APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a retaliatory discharge case. Appellant worked for the Appellee nursing home. Appellant reported that patient abuse was occurring at her employer's facility. The Tennessee Department of Health investigated the Appellee's facility, but found no wrongdoing. In response to the Appellant's reporting, Appellee's employees allegedly harassed the Appellant. Appellant notified Appellee that she would not report to work the day after the alleged harassment. However, she also did not report to work or call in the day after that, and Appellee terminated her employment. The trial court granted Appellee's individual employees' motions to dismiss and later granted the Appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court also denied the Appellant's oral motion to amend her complaint at the summary judgment hearing. We affirm.

Petitioner Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) brought this action to set aside a tax sale of real property. MERS argues that the county’s failure to provide it with notice of the tax sale violated its rights under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. The defendant purchaser of the real property filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings; he argued that MERS did not tender payment of the sale price plus the accrued taxes before bringing suit, as is required by statute in a suit challenging the validity of a tax sale. The defendant purchaser also argued that MERS did not have an interest in the subject property that is protected under the Due Process Clause. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that MERS did not have an interest in the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, though based on MERS’s lack of standing to file suit. We hold that when a plaintiff who claims a protected interest in real property files suit to have a tax sale declared void for lack of notice, the pre-suit tender requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c) does not apply, so MERS was not required to tender payment before filing this lawsuit. We further conclude that MERS acquired no protected interest in the subject property through either the deed of trust’s designation of MERS as the beneficiary solely as nominee for the lender and its assigns or its reference to MERS having “legal title” to the subject property for the purpose of enforcing the lender’s rights. Because MERS had no protected interest in the subject property, its due process rights were not violated by the county’s failure to notify it of the tax foreclosure proceedings or the tax sale. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the tax sale purchaser, albeit on a different basis from the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The defendant, Gerald Hobbs, was convicted of one count of assault and one count of aggravated assault, while an order of protection was in effect, upon his former girlfriend and sentenced to an effective term of four years imprisonment.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions, that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury as to self-defense, and that the court erred in sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Scott Benjamin Carroll, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine.  See T.C.A. § 39-17-435(a).  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss or request a jury instruction based on the State’s destruction of evidence recovered from a methamphetamine laboratory.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Emmanuel Bibb Houston, was convicted as charged in count 1 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to sell, a Class E felony; in count 2 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to deliver, a Class E felony; in count 3 of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and in count 4 of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -1324(a), -425(a)(1).  The trial court merged count 2 with count 1 and imposed an effective sentence of six years.  Houston’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his felony convictions.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Walter H. Webb, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, four counts of aggravated domestic assault, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony on the ground that it violated the protection against double jeopardy, that the State failed to prove the requisite mens rea for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences and ordering that some of the sentences run consecutively.  Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not err in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences.  After de novo review of Defendant’s consecutive sentences, we affirm the alignment of the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Keiahtee Jamal Terrell, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and robbery, Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective four-year sentence at 30%, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation.  After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Both of the appellants, Anthony Wilson and Deangelo Taylor, stand convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced them to life for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court aligned appellant Taylor‘s sentences consecutively and appellant Wilson‘s sentences concurrently. On appeal, appellant Taylor argues that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant‘s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others; (4) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the State told the jury that appellant was in jail; (5) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a close-up autopsy photograph of the victim‘s face; (6) the trial court erred in admitting Chris Williams‘ statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); (7) there was cumulative error that requires reversal; and (8) the trial court erred in aligning appellant‘s sentences consecutively. Appellant Wilson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his Motion for Acquittal because the proof at trial was inconsistent and insufficient and also erred in admitting into evidence Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). Following our thorough review of the arguments, record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of appellant Taylor‘s attempted murder judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Emily Virginia Helton, pleaded guilty to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, with the trial court to determine the sentence.  After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve three years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied her an alternative sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

An employee filed an action seeking workers’ compensation benefits for hearing loss and breathing problems in 2003. In 2005, the hearing loss claim was settled, and the breathing dysfunction claim was dismissed with prejudice. In 2011, the employee was diagnosed with asbestosis-related lung disease. He filed this action, seeking benefits for that condition. The trial court granted his employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the claim was barred by the 2005 settlement and judgment. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Troy Lynn Fox, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting sentence of life in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that his petition states a colorable claim for relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, thus entitling him to counsel and to an evidentiary hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the Petitioner and the State, reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the petition, and remand this case to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The Petitioner, Russell Leaks, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief.  He contended that he was entitled to relief because he was arrested without a warrant while he was on probation.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Tavaria L. Merritt, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental capacity and for failing to meet with him a sufficient number of times.  He also argues that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jennifer Lee Dickey, appeals the trial court’s decision ordering her to serve her sentence in incarceration.  She argues that the trial court erred in denying her an alternative sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Christopher Carey, of driving while intoxicated (“DUI”), and the trial court found him guilty of violating the implied consent law.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty nine days for the DUI conviction and ordered that he lose his driving privileges for one year for violating the implied consent law.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) his constitutional right pursuant to the Confrontation Clause was violated; (2) the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury about a missing witness; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted the video recording of his traffic stop into evidence; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (5) the trial court erred when it enhanced the Defendant’s sentence based upon a reckless driving charge.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant’s right to confront a witness against him was violated when the trial court allowed the admission of the videotape of him performing field sobriety tasks and the officer conducting those tasks was not present at trial.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments, vacate the Defendant’s convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Joyce Watkins, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of her petition for habeas corpus relief from her 1988 convictions for first degree murder and aggravated rape and her effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by denying relief because the indictment failed to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Sabrina Howard (“the Defendant”) appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her motion to suspend the remainder of her sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Because the record shows that the motion was untimely, we affirm the order of the trial court.

This is an appeal of the general sessions court’s grant of a one-year extension of an order of protection. The respondent, a pro se litigant, appealed the extension to the circuit court. The circuit court initially dismissed the appeal as untimely. Upon further review, the circuit court transferred the appeal to this court for lack of jurisdiction. We hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, a final order for purposes of appeal was never entered. We remand this case for entry of a final order.

In this post-divorce dispute, Father asserts the trial court erred in failing to find a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the residential schedule. We have reviewed the evidence and find that the significant change in Father’s work schedule, the parties’ admitted failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and Father’s remarriage, when taken together, constitute a material change affecting the child’s best interest. Therefore, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for a determination of whether a modification of the residential schedule is in the child’s best interest.  

The Petitioner, Steven O. Hughes-Mabry, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court‘s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1000' of a school zone, introduction of contraband into a penal institution, and driving on a suspended license, for which he is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that the court erred in excluding evidence relevant to an issue that was not raised in the petitions. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan. Father asked the trial court to name him the primary residential parent, alleging a material change in circumstance. The court denied the request to change the primary residential parent, finding Father had failed to meet his burden of proof, but nonetheless modified the parties’ residential parenting schedule. On appeal, Father argues the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether a material change had occurred and erred in finding he had not met his burden of proof. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Father did not prove a material change in circumstance sufficient to justify a change in the primary residential parent; however, we find proof of a material change of circumstance sufficient to meet the lower standard for modification of the residential parenting schedule. Because in modifying the residential parenting schedule the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a), we reverse in part and remand with instructions for the trial court to make a determination of whether it is in the child’s best interest to modify the residential parenting schedule and, if so, to modify the schedule accordingly.
   

This is a divorce action in which the trial court granted the husband a divorce and entered a parenting plan, designating the husband as the primary residential parent but awarding the wife substantially equal co-parenting time with the minor child. The husband appeals, raising numerous issues relating to the parenting plan. We affirm.

The appellant, Nicky Lowe Evans, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to two counts of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; four counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and five counts of operating a home improvement business without a license, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of ten years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the length and manner of service of his sentences is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the appellant's conviction in count one, theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, must be reversed and the charge dismissed. The appellant's sentences for his remaining convictions are affirmed. However, the judgments of conviction for counts seven through eleven reflect the incorrect convicted offense. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for the correction of those judgments.

Subdivision developer brought a breach of contract action against the contractor who had been engaged nine years previously to pave the roads in the subdivision after the contractor refused to complete the second phase of paving for the roads at the price specified in the contract. The contractor moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the provision in the contract relating to the second phase of paving was a separate offer which had not been accepted by the developer and that the action was barred by laches and the statute of limitations. Developer also moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to developer and denied summary judgment to contractor. Contractor appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Upon review of the record transmitted to us on appeal, we conclude that this case should have been appealed to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. As we are without jurisdiction, we must transfer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals in accordance with Rule 17 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.