APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A long haul waste carrier was cited for violating safety regulations by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (the “Division”). The waste carrier informed the Division that it had corrected the alleged violations and received an automated reply that the Division had ceased operations due to the federal government’s suspension of funding. The waste carrier intended to contest the citations but failed to notify the Division of its intent within the statutory twenty-day period. Once the Division was operating again and the waste carrier informed the Division of its intent to contest the citations, the Division responded that the waste carrier had waited too long and that the citations had become final orders by operation of law. The waste carrier filed a petition for judicial review in chancery court, and the trial court remanded the case back to the Division to allow the waste carrier to seek relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Division appealed, claiming the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Mangrum, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated kidnapping and her effective life sentence.  The Petitioner contends that (1) she received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and (2) counsel’s ineffective assistance deprived her of due process of law.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, James Ronald Rollins, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the Hamilton County Criminal Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the appellant appeals the ruling. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 Interlocutory appeal. Upon further review, we have determined that none of the issues certified for interlocutory appeal are properly before us. Accordingly, we vacate our order granting interlocutory appeal and dismiss the appeal.

The trial court revoked Ashley Kelso’s (“the Defendant”)probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence.  After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Defendant violated her probation or by ordering that she serve her sentence in incarceration.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Adam Clyde Braseel, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault and sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  State v. Adam Clyde Braseel, No. M2009-00839-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3609247, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).  On direct appeal, this Court merged the aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder convictions and corrected several clerical errors in the judgments.  In all other respects, the convictions and sentences were affirmed.  Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing, among other things that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the pre-trial identification of Petitioner as the perpetrator, should have challenged the eyewitness identification of Petitioner at trial, and should have requested a jury instruction on eyewitness identification.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief.  The State appealed.  After a thorough review, we reverse and remand the judgment of the post-conviction court.  All of Petitioner’s covictions are reinstated and his petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

The defendant, John Freitas, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of assault and domestic assault, both Class A misdemeanors, and sentenced to consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) his convictions for assault and domestic assault violate double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we conclude that it violates double jeopardy for the defendant to receive punishments for assault and domestic assault. Therefore, we order that the defendant's convictions stand but that amended judgments be entered showing that the simple assault conviction merges into the domestic assault conviction for imposition of one sentence.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in which Defendant argues that summary judgment was improper because a dispute of material fact exists regarding her affirmative defenses. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal by permission, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. A Henry County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Tina Lynn Szabo, for various charges arising out of a traffic stop based upon the Defendant's erratic driving and the subsequent blood test results obtained by a search warrant for a blood draw. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood test results obtained as a result of a search warrant, and the trial court suppressed the blood test results, ruling that an error within the warrant and an untimely return rendered the search warrant invalid. The State filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. We granted the Rule 9 appeal, and the State asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the condemnation of property by a utility district. The trial court entered an order of possession vesting title of the property in the utility district and reserved the issue of just compensation for a jury trial. Prior to trial, the utility district filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert appraisal and testimony of the landowner‟s expert witness. The trial court permitted the expert to testify over the objections of the utility district. At the conclusion of the three-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of $417,000 for the seven-acre parcel at issue, which was the same value suggested by the landowner‟s expert witness. After the trial court denied the utility district‟s motion for a new trial, the utility district timely filed a notice of appeal. The utility district maintains on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the testimony of the landowner‟s expert witness, and it also argues that the jury verdict is not supported by material evidence. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Khalid M. Mohssin, entered an open guilty plea to conspiracy to sell and deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103; -17-417. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court determined the Defendant would receive a five-year sentence, as a Range I, standard offender, and denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence to five years and by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Tonya Lavette Christopher, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. The Defendant's plea agreement preserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the police encounter which preceded her arrest. Following our review, we conclude that the police officer's detention of the Defendant was justified upon reasonable suspicion of obstructing a roadway in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-307. Accordingly, the DUI judgment is affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father and Stepmother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother to the child. The trial court found that the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and conduct demonstrating a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We reverse the finding of abandonment for willful failure to support but affirm the other grounds for termination and the finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. The termination of Mother’s parental rights to the child is therefore affirmed. 

The Petitioner, Kenneth Sherron, pleaded guilty to facilitation of kidnapping. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Petitioner appeals, asserting that the post-conviction court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute between unmarried parents regarding the modification of a residential parenting schedule for their minor child. Following a hearing, a juvenile court magistrate modified the parties’ existing parenting schedule to permit Father to exercise parenting time with the child during the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month. Father requested a rehearing before the juvenile court judge. The case was reheard, and the juvenile court judge ordered a similar parenting schedule permitting Father to exercise parenting time during the second, fourth, and fifth weekends of each month. The juvenile court also ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,500. On appeal, Father takes issue with the parenting schedule and award of attorney’s fees ordered by the juvenile court. Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented, we affirm the juvenile court’s parenting schedule; however, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand the case to the juvenile court for a determination as to the amount and reasonableness of the attorney’s fees incurred.

A jury found that the Defendant, Brian Adams, was guilty of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of ninety years. The Defendant asserts that his convictions should be overturned on the basis of insufficient evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated rape and received a sentence of twenty-five years as a multiple rapist. The Defendant now challenges his sentence as illegal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that the trial court erred by failing to make a factual finding of his previous rape conviction and that a disparity exists between the length of his sentence and other shorter sentences for more serious convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Defendant's motion to correct his sentence.

This appeal involves a dispute between unmarried parents regarding a residential parenting schedule for their minor child. Following a hearing, a juvenile court magistrate ordered a structured parenting schedule permitting Father to exercise parenting time with the child during the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month. Father requested a rehearing before the juvenile court judge. The case was reheard, and the juvenile court judge ordered a similar parenting schedule permitting Father to exercise parenting time during the second, fourth, and fifth weekends of each month. The juvenile court also ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,500. On appeal, Father takes issue with the parenting schedule and award of attorney’s fees ordered by the juvenile court. Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented, we affirm the juvenile court’s parenting schedule; however, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand the case to the juvenile court for a determination as to the amount and reasonableness of the attorney’s fees incurred.

The defendant, Alberto Conde-Valentino, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance of co-defendants, that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Because the order appealed does not comply with Rule 58 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order is not a final judgment. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction and this matter must be dismissed.

The petitioner, Cameron Brown, appeals from the Sumner County Criminal Court order granting in part and denying in part his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition attacked his 2008 guilty-pleaded convictions of four counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; one count of forgery; passing a worthless check in an amount more than $500; and failure to appear as well as his 2011 guilty-pleaded conviction of escape.  Because the writ of error coram nobis is not available to collaterally attack guilty-pleaded convictions, the judgment of the coram nobis court granting the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacating the petitioner’s conviction of forgery is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of that conviction and the accompanying four-year sentence.  The judgment of the coram nobis court denying the remaining claims for coram nobis relief is affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Cuben T. Lagrone, of attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, employing a firearm during the commission of attempted first degree premeditated murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to a total effective sentence of sixty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence from a cell phone seized during a traffic stop and weapons seized during a traffic accident investigation; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to play a video recording during its opening statement; (3) the trial court erred when it instructed two witnesses, without first appointing counsel, to testify against the Defendant after the witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and when it allowed the State to make an inappropriate comment in front of the jury on this matter; (4) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the first victim’s 911 call, images of the Defendant near or displaying firearms, and the Defendant’s jail call, and improperly declined to admit into evidence the second victim’s letter to the first victim; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his convictions; (6) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on a witness’s recantation; (7) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding the truthfulness of witnesses and regarding criminal responsibility; (8) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (9) the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant; and (10) due process requires a reversal of the Defendant’s convictions because of the effect of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial courts judgments of convictions in all respects. We vacate the sentences for the two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a felony and remand for resentencing on those two counts.

In this bench trial following a de novo appeal from the general sessions court, the trial court awarded Appellees a judgment of $2,308.28 representing the principal and interest due on a promissory note. Appellants raise several issues concerning the general sessions court proceeding as errors on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.