APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Patient brought a health care liability action against his eye surgeon, alleging that the surgeon’s negligence in performing a LASIK procedure resulted in several eye injuries. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the surgeon, finding the patient failed to present evidence establishing the standard of care and causation. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to create an issue for the jury, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subjectmatter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrew Barry Diebold, entered pleas of guilty to possession of marijuana with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced, respectively, to two years as a standard offender, to serve ninety days, with one year and nine months of unsupervised probation, and to ninety days at 75%. As a condition of his pleas, he reserved as a certified question if the warrantless search of his backpack by a law enforcement officer was illegal. The search was made by the defendant’s father, who was a lieutenant with the Brownsville Police Department, as the backpack was in the passenger side of the father’s truck, which the defendant had been operating. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney failed to act diligently in his representation of a client and suspended the attorney from the practice of law for forty-five days. The trial court affirmed the suspension. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the loan servicing company. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In December 2011, Chad Seigmund (“Employee”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course of his employment. His employer, Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC (“Employer”) provided medical treatment but denied that Employee sustained permanent impairment or disability. Following a trial, the trial court found that Employee had sustained permanent disability and awarded Employee 16.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the permanent disabilityfinding. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Edward Carter, was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve 11 months and 29 days in the county jail, suspended to community corrections. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, Father appeals the rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido awarded to Mother, the amount of parenting time he received, the designation of Mother as sole decision-maker and the failure of the trial court to find that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido and the designation of Mother as primary residential parent; we vacate and remand for further consideration the residential parenting schedule,the allocation of decision-making authority, and the determination of Mother’s income.

In 1996, the Petitioner, Alicia Shayne Lovera, was found guilty by a jury of first degree premeditated murder of her husband. On the morning of the sentencing hearing in which the State was seeking a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, the Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to first degree premeditated murder in return for a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. In March 1999, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On December 19, 2013, the Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging the judgment of conviction was void on its face because it was entered upon her plea of guilty after she had been found guilty by a jury. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing for failure to state a claim. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

This case arises out of an investigation by the Memphis police department of a business suspected of selling illegal inhalants. The business owner was arrested and charged with the criminal sale of inhalants. The police seized bank accounts belonging to the owner and two corporations related to the business and instituted forfeiture proceedings regarding the funds in those accounts. The bank account owner and the two corporations filed suit against the city and multiple police officers seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court stated that the amended complaint failed to allege any Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations, the grounds upon which the plaintiffs sought relief. With respect to the only remaining individual defendant, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the first amended complaint, holding, in part, that the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies precluded any Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims. We affirm.

An employee was exposed to a chemical in the course of his employment. He alleged that he developed a disabling pulmonary condition as a result of the exposure.  His employer denied that the condition was caused by the exposure. The trial court found for the employee and awarded permanent partial disability and other benefits.  The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation.  The appeal has been referred to the  Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.  

Dennis Turner was injured while playing softball in a charity tournament at Marvin Rich Field in Bean Station. He sued the City of Bean Station, among other defendants, alleging that the City negligently failed to properly maintain the pitcher’s mound, pitcher’s rubber, and the field as a whole, resulting in his injury. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that its governmental immunity is not removed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), which removes immunity for “any injury caused by the dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement owned and controlled by [a] governmental entity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-204(a)(2012) (emphasis added). The City presented proof establishing that it does not own Marvin Rich Field. The trial court denied the motion but granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant the City’s motion for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without conducting a hearing. He claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his current sentence is illegal because it was enhanced based upon prior illegal sentences and that the illegal sentences were improperly used to impeach him at trial. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Mother’s parental rights to her children were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and noncompliance with a permanency plan. Mother challenged the ground of abandonment, arguing there was a no contact order in place that prevented her from visiting her children. When the no contact order was put into place, Mother was informed she would be able to visit her children if she passed drug tests and took parenting classes. Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and failed to take advantage of services offered by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mother abandoned her children by failing to visit them and that it is in their best interest to terminate her rights. A petition for custody that may have been pending when Mother’s rights were terminated is part of a different proceeding and does not render the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights premature.

Lashay Nicole Scruggs (“the Defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) placing heavy emphasis on charges listed as “pending” in the pre-sentence report but that were actually disposed of prior to the sentencing hearing; (2) placing emphasis on the presence of marijuana in the Defendant’s system when marijuana use was not an element of vehicular manslaughter as charged in this case; and (3) placing emphasis on the need to deter others from driving irresponsibly when there was no evidence of such a need in the record. Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the modification of Father’s parenting time and the juvenile court’s allocation of child support obligations. Father petitioned to modify custody or, alternatively, the residential parenting schedule. The juvenile court found that there had been no material change in circumstance and did not modify the primary residential parent designation. However, the court decreased Father’s parenting time and increased his child support obligation. Father appeals the juvenile court’s finding of no materialchange in circumstance, the modification of his parenting time, and the juvenile court’s failure to apply a credit for transportation costs against his child support obligation. Because we find the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Petitioner, Glyn Terrance Dale, Sr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for introducing into evidence at trial two statements the victim made to an investigator from the Department of Children Services (DCS). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the grant of a default judgment entered against him on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the motion prior to the hearing and, consequently, could not present a defense. Upon consideration of the entire record, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

The defendant, Leslie Allen Ware, Jr., appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine for sale or delivery, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold, facilitation of theft, facilitation of conspiracy to commit robbery, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide. The defendant received an effective sentence of 36 years. He claims on appeal that the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An individual employed by Claiborne County as Director of Schools was terminated over two years earlier than the employment term set forth in the parties’ contract. The county and the individual entered into another contract (“modified contract”) whereby the individual agreed to work as Safety Coordinator for five months and be compensated in an amount equal to the amount he would have been paid had the prior contract not been terminated. This resulted in a salary increase of nearly $40,000 per month for each of the five months the individual was employed as Safety Coordinator. The modified contract provided that the employee would be paid whether he performed any work or not, and the employee agreed to waive and release any claims he might have against the county. When the employee applied for retirement benefits,the agencyin charge of calculating the amount of benefits did not treat the nearly $40,000 increase in compensation as “earnable compensation” because the additional compensation was not for “services rendered,” as required by the statute. The employee contested this decision, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the agency, granting the agency’s motion for summary judgment. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The employee appeals the trial court’s judgment to this Court, and we affirm.

Petitioner, Thaddeus Johnson, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. For these crimes, he received a life sentence and a consecutive twenty-five year sentence. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal, Petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition and also alleges ineffective assistance at the post-conviction hearing. After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff in suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of his arrest appeals the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed on behalf of the City and Police Chief and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers who participated in his arrest. In responding to the motions, plaintiff acknowledged that the claims against City, Police Chief and two of the officers should be dismissed; we affirm the dismissal of those claims and parties. The order granting summary judgment to the remaining officer does not state the legal ground therefor or make findings of fact relative thereto; consequently, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We reverse the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend to substitute one of the officers for the defendant named John Doe.

A funeral director sustained injuries to his shoulder and back while assisting with carrying a casket. His injury was accepted as compensable. Within a few days, he submitted a letter of resignation to his employer. After recovering from his injuries, he filed this action seeking permanent disability benefits. He also sought reconsideration of a previous settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that the employee was not entitled to reconsideration of the earlier settlement and that any award for his later injury was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap because of his voluntary resignation. The trial court found that the employee did not voluntarily resign, granted the petition for reconsideration, and awarded benefits for the second injury in excess of the cap. The employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This litigation is a dispute between the boards of education of the cities of Athens and Etowah (“the City School Boards”) on the one hand and McMinn County (“the County”) over the distribution of tax revenues among the various school systems within the county. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (2013) mandates that “[a]ll school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee” among the local education agencies in the county based upon average daily school attendance. Over the years spanning from 1996 to 2011, the County apportioned funds in the account designated “general purpose school fund” to the City School Boards, but did not apportion funds from the County’s “educational capital projects fund.” The County argues that funds appropriated for and spent on school capital projects are not “school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes” under the language of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted the County summary judgment. It dismissed the complaint of the City School Boards. We affirm.

At an earlier time, in 2011, Betty Graham had filed a lawsuit arising out of a failed real estate transaction against (1) her real estate agent, Ginny Hall; (2) Crye-Leike Realty Corporation; (3) S&J Southeast Investments, LLC, the potential buyer of her condominium with whom she had unsuccessfully negotiated a contract; and (4) attorney Ellie Hill, her trial court appointed guardian ad litem. The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Graham appealed, but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Following her dismissal, our mandate, see Tenn. R. App. P. 42, 43, was issued on January 4, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Graham, acting pro se, “refiled” a lawsuit that is functionally identical to her first complaint. In her second suit, she relied upon the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2000). The trial court dismissed her second complaint on the ground of res judicata. We affirm that dismissal. Furthermore, we conclude that Graham’s suit is frivolous. Hence, this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses associated with this appeal.