one count of rape and one count of sexual battery. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for sexual battery and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, David Weed, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony. Defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses charged and was sentenced by the trial court to two years in the Shelby County Workhouse for each count, with all but 90 days suspended, after which Defendant would be placed on probation for five years. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals his sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion, or in the alternative, his request for full probation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Lynn Clark, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for second degree murder, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother of the parties’ only minor child filed two motions to alter or amend the divorce decree in order to clarify the parties’ obligations under the marital dissolution agreement regarding their 2009 income tax returns, and two petitions for civil contempt. The contempt petitions alleged that the father failed to make timely child support payments and failed to reimburse the mother for mortgage payments, medical expenses, and school-related expenses for the parties’ child. The trial court denied the motions to alter or amend,finding that the amendment sought by the mother was unnecessary and that the father breached the tax provision of the MDA as written. The court also denied the petitions for civil contempt, finding that the father purged himself of the contempt prior to hearing on the petitions. The court ordered the father to pay the mother $10,302.36 plus post-judgment interest for the tax liability she incurred due to the father’s refusal to file a joint tax return and $3,500 for the attorney’s fees the mother incurred in filing the petitions for contempt. We affirm.
 

The defendant, Andrew Hayes, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court committed plain error in its instructions to the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Much aggrieved by his convictions of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of 120 years  incarceration, the petitioner, Steve Allen Click, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief attacking the judgments based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment to the petition, and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court ruled that the petitioner had failed to establish his claims by clear and convincing evidence and denied relief. The petitioner now appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, George Lee Jones, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his 1981 Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. In this appeal, he claims that his aggravated rape conviction and accompanying sentence of life imprisonment are void because that offense was not actually classified as a Class X felony by the general assembly at the time of his crime. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Joseph Gunter ("the Petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Petitioner also sought DNA analysis of certain evidence introduced in his trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and denied the Petitioner’s request for DNA analysis. This appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, James Byron Wright, entered a guilty plea to violation of an habitual motor offender order and to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) 6th offense, and received concurrent two-year sentences on the convictions to be served by incarceration. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-212, he was released from confinement and placed on supervised probation. A little less than two months later, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Defendant failed to report to his probation officer as required. The trial court, following a hearing, found Defendant had violated his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the balance of the sentence by incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s disposition that Defendant serve the balance of his sentence by confinement is too harsh. After full review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Melvin Crump, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder in perpetration of a rape, and felony murder in perpetration of larceny. The trial court merged Petitioner’s convictions, and Petitioner was sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction can be found in this Court’s opinion in the direct appeal. State v. Melvin Crump, No. M2006-02244-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 723524 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, March 18, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn., Aug. 24, 2009). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal of the Chancery Court’s order upholding the Tennessee Department of
Labor and Workforce Development’s determination that ARI underpaid state unemployment
tax premiums. ARI appeals asserting its due process rights were violated in the
administrative hearing process and that there is not substantial and material evidence to
support the Department’s assessment. Finding no error, we affirm the Department’s
assessment of unpaid unemployment tax premiums.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw filed a claim for unemployment compensation following her termination from Westgate Resorts. The claim was originally granted by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and subsequently upheld by the Appeals Tribunal and the Board of Review. Westgate Resorts filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the Board of Review’s decision, finding that Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because she was a qualified real estate agent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-207. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Xavier Bell, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range I, standard offender, to serve nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted recordings of the Defendant’s jail telephone conversations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Rickey Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of burglary of a building and theft over $1000, both Class D felonies, based on his theft of cigarettes from a Memphis Kroger. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a multiple offender to concurrent terms of seven years for each conviction. He raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether there was a proper chain of custody and authentication for the admission of the store’s surveillance videotape; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting the store’s inventory review documents; (4) whether his constitutional rights were violated by the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing comments; and (5) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and possession of drug paraphernalia. After the denial of a motion to suppress, he was convicted by a jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years, to be served consecutively to two other sentences. This court dismissed the notice of appeal because it was filed before the trial court issued a final order from which to appeal. See State v. Gregory O. Cherry, No. W2006-00015-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2155740, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2007). The defendant then filed a “Petition for Delayed Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court denied, and this appeal followed. On appeal, he challenges: (1) the denial of the motion to suppress his statement and the evidence obtained by a warrantless search of his vehicle; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the priority of two liens, a mechanic’s lien and a bank’s deed of trust.
We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
bank. We have further determined that the mechanic’s lien is entitled to priority and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment on that issue.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and/or deliver, possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Kenneth L. Davis, No W2008-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 160927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request to amend his petition a third time and when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the post-conviction court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Before receiving medical treatment for that condition, he accepted an offer from his employer to resign in exchange for a lump sum payment of his retirement benefits. The offer was unrelated to the work injury. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) limited the employee’s award of benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in light of his voluntary retirement. On the date scheduled for trial, the trial court declined to hear evidence or permit an offer of proof concerning the voluntariness of his retirement and the extent of his vocational disability. Judgment was entered awarding permanent partial disability of one and one-half times the medical impairment. The employee has appealed. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a determination on the merits of the case.

This appeal concerns a car dealership’s protest of Hyundai’s proposal to enter into a
franchise agreement with another dealership in the same market area. During the pendency
of a contested case proceeding, the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission issued a license
to the second dealership, which began doing business. Denied relief at the administrative
level, the protesting dealership filed a petition in chancery court. The chancellor found that
the motor vehicle commission had erred in dismissing the contested case proceeding of the
protesting dealership, but dismissed the petition based upon the conclusion that the matter
was now moot. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion and affirm.

The Defendant, Nicole Starcher, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and three counts of passing a worthless check, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -121. Following a sentencing hearing, at which the trial court denied judicial diversion, the Defendant was sentenced to three years enhanced probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her application for judicial diversion. Because the trial court failed to adequately state upon the record the basis for its denial of the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion, we vacate the Defendant’s sentences and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing and correction of the judgments.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for the failure to visit or support. On appeal, Mother asserts the trial court erred by determining that her failure to visit or support her children was willful. We affirm.

The petitioner, Gerraldo White, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing an attorney to represent him, without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised, and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the State’s brief opposing his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has asserted no colorable claim to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Darryl Thompson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of forty years. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly advise him of the consequences of pleading outside his range. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Robin Paul Cagle (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery, alleging that his guilty plea was constitutionally infirm and that it was entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.