APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’
custody in May of 2020. After a long period in which DCS did not hear from the children’s
father, and the father made no progress on his permanency plan, DCS filed a petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for
Overton County (the “juvenile court”) found that DCS proved five statutory grounds for
termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals and, discerning no error, we
affirm.

In this post-divorce case, the husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement concerning military retirement was modifiable.  The trial court dismissed the husband’s petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and ruled that the provision at issue was not modifiable.  While we find that the trial court erred in granting the wife’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we affirm the result reached by the trial court on the merits of the dispute.  Further, we have determined that the wife was not entitled to an additional award of attorney fees at trial and is not entitled to her attorney fees on appeal.

A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer, at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax proceedings and violation of her due
process and equal protection rights. The trial court denied the taxpayer’s motion to set aside, concluding the taxpayer was properly served with notice of the underlying delinquent tax proceedings. We affirm.

Caprice McLemore, Gary McLemore, Misty Tanner, Barrett Tanner, and McKinley Tanner (together, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their case against the defendant, Knox County (“Appellee” or “the County”). Appellants were injured in a car accident on Clinton Highway after being struck by a vehicle driven by Roy Michael Simmons (“Mr. Simmons”), who was evading a Knox County sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that it was liable for their injuries arising from the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the deputy pursuing Mr. Simmons did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and that the County was thus not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Gary Porter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Davidson County Chancery Court (the
“chancery court”), wherein he requested that the chancery court award him certain pre-trial
jail credits which he was already awarded toward a separate sentence that Petitioner
previously served. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Amber
Phillips (“Phillips”), Director of Sentence Management Services for Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner appeals the judgment of the chancery
court. Having determined that Petitioner’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of
briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issue purportedly raised on appeal is waived.
The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from a divorce after a short marriage. The husband appeals from the ruling of
the trial court as it relates to the division of marital assets, the number of days he was awarded in
the parenting plan, and the alimony award to the wife. Upon our review, we find the order appealed
from is nonfinal and must be dismissed.

Defendant, Jamieum Alvin Reid, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for
possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
pled guilty as charged and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve
his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying alternative sentencing because he was already approved by a
community based program, and the State failed to present evidence that an alternative
sentence was inappropriate. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tipton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for especially aggravated kidnapping,
especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault by strangulation. Prior to trial,
counts one and two of the indictment were amended to aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault by strangulation. Following our review of the entire
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

This matter concerns prior restraint on speech. Patrick M. Malone (“Father”) is a party to
an action in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) against
maternal grandparents James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“Respondents”)
concerning Father’s minor child, Rosie (“the Child”). Father’s father, Michael P. Malone
(“Petitioner”), testified voluntarily at a hearing on Father’s motion to set bail pending
appeal of Father’s convictions for criminal contempt. In two written orders, the Trial Court
ordered Petitioner not to discuss the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.
Petitioner, a non-party, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking reversal
of the Trial Court’s orders against him as he contends they were improper. We granted the
petition. The Trial Court’s restrictions lack an adequate evidentiary basis. In addition, the
Trial Court erred in abridging Petitioner’s constitutional right to free speech when
Petitioner is a non-party who lacked the benefit of notice or a hearing. We reverse the
provisions of the Trial Court’s orders dated August 15, 2023 and August 17, 2023
restraining Petitioner from discussing the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract action wherein the appellee was directed to deposit funds owed to the appellant with the Clerk and Master. The appellee claimed an interest in some of the deposited funds pursuant to a separate contract. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the appellee for the requested amount. Because the appellant failed to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal.

Cecil Cemontaie Burnice, Defendant, claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on new criminal charges of aggravated robbery and criminal trespass because Defendant was subsequently found not guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and the State dismissed the criminal trespass count  We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation based on the evidence presented at the revocation hearing.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Gause, was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree felony murder under alternate theories; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and accessory after the fact, a Class E felony. After merging the felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the accessory after the fact conviction, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother and a father appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and five statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights. The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2023. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until December 8, 2023, more than thirty days after the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this delayed appeal, Defendant, Shatara Evette Jones, appeals her conviction for first degree murder for which she received a mandatory life sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges: 1) the trial court’s restricting her right to cross-examine a State’s witness; 2) the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss, pursuant to State v. Ferguson, based on the State’s failure to preserve evidence; 3) the trial court’s denial of her motions to suppress her statement to police and cell phone data; 4) the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the victim’s gang involvement and a rap video in which he is depicted holding a gun; 5) the trial court’s omission of an instruction in the written jury instructions; and 6) the sufficiency of the evidence of her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action following a short-term marriage. There were no children born of the marriage, and the only issue on appeal pertains to the classification of real property. At issue is the Wade Springs property, which the husband purchased using his separate property. He closed on the purchase of the Wade Springs property the day after the parties married, and the property was deeded in the husband’s name only. Because the property was used as the marital residence during the two-year marriage and marital assets were used to maintain the property, the wife contended that the property became marital property by transmutation, commingling, or Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121. The trial court found that the Wade Springs property was the husband’s separate property at the time of purchase and it remained his separate property. The court further found that the wife’s contributions to the property could easily be extracted and awarded her, inter alia, a cash judgment in the amount of her contributions to the home. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, we affirm.

In this easement dispute involving a shared driveway between adjoining real property
owners, the petitioners filed an action for declaratory judgment, alleging that the
respondents had interfered with their use of the driveway and requesting that the court
declare the “rights and obligations of the parties.” Acting without benefit of counsel, one
of the two respondents filed a response opposing the petition and subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting multiple counterclaims. The trial court
dismissed the respondent’s counterclaims in an order not included in the appellate record.
The trial court conducted a bench trial, during which all parties were represented by
counsel. At trial, the petitioners sought an implied easement and an easement by
necessity. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the parties had shared driveway
easements and that the petitioners had carried their burden to prove an implied easement
and an easement by necessity. The court included in its judgment parking limitations on
the parties’ use of the shared driveway. The respondent who initially filed pleadings pro
se has appealed, again acting without benefit of counsel. Discerning no reversible error,
we affirm

A woman asserting that she is a child’s great-grandmother filed a petition to establish paternity and for grandparent visitation. On the face of the petition, the purported great-grandmother brought the action both on behalf of herself and, acting with a power of attorney, on behalf of her grandson, the alleged biological father of the child. The parties agree that a power of attorney was never properly executed by the alleged father. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition in full. With regard to the paternity suit, the trial court found that the great-grandmother lacked the authority to file a paternity suit on the alleged biological father’s behalf and did not have standing to bring it on her own behalf, and therefore the paternity action was due to be dismissed. With regard to the grandparent visitation action, the trial court held that without a pending contested paternity suit, the grandmother lacked standing to bring an action for grandparent visitation, and in the alternative, that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. We affirm.

A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to circuit court and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant’s statement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Police officers in this case obtained a confession from a juvenile by threatening him with the death penalty, repeatedly denying his requests for his mother who was present at the station, and interrogating him for over six hours in the middle of the night. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant’s Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession was involuntary. I also would have concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause that the Defendant committed the offenses. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

This appeal arises from a complaint wherein the plaintiff alleged that he had a confidential relationship with his alleged biological daughter and that she induced him, by a promise that she would take care of him, to grant her a remainder interest in his real property. After a bench trial, the trial court found that a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant and that suspicious circumstances existed to support a finding of undue influence. As such, the trial court entered an order divesting the defendant of any interest that she had in the property and restoring the plaintiff’s interest in the property to be held by his estate. The defendant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After four creditors filed separate claims against the estate of Elga Jean Epley (“the
estate”), the estate timely filed sworn exceptions to each separate claim. The creditors are
(1) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., (2) Bank of America, N.A., (3) Phillips & Cohen
Associates, Ltd on behalf of Citibank, and (4) Maury Regional Health System (collectively
“the creditors”). Following a hearing on the claims and the exceptions thereto, during
which no testimony was introduced and no representative appeared on behalf of any of the
creditors, the trial court denied the exceptions to each of the claims. This appeal by the
estate followed. None of the creditors have filed a brief. Thus, none of the creditors have
presented arguments in opposition to the issues raised by the estate, as required by
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(b) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee. Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented
by the estate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court for the reasons set forth below and
remand with instructions to deny all of the claims asserted by the appellees and to enter
judgment in favor of the estate.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this intrafamily dispute, a son sued his mother and various other family members following the death of his father. The claims included, inter alia, breach of contract, libel and slander, and wrongful death. The defendant family members eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that statutes of limitation barred several of the son’s claims, and that there was no evidence the son could point to in support of his additional
claims. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the suit. The son appeals. Having determined that the son’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived and the appeal is dismissed.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his three children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.