APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Branden Eric Michael Delong, appeals the Chester County Circuit Court’s
ordering him to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement after revoking his probation,
arguing that the trial court should have elected to place him back on supervised probation.
Based on our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation
but reverse the court’s placing his original ten-year sentence into effect and remand the
case to the trial court for findings related to the appropriate consequence for that revocation.

The Petitioner, Joseph Wilson, was convicted in 2001 by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of a number of offenses, including attempted second degree murder and three counts
of aggravated rape, based on his having raped and cut the throat of a woman during his
participation with accomplices in burglarizing her home. In February 2022, the Petitioner
filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et. seq., for DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit, the
knife used to cut the victim’s throat, the clothing the victim was wearing at the time of the
assault, and assorted other items recovered from the bathroom where the sexual assault
occurred, asserting that “significant technological developments in forensic methodologies
over the last fifteen years [have occurred] that may now make it possible to conclusively
identify the true perpetrator[.]” Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the
petition, finding that the Petitioner had not shown there was a reasonable probability that
he would not have been prosecuted or convicted or that new DNA testing would resolve
an issue that had not been previously resolved. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the
post-conviction court erred in finding that the Petitioner did not satisfy the requirements
for DNA analysis pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The State concedes
that DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit and the knife is warranted but argues that it is
not warranted for the other pieces of evidence. We agree with the State that DNA analysis
is warranted for the sexual assault kit and unwarranted for the items collected from the
bathroom and for the victim’s clothing that was not collected as part of the sexual assault
kit. However, we disagree that DNA analysis is warranted for the knife. Accordingly, we
reverse the denial of the request for DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit but affirm the
denial of the request for DNA analysis of the knife and additional items. Thus, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order for DNA testing consistent with
this opinion.

The pro se petitioner, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights and the stepparent adoption of her two children by their stepmother. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The termination was conjoined with a stepparent adoption, which the trial court granted. The Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting the stepparent adoption.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Bevis, Jr., of two counts
of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during
the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of
thirty-five years at eighty-five percent for the attempted murder convictions and a
consecutive ten-year sentence at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. On
appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court failed to declare a mistrial in response to
numerous outbursts by the victims’ families; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; (3) the trial court erred in overruling the defense’s objection when the
prosecutor misrepresented evidence during closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and attempted first degree murder
without serious bodily injury. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to reflect the accurate
conviction offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

Appellees, a married couple at the time, purchased two properties. Appellants, Husband’s adult daughters from a previous relationship, sought imposition of resulting trusts on the respective properties. Appellants, each of whom lived in one of the properties, maintained that they had agreements with their father whereby they would own the properties so long as they paid all expenses thereon. Appellee/Wife disputed such arrangement and maintained that the disputed properties were marital properties. Because of the suspect circumstances surrounding the purchases of the properties and the disputed testimony regarding any agreements by and between Husband and Appellants, Wife argued that the properties were not subject to the imposition of the equitable remedy of resulting trusts. The trial court denied Appellants’ respective petitions to establish resulting trusts, and they appeal. Because Appellants failed to meet the burden of proof to establish resulting trusts, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Travis Haynes, of first-degree murder,
tampering with evidence, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, for which he
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The defendant also
argues the trial court erred in not allowing the introduction of autopsy photographs through
Ms. Dinkins, in failing to include an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and in denying
the defendant’s motion to continue. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Moquann Smith, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective eleven-year sentence in confinement and three years of probation. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14-105(a)(4) (2018) (grading of theft). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting a video recording and several photographs depicting him with a handgun. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Khalil Young, pleaded guilty to attempted carjacking and kidnapping, and
the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying
his request for diversion and alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and
considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric DeShawn Webb, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s partial denial of his motion to reduce his sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and imposition of an effective 10-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated rioting and aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape, alleging that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

A Tipton County jury found the defendant, Kevin Scott Pendleton, guilty of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon for which he received a sentence of ten years in confinement.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

A general contractor sued two business entities and their sole owner for breach of contract. The defendants denied liability and filed a counter-complaint. Four years later, the contractor moved for sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 16.06. The trial court entered a default judgment against the defendants and dismissed their counterclaims with prejudice due to their repeated failure to comply with pretrial orders. The defendants moved to set aside the final judgment. The trial court granted the owner relief from the judgment. But it refused to set aside the judgment against his two companies. And it granted the contractor summary judgment against the owner on the remaining claims. We affirm.

Defendant, Frank James Hastings, appeals his effective sentence of twenty-two years related to three cases in which he entered open best interest pleas. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive service and denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed
pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, wherein he sought DNA
testing of evidence related to his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted
second-degree murder. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Wayne Daryl Potee, pleaded guilty in case numbers 2015-CR-185 and 2015- CR-186 to one count of selling 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine in a Drug-Free School Zone (“DFSZ”) and one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine in a DFSZ. Defendant received an effective 15-year sentence to serve at 100 percent for his convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h)(1), which the trial court denied following two evidentiary hearings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. In his brief to this Court, Defendant acknowledges that he has no right of appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, see State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). He nonetheless asserts that the trial court’s ruling was fundamentally illegal and asks this Court to grant a writ of certiorari. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we deny Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jaquan Gathing, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

The Defendant, Ralph Lee Atkins, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The
Defendant was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court

This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Tara C. (“Mother”)to two of her children, Kamdyn H. and Bentyn H. upon finding that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was mentally incompetent and that it was in the best interest of Kamdyn and Bentyn for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.

A former Shelby County employee alleges that she was wrongfully terminated by the
County and that the Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board (CSMB)
improperly declined to consider her appeal. The CSMB’s decision not to consider her
appeal was based upon its determination that the former employee was administratively
removed from her position, not punitively terminated, and, accordingly, the matter was
beyond its authority. The former employee sought judicial review of the CSMB’s decision
in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The Chancery Court dismissed, concluding that the
CSMB did not err on the merits and that the Chancery Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The former employee appeals to this court. Based upon a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, we affirm the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the former employee’s
petition for judicial review.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee from a circuit court judge’s denial of a motion to recuse. The Appellant moved for recusal based on the judge’s setting a trial date, based on the judge’s having filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Responsibility against the Appellant’s attorney in an unrelated case, and based on criticism of the attorney in an
unrelated case. The judge denied the recusal on the merits and also due to a failure to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 10B. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

Plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against several defendants. Following a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and that the action was untimely. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and, following our review, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Joseph Floyd, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking postconviction
relief from his convictions of driving under the influence (two counts) and
reckless driving. He received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days,
which was suspended after service of seven days. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his ex-girlfriend as a witness at trial and claims
she would have established that the Petitioner was not the driver at the time of the offense.
The Petitioner also argues the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because the
court initially “advised [the Petitioner] that it would accept an affidavit of [his exgirlfriend]
as a substitute for live testimony” and later denied the Petitioner relief for failure
to produce witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

The Smith County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Ralph Edward Overstreet, Jr., for burglary, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the prosecutor’s previous representation of Defendant created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification and a new trial; (2) the State violated its discovery obligations by introducing evidence that the State allegedly did not disclose of a prior domestic incident between Defendant and his girlfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of any other conviction. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Decedent’s son, individually and as personal representative of his mother’s estate, sued several of his siblings and decedent mother’s bank. Among other things, the son alleged that the bank breached its duties to the decedent by disbursing funds out of her checking and savings accounts following her death. Eventually, the bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not negligent in its handling of the decedent’s accounts, nor did it breach any contractual duty to either the decedent or her son. The son appeals and, discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm.