APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An employee alleged an injury to his shoulder caused by repetitive work activity. His employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim because the initial report of the injury and early medical records described only injuries to the employee’s hand and wrist. The trial court found that the shoulder injury was compensable and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. The employer appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on the issues of causation and notice. After reviewing the record and considering the employer’s arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee was found dead at a job site, and his widow made a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits. The claim was denied by his employer. A trial court found that the widow did not sustain her burden of proving that her husband’s death was caused by his employment and entered judgment in favor of the employer. The widow has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas James Heffner, appeals the revocation of the community corrections sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An employee sought reconsideration of his workers’ compensation settlement after his position was terminated due to a reduction in workforce. His employer subsequently offered employment to the employee on two occasions after his termination. His employer contended that the employee did not have a loss of employment. The trial court found that the employee was eligible for reconsideration and awarded additional benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee was eligible for reconsideration. In the alternative, the employer contends that the trial court’s award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 1983 conviction of petit larceny and his 1978 conviction of receiving stolen property. Because the petitions are time-barred and because the petitioner failed to establish grounds for tolling the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

Edith M. Ramsey and Mary E. Horton filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to the interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Pauline Martin (“the Will”). Specifically, Ms. Ramsey and Ms. Horton sought an order establishing the location and width of a right-of-way granted in the Will. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment on October 11, 2011 finding and holding, inter alia, that the right-of-way referenced in the Will was a farm road with a width of twelve feet as shown on an August 25, 2009 survey. Charles E. Martin, another beneficiary under the Will, appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the right-of-way referenced in the Will is not the farm road, but is what is referred to as the Ramsey right-of-way as shown on the August 25, 2009 survey, and we reverse the Trial Court’s judgment as to the location. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s judgment.

In this action for divorce the Chancery Court of Jefferson County awarded the parties a divorce, divided the marital property and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, both parties attack the appropriateness of the alimony award. The wife also asserts that the court erred in classifying one asset as the husband’s separate property. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order granting a Motion for Default and authorizing the clerk and master to sell the parties’ real property. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The defendant was convicted of burglary and theft, both Class D felonies. The defendant was sentenced to two concurrent seven-year terms in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s participation in an additional burglary and by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A physician convicted of driving under the influence in another state was adjudged to have engaged in “unprofessional, dishonorable or unethical conduct”, as proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b)(1), by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners; the Board placed the physician’s medical license on probation and ordered him to obtain treatment and counseling. On petition for review, the Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and reversed the Board’s decision. We reverse, holding that Tenn.Code Ann.§ 63-6-214(b)(1) provides sufficient notice to the physician that his conduct was subject to potential discipline by the Board.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Michael Wayne Davis, of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his attempted second degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance based upon an unavailable witness, the trial court’s admission of an alleged hearsay statement by a witness, and the trial court’s admission of his statement that was not timely disclosed during discovery. Upon review, we conclude that there is no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Stephanie Rena Holt, after pleading guilty to various offenses, was granted probation and placed into the Williamson County Drug Court program, with a condition of probation being that she complete the program. While serving an initial seventy-day period of incarceration, she received write-ups for infractions of several jail rules, resulting in her termination from the drug court program. Following a revocation hearing, her probation was revoked because she had not completed the drug court program. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and requiring that she be incarcerated for the remainder of her sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. A jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of first degree murder, the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which the trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Appellant challenges his convictions, claiming that his confession was the product of an illegal arrest and was involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Larsen, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. Larsen’s guilty plea hearing indicated that he attempted to reserve a certified question of law on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 at the time he entered his guilty plea. Following the dismissal of his appeal on the basis that the appellate record contained no attachment or corrective order setting out a certified question of law, Larsen filed a petition to rehear, arguing that the attachment containing the certified question referenced on the judgment form “became detached from the judgment sheet before the record was prepared and transmitted.” This Court subsequently granted Larsen’s petition to rehear and motion to supplement the appellate record with this attachment and vacated its previous order dismissing the appeal. Larsen timely supplemented the appellate record with the missing attachment, which stated the following certified question of law: “[W]hether the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that his pre-trial detention was not for a valid remedial purpose but rather was punitive.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Mario Morris, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Plaintiff, David Desgro, alleged that he hired defendant, Paul Pack d/b/a Resi Chek, to perform an inspection on a house plaintiff wanted to purchase. After defendant inspected the house and reported the house had no major problems, plaintiff purchased the house in reliance on defendant’s report. Plaintiff claims that he then discovered multiple serious issues with the house, including plumbing problems, insulation and heat pump problems, and inadequate floor support. Plaintiff filed suit 13 months after the inspection was completed, and defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff’s signed contract with defendant provided that plaintiff must file suit on any claims within one year of the date of inspection. The trial court found that plaintiff signed such an agreement and that the contractual limitations period of one year was reasonable. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, ruling that plaintiff’s claims were untimely. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, William Glenn Wiley, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial based on "the State’s systematic late-disclosures of exculpatory evidence," which rendered his trial counsel presumptively ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In the alternative, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard based on counsel’s inadequate response to the late-disclosed evidence and failure to call two exculpatory witnesses at his trial. Finally, the petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new post-conviction evidentiary hearing because of the post-conviction court’s denial of his request for a continuance and an order to have the potentially exculpatory fingerprint evidence analyzed. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Robert M. Deunes-Cruz, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest, Class C felonies. SeeT.C.A. §§ 39-13-532, 39-15-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of three years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lavon Douglas Robertson, was convicted by a jury of one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years of supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of a one-room "dwelling" used by the Defendant and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shavon Page, pled guilty to five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary, in exchange for an effective sentence of thirty years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner contends first that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615, to have his trial counsel excluded from the courtroom during the post-conviction hearing. He next contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case, which rendered the Petitioner’s guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Respectfully, I would not engage in an analysis of standing relative to the dirt road leading from the public road to the defendant’s building.

The petitioner, Brenda Reynalda Inzunza, appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to advise her of the deportation consequences of her guilty plea and that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ , 130 S. Ct. 1476 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time she entered her plea. In the alternative, she argues that due process considerations should operate to toll the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Jose Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his guilty plea, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner claims that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), his counsel was deficient in failing to advise him regarding the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The petition was filed more than one year after the guilty plea, and the post-conviction court denied relief based on the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). We conclude that a post-conviction action does not lie when the petitioner’s record has been expunged and no conviction exists. In addition, the trial court was correct in concluding the petition was time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal.