APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s order holding him in
criminal contempt. Due to the deficiencies in Husband’s brief, we do not reach the
substantive issues. Appeal dismissed.

I join in full the majority opinion’s analysis of the Brady issue and its judgment
affirming Tony Thomas’s conviction. I also agree with much of the majority’s analysis
regarding the accomplice-corroboration rule, including its decision to abrogate that rule. I
respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that our holding abrogating
the accomplice-corroboration rule should apply only in future cases and pending cases that
have not yet gone to trial. I would instead apply that holding here—and to other cases
pending in trial courts or in appellate courts on direct review—and affirm Laronda Turner’s
conviction on that basis. I write separately to offer an additional reason why the
accomplice-corroboration rule should be abrogated and to explain why our decision should
apply retroactively.1

This is a divorce proceeding in which the wife filed a divorce complaint against the husband on the grounds of adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. While the action was pending, Husband drafted a handwritten reconciliation document in which he promised that the marital residence would become the wife’s separate property if he ever “cheated” on her again, “in consideration of her reconciling with [him] (also dropping the
divorce lawsuit currently filed).” Although the wife took no action to “drop” or dismiss the divorce complaint, the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. Upon learning that the husband’s infidelity had resumed, the wife successfully motioned to set aside the order of dismissal, and the case went to trial. In its final order, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct due to the husband’s infidelity. Because the wife took no action to enforce the purported reconciliation agreement, the court classified the marital residence as marital property, not the wife’s separate property. The court awarded the wife approximately $3.9 million in marital assets, of which $1.3 million was liquid assets, representing 60% of the marital estate. The court further awarded the wife $13,000 per month in transitional alimony for eight years and $229,000 in alimony in solido, but declined to award her alimony in futuro. The court also denied the wife’s request to recover her attorney’s fees and expenses. The wife appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to classify the marital residence as her separate property and in failing to award her alimony in futuro as well as her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

After a Dickson County jury trial, Defendant, Kirk D. Farmer, was convicted of vandalism of $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and disorderly conduct. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his vandalism conviction. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted two defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, of three counts of
first-degree premeditated murder. Those convictions stem from a triple homicide that
occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, in 2015. Another co-defendant, Demarco Hawkins, was
also implicated in the killings. However, his trial was severed from the other defendants,
and he testified against Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner. After Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner
were convicted, they appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising five issues for
review. The intermediate appellate court ruled unanimously on three of the issues, but one
judge dissented on the other two. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner sought permission to appeal,
and we accepted the appeal only as to the two issues on which the intermediate appellate
court was divided. First, we agreed to consider whether the prosecution breached the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to produce statements
made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer conferences, which were allegedly inconsistent with Mr.
Hawkins’ formal statement to law enforcement, before trial. Second, we agreed to address
whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ms. Turner’s murder convictions. Based
on our review, we conclude that the State did not breach its obligations under Brady with
regard to Mr. Thomas. Additionally, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions because Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not adequately
corroborated.1 As a result, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part
and reverse in part. Additionally, in this opinion, we abrogate Tennessee’s common law
accomplice-corroboration rule. However, we apply that change on a prospective basis
only, and, thus, it has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

A husband challenges the issuance of an order of protection prohibiting him from contacting his wife. Finding that the evidence supports the issuance of an order of protection and that the husband has waived any objection to improper venue, we affirm.

I agree that Tony Thomas’s murder convictions should be affirmed. The Brady v.
Maryland issue raised by Mr. Thomas is a close question. Before trial, Mr. Thomas
requested the prosecution to provide witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements. The trial
court ordered disclosure, the prosecution failed to disclose the statements in its possession,
and the statements were favorable to Mr. Thomas. In my view, the State’s failure to disclose
the witness’s statements until he testified at trial was nondisclosure, not delayed disclosure.
However, the nondisclosed statements had to be material to Mr. Thomas’s defense for his
Brady claim to prevail. Because the statements were not sufficiently material, his Brady
claim fails.

This appeal arises from a Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) petition to access a Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) case file regarding its investigation into the fatality of a fourteen-year-old boy. The petition also sought disclosure of the investigation into the child’s death, as well as four prior investigations related to the same child, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-107. Prior to the filing of the petition, the petitioner, Stacy Jacobson (“Ms. Jacobson”), submitted a written request to obtain the unredacted version of the deceased child’s case file, along with the records from four prior DCS investigations related to the child. DCS denied the requests, citing several legal bases, including Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-124, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 37-1-409 and 612, Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-107, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”), and the 2013 Davidson County Chancery Court order requiring that DCS redact all such records to eliminate information made confidential under state law. Thereafter, Ms. Jacobson filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to obtain access to the unredacted public records, the four related investigative files, and for her attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the petition, finding that, under “the state law exception” to the TPRA, which encompasses Rule 16, the redacted portions of the case file and the four related investigative files are exempt from disclosure because they are relevant to an ongoing criminal prosecution of the deceased child’s family members who are alleged to be responsible for his abuse and death. Ms. Jacobson subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing that the trial court had failed to consider whether the DCS records from the prior investigations involving the deceased child were part of the child’s “full case file.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that a ruling on this issue would constitute an advisory opinion. Ms. Jacobson appeals the trial court’s denial of her requests. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from an Order Granting Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss and Denying Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus. Because the appellant did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate,
its determination that he was underemployed, and the wife’s awards of alimony. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed a premises liability claim against the defendant store after she fell at its entrance. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment. We affirm.

The mother of an incarcerated person filed suit against the prison operator for injuries
allegedly sustained when a chair in the prison visitation room collapsed as she sat in it.
The trial court denied the mother’s motion for sanctions based upon allegations of
spoliation of evidence. The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of the
prison operator. We affirm the trial court’s decisions on both motions.

The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed the motion for summary judgment filed by Stephen Boesch (“Plaintiff”) due to his failure to file a separate statement of undisputed material facts in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The Trial Court additionally denied Plaintiff’s oral motion for default judgment against Scott D. Hall (“Defendant”) and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Duane Gray, Jr., of assault,
kidnapping, possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin, four counts of possession with
the intent to sell or deliver four different scheduled drugs, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him as a Multiple Offender to an effective
sentence of fourteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1)
the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his offenses; (2) the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of a motel room;
(3) the trial court erred with it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
search of two cell phones; (4) the State violated his right to due process by intentionally
allowing false testimony; (5) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment
of acquittal to the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping; (6) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for kidnapping; and (7) the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for new trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is the second interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B, filed by the appellants seeking to recuse the trial judge in the underlying
conservatorship action. After this Court entered its opinion and judgment in the first
interlocutory appeal, the trial judge entered several orders before the mandate was entered
with the trial court. In this second interlocutory appeal, appellants request, inter alia, that
we declare those orders void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After careful review,
we determine that the stay of trial court proceedings imposed by this Court in the first
interlocutory appeal remained in place until the mandate was entered. Taking into
consideration the limits of our review in a Rule 10B appeal, we vacate the trial court’s
orders entered between the time the appellants filed their second motion to recuse and the
trial court’s ruling on the recusal motion. We also vacate the trial court’s order denying
the second motion to recuse. Because the trial court’s order denying the second motion to
recuse is vacated, all remaining matters in this second interlocutory appeal are pretermitted
as moot.

This is an appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board which affirmed a judgment of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims finding that Appellee Natacha Hudgins’ back injury was compensable and that the date of her maximum medical improvement was January 6, 2022.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Glover, of aggravated rape for
which he received a sentence of seventeen years with the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial judge in preventing him from
impeaching the victim with evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history. Following our
review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital in this premises liability case, finding that the defendant had no notice of the alleged dangerous or defective condition on its premises. The plaintiff has appealed. Following our review, we determine that the plaintiff was not provided notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to all issues to be considered by the trial court at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Pro se Petitioner, Alfonso Thomas Peck,1 was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of two counts of aggravated rape, for which he received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily denied in part and granted in part. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the partial summary denial, arguing that his sentences are illegal because the judgment documents fail to specify the sentence length in years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner appeals as of right the Bradley County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his motion to correct illegal sentences. Upon our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to prepare a sufficient brief compliant with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b). Accordingly, the Petitioner’s issues are waived, and his appeal is dismissed.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Connie Reguli, of one count of facilitation of custodial interference and two counts of being an accessory after the fact. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years of probation after service of thirty days in confinement and denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her convictions. She also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the indictment for its failure to include an essential element of the underlying felony of custodial interference; (2) failing to instruct the jury concerning the essential elements of custodial interference; and (3) failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of voluntary surrender and legal representation. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of split confinement and denying her request for judicial diversion. Consistent with our decision in State v. Hancock, 678 S.W.3d 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023), we recognize that the principal’s actions in this case did not violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-306 at the time they occurred. As such, we hold that the Defendant cannot be guilty of facilitating the felony of custodial interference or being an accessory after the fact. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the trial court’s judgments, vacate the Defendant’s convictions, and dismiss the case.

The Petitioner, Roderick Bates, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial
of his post-conviction relief from his jury-trial convictions for especially aggravated
burglary and first degree murder, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. On
appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief for his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant challenges his convictions on two charges of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection prohibiting him from contacting his former partner. The convictions arise from two communications between the appellant and the appellee when exchanging their minor child. We have determined that the underlying orders lack the required level of clarity and contain significant ambiguities. We, therefore, reverse the convictions.

Two neighboring property owners had the right to use the same easement for ingress and egress. For many years, the neighbors used and maintained a shared gravel road to access their properties. Then one property owner unilaterally removed gravel from part of the road and created an alternate route. The other property owner filed suit, seeking to protect his easement rights. The trial court held the owner who damaged the road liable for “acting beyond his legal rights” and “changing the nature and character of the easement.” Among other things, the court awarded the damaged party a judgment for the costs of the repairs plus pre-judgment interest and a permanent injunction. Because the evidence preponderates against the damages awarded, we modify the judgment by reducing the award. We also vacate the permanent injunction because the damaged property owner did not seek that relief. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.