APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charis Lynn Jetton, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324(a). For her respective crimes, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of seven years and three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied her request for alternative sentencing as to the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s seven-year sentence to be served in confinement.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Sappington, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft of property with the value of more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. T.C.A. § 39-14-103, 105(a)(4). The sole issue presented for our review in this appeal as of right is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns visitation in a post-divorce setting. Claire Nicola Bell (“Mother”) and Timothy John Bell (“Father”) are parents of the two minor children at issue, ages eleven and seven at trial (“the Children”). Mother and Father divorced in 2012. Both parents were named “co-primary residential parents” and each parent received equal visitation time with the Children. Later, as the arrangement grew contentious, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking to be named exclusive primary residential parent. Father, in turn, filed a counter-petition seeking the same designation. A hearing was conducted before the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Afterward, the Trial Court named Father primary residential parent and awarded him increased visitation time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, James Johnson aka Guy Bonner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition apparently challenged his 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and resisting arrest. Because the petitioner has established sufficient facts to make a threshold showing that he complied with the “mailbox rule,” he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he delivered his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Mack Jeffery Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction.

Following the denial of suppression motions, the defendants, Lucy Caitlin Alford and Jeremie Alford, entered guilty pleas in Franklin County Circuit Court to felony possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law relating to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the search warrant issued in this case.  The defendants assert the affidavit, which was based on information provided by a confidential informant, failed to meet the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause, lacked independent police corroboration, and was materially misleading.  The State contends the affidavit was sufficient.  Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, including the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision of State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2014-00566-SC-R11-CD, 2017 WL 1246855 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017), we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1000 or more, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-two years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the postconviction court’s denial of relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present an alibi witness at trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves an option to purchase real estate. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded the tenant a judgment for $12,000. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, James R. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis that was dismissed by the trial court as being time-barred and for failing to allege newly discovered evidence. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Dominique Greer, was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for felony murder and eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to the sentence for felony murder. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior robbery; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider the prior robbery for issues other than intent and identity; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Merritt to testify concerning Defendant’s cell phone records; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress; (5) the trial court erred by allowing a constructive amendment to the felony murder indictment; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s felony murder conviction; and (7) there was cumulative error. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court because the trial court committed reversible error in its final charge to the jury.

The Petitioner, Jeffery Lee Miller, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner seeks relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. The Petitioner argues that (1) the coram nobis court erred by determining that due process considerations did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard regarding reasonable diligence in its order and final judgment; (3) the coram nobis court’s grounds for dismissal were erroneous; and (4) the coram nobis court’s assessment of the State’s open file policy was erroneous. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Wife filed a complaint for divorce following a fifteen-year marriage.  The trial court granted Wife a divorce, distributed the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony.  The trial court granted Husband’s request to pay the alimony in solido award over a period of six years, with post-judgment interest payable at 10% interest per annum.  Husband appeals the division of some of the marital assets and debts, the award of alimony in solido, and the post-judgment interest award.  We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in solido, but we modify the post-judgment interest rate from 10% to 5.50% to conform with the interest on judgments statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121.

I concur in the results reached by the majority but write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the admissibility of evidence of the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll. The majority holds that the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll was properly admitted to prove identity and intent for the charged offenses. However, I believe that the probative value of the Defendant’s prior bad act is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. Thus, the evidence that the Defendant committed a prior robbery should not have been admitted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded.

The Defendant, Donald Gwin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior sexual battery conviction, similar to that for which he was on trial, could be introduced if he opened the door to its admissibility; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard that he wore an ankle bracelet for monitoring as part of the sex offender registry; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a local newspaper printed an article about his case; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire.  When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.  The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion.  Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion.  

Petitioner, Young Bok Song, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis concerning his multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and his sixty-five-year sentence. The petition was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Jaleel Jovan Stovall, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of rape of a child and received a sentence of twenty-five years at 100% service. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to hearsay introduced by the State and for failing to argue that a letter allegedly authored by the Petitioner was not properly authenticated. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Patrick Russell Chambers, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court in case number C-24053 to possession of contraband inside a penal institution, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-301 (2014). The Defendant also stipulated that his conduct in case number C-20453 violated the conditions of his community corrections sentence relative to a reckless homicide conviction in case number C-20398. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for the contraband conviction and to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence for the reckless homicide conviction after finding that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his release. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jarrod Reese Spicer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the trial court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner claims counsel was ineffective because he failed to fully assist the petitioner until receiving full payment for his services, failed to subpoena certain witnesses to testify at trial, failed to obtain a medical expert to rebut the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death, and failed to obtain a mental evaluation. Following our review of the record and submissions of the parties, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal stems from a dispute over a tract of real property in Nashville.  The plaintiff, who claims to have entered into an enforceable contract for sale of the disputed tract, brought multiple claims against multiple defendants after the land was not transferred to him.  After competing cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff never entered into a valid, enforceable contract regarding the subject property.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

The pro se Petitioner, Frankie Jason Cope, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Vanessa Rennee Pinegar, appealed her convictions of one count of facilitation of delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her effective nine-year sentence.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence.  The defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to our Supreme Court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State  v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration, we vacate the defendant’s enhanced sentences under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Madison County jury found Eddie H. Pittman, the defendant, guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, aggravated criminal trespass, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon conviction with the reckless aggravated assault conviction and imposed an effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and argues the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.