APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marcus Frazier Thompson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of five counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2010). He was sentenced as a career offender to ninety years to be served at sixty percent. On appeal he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of a prospective juror’s race, (3) a witness’s testimony should have been excluded due to a violation of the rule of sequestration, and (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of ammunition found during a search of the Defendant’s apartment. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the summary denial of his fourth pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1999, the petitioner pled guilty to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and received a two-year sentence, which was to be served in Community Corrections after ninety days incarceration. Based upon a blood sample taken from the petitioner as part of the intake process, he was later convicted, in two separate cases, of two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He is currently serving an effective thirty-four year sentence in the Department of Correction on those convictions. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily denying his petition. Following review of the record, we affirm the court’s determination.

The issue in this post-divorce proceeding is whether a parent seeking to modify a residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan must prove that an alleged material change in circumstances could not reasonably have been anticipated when the residential parenting schedule was originally established. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) (2010), enacted in 2004, abrogated any prior Tennessee decision that could have been read as requiring such proof. Accordingly, because the father who sought modification in this case was not required to prove that his remarriage, relocation, changed work schedule, and natural aging of his children were unanticipated, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment modifying the residential parenting schedule to give the mother 222 days and the father 143 days of residential parenting time with the two minor children.

Subcontractor B hired subcontractor A to install bathrooms in fulfillment of subcontractor B’s contracts with general contractors. After it was terminated by subcontractor B, subcontractor A sued to recover payments owed for work subcontractor A completed before termination. Subcontractor B filed a counterclaim for damages and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed subcontractor B’s counterclaim and found that subcontractor A was entitled to quantum meruit recovery. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Joann G. Rosa, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her conviction for first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial judge who presided over her jury trial pleaded guilty to official misconduct, that the judge’s misconduct was newly discovered evidence entitling her to a new trial, that the judge’s misconduct created structural error entitling her to a new trial, and that the trial judge who denied coram nobis relief had a conflict of interest because she was mentioned in the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) report regarding the misconduct allegation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Xavion Lyndon Underwood, was convicted of aggravated robbery, for which he received a ten-year sentence. He appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Enrique Leon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, William Richard Hicks, alias Billy Richard Hicks, appeals from his convictions for various alcohol- and driving-related offenses, which we will detail, the most serious of which were DUI, tenth offense, and violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender (“HMVO”) statute. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each of these convictions, with the HMVO sentences to be served consecutively and the DUI and misdemeanor convictions to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. From these sentences he appeals, arguing that his sentences are excessive and that the court erred in ordering they be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 91142, Count 5, to reflect the length of the defendant’s sentence as eleven months, twenty-nine days, which was omitted.

The Defendant, Justin Gibson, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence, first offense. He agreed to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after seven days’ incarceration. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the warrantless search of his home as not justified by either consent or exigent circumstances. After a thorough review of the applicable law, we conclude that the officer’s entry into the Defendant’s home was supported by neither exigent circumstances nor as a part of the community caretaker function; therefore, the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the Defendant.

The petitioner, Jarrett Inman, pled guilty in the Roane County Criminal Court to rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to seventeen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence of the victim’s recantation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Yovonda Sherith Chambers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a health care liability action wherein the trial by jury resulted in a judgment for the Defendant, Dr. Timothy Renfree. Plaintiffs, Larry and Dinnie Burchfield, filed this lawsuit against Dr. Renfree alleging that he negligently performed surgery on Mr. Burchfield’s right arm and caused nerve damage. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Dr. Renfree, the Burchfields filed post-trial motions seeking relief from the judgment and alleging numerous errors in the administration of the trial. The trial court denied the post-trial motions and affirmed the jury’s verdict as thirteenth juror. The Burchfields appealed. We vacate the jury’s verdict, finding reversible error in the administration of the trial, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Anthony Whited, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he presented a colorable claim for relief and that he should, therefore, have been afforded the assistance of post-conviction counsel and an evidentiary hearing. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of post-conviction counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Overbay, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief for his conviction for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, William Lanier, of premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant asserts: (1) that he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Anthony Mullins to testify as a blood spatter expert; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting blood spatter evidence that was insufficiently authenticated; (5) that the trial court improperly limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses; (6) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its questioning of witnesses and closing argument; and (7) that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Earl Evans (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to ten years’ probation. Upon the filing of a probation revocation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence of ten years’ incarceration. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s ruling, asserting that the trial court erred in sentencing him to his original sentence in confinement. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court awarded an employee 85% permanent partial disability to both ears. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding the employee’s claim was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(b). We affirm the trial court’s determination that the employee’s claim was timely filed.

The petitioner, Broderick Joseph Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal concerns the application of a statutory amendment to a contract the plaintiff had with the city. The plaintiff claims the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 8-198, effective July 1, 2011, violates article I, section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that the amendment does not apply to existing contracts. The trial court concluded that the retroactive application of the amendment was not a constitutional violation. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In 2011, the Tennessee General Assembly amended Tennessee’s voting procedures to provide for the use of photographic identification in elections. The General Assembly amended these procedures in 20122 and again in 2013.3 I concur with the Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of these procedures as they stood in 2012. I write separately, however, to address the threshold matter of the standard of review that should be used to address the constitutionality of these amendments.

Defendant, Dustin Marshall Goforth, was serving a suspended eight-year sentence on supervised probation. Violation of probation warrants were filed, and his suspended sentence was revoked after an evidentiary hearing. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration in the Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for the judge to recuse himself in this case prior to the evidentiary hearing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

St. Thomas Hospital suspended a surgeon’s hospital privileges and restored them less than three months later, as part of a settlement in which the doctor also waived a “fair hearing,” which was the next step in the hospital’s procedures. The surgeon subsequently sued the hospital, contending that it had not properly followed its own bylaws in regard to the suspension of his privileges and that he was therefore entitled to damages for breach of contract, defamation of character, and tortious interference with business relations. The hospital denied that it had violated any of its bylaws and asserted that it was entitled to immunity for its actions under the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 and the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Because the surgeon failed to show that the hospital did not follow its bylaws, because of his settlement and waiver of a fair hearing, the hospital was entitled to the immunity granted to the peer review process. We affirm.

Defendant, Lavario Devon Kibble, entered guilty pleas to reckless endangerment and aggravated assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Under the agreement he received consecutive sentences of one year for reckless endangerment and four years for aggravated assault. The manner of service of the effective sentence of five years was left to determination by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served totally by incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have ordered an alternative sentence of either split confinement or periodic confinement. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Darrell Carpenter, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder in November of 2007. At the conclusion of a jury trial, he was convicted of the offense as charged in the indictment and sentenced to twenty years in incarceration as a violent offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant did not seek an appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. The trial court granted the motion for delayed appeal. In this Court, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence resulting in his second degree murder conviction. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to this court’s opinion in Stephen Anthony Scott v. State, No. M2010-00448-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632, at *5 (Nashville, Aug. 16, 2011), the Montgomery County Circuit Court resentenced the appellant, Stephen Anthony Scott, to the presumptive minimum sentence in the range for his convictions of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted robbery. Six months later, the trial court found the appellant to be an especially mitigated offender and further reduced his sentences for count 3, especially aggravated kidnapping, and count 4, kidnapping, by ten percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender for all of the offenses, and that his sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to classify the appellant as an especially mitigated offender and could not reduce his sentences by ten percent. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of his previous sentences for counts 3 and 4. Regarding the issues raised on appeal, we conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgments of the trial court.