APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Austin Drummond, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with one count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve ten years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Crescent Sock Company filed this action against its Chief Executive Officer, Robert H. Yoe, III, the day before Crescent terminated his employment. It sought a declaratory judgment that Yoe’s employment contract and an agreement between Crescent and Yoe Enterprises, Inc., a company wholly owned by Yoe, were invalid and unenforceable. After a seven-day bench trial, the court found the two agreements to be valid. It enforced them and found in favor of Yoe and Yoe Enterprises on some of the causes of action in their counterclaim. The trial court awarded Yoe and Yoe Enterprises attorney’s fees of $765,880.77. Yoe’s employment contract, however, does not include Yoe Enterprises among those entitled to seek "prevailing party" fees and expenses.

Defendant, Kavonda Renee Waters, pleaded guilty to a Class A misdemeanor failure to appear in case number II-CR017036 and a Class E felony failure to appear offense in case number II-CR058059. The trial court imposed sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for failure to appear in case number II-CR017036 and two years for felony failure to appear in case number II-CR058059. On appeal, Defendant argues that her sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of prior suit pending and dismissed the plaintiff's lawsuit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Several property owners brought suit against the county for inverse condemnation when the county commission's road committee rescinded its recommendation to accept a road as a county road. The county sought dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court dismissed the suit. The property owners appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner, Brandon Sutton, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2010 Jefferson County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a breach of insurance contract action for failure to remit payment pursuant to a business-owners policy after the subject property was destroyed by fire. The case proceeded to jury trial. After denying the insurance company's motion for a directed verdict, the court submitted the case to the jury. The jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the policy and awarded compensatory and punitive damages and prejudgment interest. The jury also imposed a bad faith penalty and damages pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The insurance company appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Petitioner, Stacy Ramsey, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court treated as a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal from the denial of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. If treated as a second post-conviction petition as styled by Petitioner, through counsel, then it was subject to summary dismissal because only one petition for post-conviction relief is permitted, T.C.A. § 40-30-102(c), and because the petition was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a).

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of W.J.N. (Father) with respect to J.M.M. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds warranting termination. The court found the same quantum of evidence reflecting that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a mother’s post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan. The court below determined that while a material change of circumstances had occurred, modification of the plan was not in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

This is an appeal of an order modifying a party’s child support obligation. The trial court granted Appellee’s petition to downwardly modify her child support obligation based on a decrease in Appellee’s income. Appellant objected, arguing that Appellee was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that Appellee was not underemployed and determined Appellee’s income for the purpose of child support obligation by averaging the income she earned in each of her previous five positions. We affirm in part and vacate in part.      

This appeal concerns the propriety of a writ of certiorari granted by the Williamson County Chancery Court to review a protective custody order entered by the Williamson County Juvenile Court. The chancery court held that the protective custody order from the juvenile court was void and enjoined the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) from interfering with the paternal grandmother’s physical and legal custody of the minor children at issue. Because we are of the opinion that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order, we vacate the judgment of the Chancery Court and remand.
 

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Mother’s two children were removed from Mother on an emergency basis. A court later adjudicated the children dependent and neglected based on the stipulation of Mother. After the children had been in State custody for nearly eight months, the Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s rights—substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions. The court also concluded that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing that the evidence was not clear and convincing that there were statutory grounds for termination or that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Wayne Moore, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation after the service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, Moore reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, which was based upon an alleged unconstitutional seizure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jose Reyes, was convicted of one count of rape of a child and sentenced to thirty-two years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and that the trial court erred in several of its rulings. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred in: denying his motion in limine to prevent the Child Advocacy Center facility dog from being present with the victim as he was testifying; denying his motion to suppress his written statement and his motion in limine that the statement be excluded at trial; denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment; denying his motion for a continuance to locate a witness; denying his motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding his having sexual relations or watching pornography in the presence of the victim; denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; imposing an excessive sentence; and considering the victim impact statement, which included references to HIV, herpes, and gonorrhea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this contract action, which stems from the failure of the defendant, H. Michael Chitwood, to pay for construction work performed by the plaintiff, Raines Brothers, Inc. (“Raines”). The work was performed on a home occupied by Mr. Chitwood but owned by a trustee, James Dreaden, who was also named as a defendant in the original action. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Raines a judgment against Mr. Chitwood and Mr. Dreaden (collectively, “Defendants”) in the amount of $66,762.71. The trial court also awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum, beginning August 14, 2007. The trial court denied Raines's claim for attorney's fees. Following a timely appeal by Defendants, this Court determined that Raines adequately proved its entitlement to the trial court's judgment of $66,762.71 against Mr. Chitwood but reversed the trial court's judgment against Mr. Dreaden. This Court modified the trial court's award of the rate of interest from eighteen percent per annum to ten percent in accordance with relevant statutory and case law.

Mary Drew Gentry (“the Defendant”) appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and imposing her three-year sentence for burglary. On appeal, the Defendant acknowledges that she violated probation but argues that the trial court should have imposed split confinement and community corrections rather than ordering her to serve her sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights filed by the minor child’s maternal grandmother and step-grandfather. During the trial court proceedings, the minor child’s natural father sought to have his paternity and parenting rights established. When the trial court denied the termination petition, it ordered the natural parents to attempt to agree upon a parenting plan. The trial court noted that it would enter a permanent parenting plan on its own if the parents could not reach an agreement. Because the record transmitted to us does not indicate that the trial court ever entered a permanent parenting plan, there is an absence of a final judgment in this case. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
 

The Defendant, Micah England, pleaded guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to carrying a weapon on school property, a Class E felony, with the length and the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 (2014) (amended 2015). The court sentenced the Defendant to two years' probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from probate proceedings in the Putnam County Probate Court. During the course of the trial proceedings, an issue arose as to the ownership of a certificate of deposit titled in the decedent’s name. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that the certificate of deposit was, in fact, the property of the decedent’s estate. On appeal, the decedent’s surviving wife argues that because the funds within the certificate of deposit were derived from a joint marital account, they should have been impressed as entireties property. We agree and conclude that the funds in the certificate of deposit passed to the surviving wife upon the decedent’s death. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly reversed.  

Appellant, an inmate at a state prison operated by a private contractor, filed the underlying pro se petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge the result of a disciplinary proceeding against him. The trial court dismissed the petition against the private contractor's employees on the ground that these employees could not impose punishment on the inmate under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-24-110(5) and were, thus, not proper parties to the petition. As to the Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently and that the inmate had not stated a claim for violation of due process. We affirm and remand.

Both Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s decision to terminate their parental rights to two children. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting several grounds against each parent and also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. With respect to the grounds for termination, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and affirm in part. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s determination that termination is in the children’s best interest, and therefore, affirm the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children at issue. 

The appellant, James Frederick Hegel, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to suspend the costs the court ordered he pay for his 2009 convictions of rape of a child and incest. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant, William Scott Deadrick, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to multiple counts of selling and delivering less than one-half gram of a Schedule II controlled substance within a school zone. The trial court merged some of the convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective eight-year sentence to be served at 100%. Subsequently, the appellant filed a motion for reduction of sentence, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and wanton disregard. Because the trial court entered an order during the proceedings that excluded wanton disregard as a ground and this ground was not tried by implied consent, we reverse the trial court's finding of wanton disregard. In addition, the trial court failed to make any finding that Mother's failure to visit the child was willful. Accordingly, we vacate this ground and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.