APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Perry L. McCrobey, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State concedes that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing Defendant’s motion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand for appointment of counsel if Defendant is indigent and for other proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.

Residents of the Sylvan Park neighborhood of Nashville filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of a decision by the Metropolitan Planning Commission to recommend that the Metropolitan Council disapprove an ordinance which would expand the historic conservation overlay district in the neighborhood. The Planning Commission moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the Planning Commission’s decision “was only a recommendation and not a ‘final order’ from which an appeal may be taken with a writ of certiorari.” The court granted the motion, holding that the decision by the Planning Commission was not a final order, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Residents appeal. Because the Metropolitan Council must take further action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation before the zoning ordinance is enacted, the decision of the Planning Commission is not a final order or judgment for purposes of judicial review; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.      

In 2013, Libertad Claborn (Wife) obtained a “default judgment for dissolution of marriage” from a trial court in Illinois. Wife had resided in Illinois since 2011. The Illinois court ordered the sale of the marital residence in Chattanooga and directed Bobby L. Claborn (Husband) to “cooperate fully” in the sale. The Illinois judgment also ordered Husband to pay child support and educational expenses for the parties’ children. Wife properly enrolled the judgment in Tennessee and sought its enforcement. The trial court in Tennessee accorded full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment. Husband appeals, arguing that (1) the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale of the marital residence; (2) the foreign judgment contains provisions at odds with Tennessee public policy; (3) the trial court improperly declined to transfer the matter to chancery court; and (4) the trial court entered a “default” judgment without allowing him to present defenses. We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a health care liability action and concerns the question of proper venue. Plaintiff filed her original lawsuit in Shelby County against the Appellants, a pathology group located in Shelby County. Appellants answered the complaint and raised, as an affirmative defense, the comparative negligence of Appellees, plaintiff's primary care physician and his employer, who are residents of Sumner County. Plaintiff then moved, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-1-119, for leave to amend her complaint to add the Sumner County residents to the lawsuit. Leave was granted, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. Appellees answered the complaint and averred that venue was improper in Shelby County under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-4-101(b). Appellees asked for dismissal of the lawsuit; however, rather than dismissing the lawsuit, the Shelby County court transferred the case to Sumner County. Appellants appeal. We affirm and remand.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Ryan Scott Haraway, pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated burglary, one count of forgery, one count of theft of property, two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, and three counts of assault. The total effective sentence was seven years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a dispute over a narrow strip of real property adjacent to the boundary line of tracts of land owned by plaintiffs Wayne Holtsclaw and Willie Holtsclaw and defendants Darrell Johnson and Brenda Johnson. The Holtsclaws brought this action seeking ejectment and a declaration that they owned the disputed property. The Johnsons asserted, among other things, that they were entitled to the property because of their many years of adverse possession. The Holtsclaws responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 (2000 & Supp. 2015) bars the Johnsons' adverse possession claim because, for more than twenty years, the Johnsons had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. The Johnsons responded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tenn. 2007), which held that § 28-2-110 is not applicable “when the tracts are contiguous, a relatively small area is at issue, and the adjacent owners making claims of ownership have paid their respective real estate taxes,” applied in this case. The trial court ruled that the Johnsons established ownership by adverse possession and that the “Cumulus exception” applies. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Marquette Houston, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County judge convicted the Defendant, Steven Darrell Little, of one count of indecent exposure and sentenced him to six months of probation and ordered a $500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we conclude that there is no error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Cody Cofer, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Cumberland County. He was convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received consecutive life sentences and a concurrent twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Owner of real property conveyed, by quitclaim deed, an interest to herself and her son as joint tenants, with the right of survivorship. Owner then conveyed her interest to her grandson by quitclaim deed a year later. In the deed to her grandson, Owner expressly referenced the earlier deed to her son, the grandson’s father. After Owner died, the son filed a declaratory judgment in which he asked the court to rule that he owns the property in fee simple. The son filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The grandson appealed the trial court’s judgment. We affirm. Owner transferred her right of survivorship to her grandson; but this right would come into play only if her son predeceased her. Because Owner died first, the son exercised his right of survivorship and became the sole owner in fee of the property.
 

Defendant, John Frank Mullins, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1000 and was sentenced to eight years on Community Corrections. After a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the terms of his Community Corrections sentence, revoked the Community Corrections sentence, and ordered Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Laquint Deco Holder, pleaded guilty to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence of six years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. We therefore affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee fell from a roof in the course of his employment and sustained fractures of his left leg. The injury required three surgical procedures, including a fusion of his injured ankle, which resulted in the shortening of one leg. He asserted that his altered gait from the leg injury has caused disability to his lower back and that the permanency of his injuries has resulted in severe clinical depression. When the employee and the employer were unable to resolve the issue of workers' compensation benefits, the employee filed suit. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that the leg injury extended to the body as a whole and, further, that the employee, who had been unable to return to work, was entitled to an award of benefits in excess of six times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 (2008 & Supp. 2013). The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning disability to the body as a whole and by awarding a 90% vocational disability, which is in excess of six times the anatomical disability of 12%. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth A. Adams, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition on the grounds that it was untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the 2009 termination of a city police officer's employment on grounds of unfitness for duty due to post-traumatic stress disorder suffered as a result of the officer's active military service while on leave from his employment. Following an administrative hearing in November 2009, the city council originally upheld the police chief''s termination of the officer's employment. The officer commenced this action in state court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court. Upon hearing, the trial court found, inter alia, that the city council had incorrectly applied a statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106, which had been overruled by an agreed consent order previously entered into between the United States and the State of Tennessee. See United States v. Tennessee, Civil Action No. 1:98-1357. The trial court therefore reversed the city council's decision and ordered the officer's reinstatement with back pay. The city appealed to this Court. In a 2012 decision, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the incorrect application of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106 and remanded the case, directing the trial court to instruct the city council regarding the appropriate legal standard. See Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2011-00484-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2974762 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012). Following remand, the city council conducted a second hearing and again voted to uphold the prior termination of the officer's employment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Micah Cates, was convicted by a Carter County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication. Prior to trial, the Defendant moved the trial court to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless blood draw. The trial court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial where the State introduced evidence of the Defendant's blood alcohol content. Following the Defendant's conviction, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of eight years with a release eligibility of 30 percent. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his warrantless blood draw, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Upon our review, we conclude that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless blood draw in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the blood draw and vacate his conviction.

The Defendant, Dennis Allen Rayfield, was convicted of first degree murder by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching him, (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the alternate jurors at the close of the proof, and (4) the trial court erred in permitting the sequestered jurors to have their cell phones in their possession during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymond Lee Swett, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

An employee sustained various injuries in a motor vehicle accident. Her employer denied the claim for workers‘ compensation benefits, contending that because the employee was driving to her home from work, the injury was not compensable. The trial court awarded benefits, including permanent total disability, based upon its finding that at the time of the accident the employee was returning to her office after an employment-related client visit. The employer has appealed, raising several issues which primarily relate to whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court‘s findings. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers‘ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Joe Jackson, of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Jodi Lynn Jenkins (“Wife”), filed this divorce action against the defendant, Steven Louis Jenkins (“Husband”), on March 20, 2014. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement regarding certain issues, including an equitable division of their marital property, a permanent parenting plan, and child support. The trial court conducted a hearing on September 10, 2014, regarding the remaining issues of alimony and attorney's fees. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $3,500 per month until Husband's child support obligation terminated and $4,500 per month thereafter. The court also awarded Wife $5,000 in attorney's fees.1 Husband timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand this action to the trial court for a determination regarding the issue of a reasonable award of attorney's fees to Wife incurred in defending this appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Hubbard, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court‘s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault and resulting effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a favorable witness to testify, that the trial court erred by ruling that the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault did not violate double jeopardy principles, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial and appellate counsel failed to raise the double jeopardy issue. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties‘ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this parental termination case, A.J.S.P. (Mother) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor son, E.T.P. (the Child). After the Child was placed in state custody and adjudicated dependent and neglected, custody was awarded to a non-relative. Subsequently, physical custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services (DCS). At that time, both parents were incarcerated. As to Mother, DCS filed a petition to terminate her rights to the child based on her wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal, Mother challenges only the court’s best interest determination. We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. The plaintiffs, Margie Hunt and husband, Rickey Hunt, claim that Mrs. Hunt suffered injuries proximately caused by the conduct of the defendants with respect to two surgeries. Prior to filing their complaint, the plaintiffs gave timely written notice of their claim to potential defendants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2013). Each of the three defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Their separate motions were predicated on their assertion that the plaintiffs' pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, part of the Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization with their pre-suit notice. They also contend that the plaintiffs failed to attach to the complaint the medical authorization and also the pre-suit notice served upon the defendants. The defendant Dr. Nitin J. Rangnekar also relies upon the ground of insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied each defendant's motion. On the defendants' further motions, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We likewise granted the defendants permission to file a Rule 9 appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.