APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The question presented is whether the corporate veil of Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc. (CTF), should be pierced and its sole shareholder, Clayton V. Christenberry, Jr., be held personally liable for a debt owed by CTF to F&M Marketing Services, Inc. In 2012, F&M obtained a judgment against CTF for breach of contract. By that time, CTF, a trucking company, had suffered mortal setbacks primarily owing to the great recession. CTF was administratively dissolved that same year. CTF had no assets to satisfy the judgment. F&M brought this action, seeking to hold Mr. Christenberry personally liable for the debt. After a bench trial, the court held that F&M did not meet its burden of proving that CTF’s corporate veil should be pierced. F&M appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The minor child at the center of this appeal was born on April 3, 2012, in El Paso, Texas. Mother and child moved to Nashville, Tennessee, three months later. Father subsequently moved to Delaware. While living in Delaware, Father pled guilty to two counts of rape and was sentenced to concurrent twenty-five year sentences beginning June of 2013. Mother married Stepfather in late 2013, and in October 2014, Stepfather and Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The petition, as amended, alleged abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit or support in the four months prior to Father’s incarceration, and Father’s incarceration under a sentence of ten or more years with the child being under eight years of age as grounds for termination. Following a trial at which Father, who was incarcerated, participated by telephone, the court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest; the petition for adoption was also granted. Father appeals the termination of his rights, stating that the court erred in denying a motion to continue so he could appear in person and in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. 

Pro se Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendants, Dantario Burgess, Rodriguez McNary, and Joseph Jones-Cage, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. Mr. Jones-Cage and Mr. McNary also were convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Mr. Burgess also was convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony and of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The trial court sentenced Mr. Burgess to an effective term of fifty-five years, Mr. Jones-Cage to an effective term of fifty years, and Mr. McNary to an effective term of forty-one years. On appeal, the Defendants raise the following issues either collectively or individually: (1) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ motion to suppress a witness‘s identification of him in a photographic lineup and in limiting the
cross-examination of the victim during the suppression hearing; (2) the failure to name the predicate felony in the indictment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony voids the conviction; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court committed plain error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach the victim‘s testimony at trial with her statement to the police; (5) the malfunctioning of the recording equipment during the trial warranted a mistrial; (6) the sentences of Mr. Burgess and Mr. McNary are excessive; (7) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial; and (8) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Mr. McNary‘s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and reverse the conviction. We remand the matter for a new trial on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that Mr. Jones-Cage was convicted of attempted first degree murder in count one and is to serve 100 percent of his sentence for the firearm conviction in count three. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mahlon Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief for his convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Davidson County Circuit Court, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel. Upon consideration of the entire record, this court finds and concludes that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Dekarlos Johnson, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. On appeal, Johnson argues: (1) the admission of his redacted statement negatively impacted the jury's verdict; (2) he was denied the opportunity to present evidence in his own defense; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a 1997 divorce judgment that awarded the wife a percentage of the husband’s federal retirement annuity. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, later incorporated into a judgment, which provided that the wife would receive one-half of the marital portion of the husband’s retirement. The 1997 judgment contained no provisions regarding salary adjustments or cost-of-living adjustments applicable to the retirement annuity. In 2008, the husband’s attorney filed and the trial court entered a “Court Order Acceptable for Processing,” which provided for the wife’s fractional share of the husband’s retirement annuity but made no mention of salary adjustments applicable thereto. This order did provide, however, that the wife would be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments. Following his retirement in 2015, the husband filed a motion in 2016 seeking relief from the trial court’s prior final orders pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the relief sought merely “clarified” but did not modify the earlier orders. The wife has appealed. We conclude that the trial court impermissibly granted relief to the husband pursuant to Rule 60.01, which had the effect of modifying the parties’ settlement agreement and the court’s prior orders. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order granting Rule 60 relief.

This appeal concerns a dispute between a father and his adult son over the transfer of real property. In 1997, the father constructed a house on a portion of his two-acre tract of land for his son. Several years later, the son agreed to purchase the house. Subsequently, a disagreement led the parties to discover identical errors in the legal descriptions in the warranty deed executed by the father transferring the property to the son and the deed of trust securing the son’s purchase money loan. The trial court, upon its finding of mutual mistake, reformed the incorrect legal descriptions in the deeds, but the court also granted the father a right to use a shed and garden on the son’s land. We affirm the trial court’s reformation of the legal descriptions in the deeds. However, because we conclude that the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the parties intended the deeds to include the father’s right of use, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the interest.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that his sentences for first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder were illegal because the trial court constructively amended the corresponding indictments by instructing the jury on “alternative theories for felony murder.” The trial court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William M. Cole, was indicted for rape of a child and entered a best-interest guilty plea to incest on May 6, 2015. He was sentenced on September 8, 2015, to six years as a Range I, standard offender. On September 14, 2015, he filed a timely notice of appeal of his sentence. On September 28, 2015, he filed in the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, arguing that he was not related to the victim by blood or marriage and, therefore, could not be found guilty of incest. In this direct appeal filed after his plea of guilty and sentencing, but before he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, he argues that his plea of guilty was involuntary and should be set aside and that the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors in sentencing him. The State responds that the defendant may attack the voluntariness of his plea only in a petition for post-conviction relief and not in a direct appeal. We agree with this response, as well as the State’s assertion that the defendant was properly sentenced. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Radames Antonio Rivera, was indicted for one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted tampering with evidence, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon.  Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this dispute among competing battery distribution companies, the plaintiff companies appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and its employees. The plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds. Having determined that the trial court granted summary judgment without stating the legal basis for its decision prior to instructing the defendants' counsel to prepare a template for the court's order, we conclude that the trial court failed to fully comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. We therefore vacate the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. We affirm the trial court‟s denial of the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the defendants' motion for summary judgment in compliance with Rule 56.04 and of the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery.

The Defendant, Stephanie Lynn Ferguson, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of vehicular assault in the Criminal Court for Davidson County.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that her effective sentence does not comport with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing.  Specifically, she contends that the sentence imposed was not the “least severe measure necessary,” that the trial court ignored applicable mitigating factors, and that the court improperly determined she was a dangerous offender.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a two-car accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained irreparable damage and that Defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was 100% at fault. Prior to the commencement of this action, the automobile insurance carrier for Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, paid the lien-holder of Plaintiff’s vehicle $7,852.57, the amount Allstate believed to be the fair market value of the vehicle. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant to recover the balance of the fair market value of her car and damages for loss of use. She also asserted a direct action against Allstate, alleging that Allstate reached a settlement with her lien-holder before exploring the full extent of her damages. The trial court dismissed the direct action against Allstate for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because Tennessee law does not permit a direct action against an insured’s insurance carrier “without first establishing that the insured . . . has become ‘legally obligated’ to pay damages.” Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Seymour v. Sierra, 98 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Following the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Allstate, the trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant upon the finding that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the fair market value was more than Allstate paid on behalf of Defendant. The court also summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for the loss of use of her car, because it could not be repaired and she never sought to rent a replacement vehicle. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The petitioner, Terrell Loverson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred by concluding that appellate counsel rendered effective assistance. According to the petitioner, appellate counsel should have raised, as an issue on appeal, the trial court's denial of his request for a self-defense jury instruction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case arises from the sale of the assets of a small cable television system. DirecTV program channels constituted the majority of the system’s programming. Three years after the sale, DirecTV stopped providing its programming signal to the cable system, claiming the signal had been obtained illegally. The buyer of the cable system filed suit against DirecTV for breach of contract and defamation. After reaching a settlement with DirecTV, the buyer filed this action against the seller of the cable system, seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud and a declaratory judgment that the promissory note the buyer had executed as part of the purchase was not yet due and payable. The seller filed a counterclaim, seeking payment of the promissory note. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the buyer’s claims against the seller. The court also dismissed the seller’s counterclaim under the doctrine of unclean hands. After a review of the record, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the seller’s counterclaim. Accordingly, we affirm.

Petitioner, Gale Marleen Krizka, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, in which she alleged that her counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness, failing to call witnesses, and failing to give an opening statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal pertains to an effort to set aside a default judgment. M.V. (Mother) filed a petition seeking a restraining order against M.A.G. (Father) and modification of their permanent parenting plan. Father was served with Mother’s petition. He did not file a response. Mother later filed a motion for a default judgment and mailed the same to Father. He did not respond or attend the noticed hearing. At the hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s proffered permanent parenting plan and awarded her attorney’s fees. The court mailed the final judgment to Father. Father then moved to set aside the judgment, claiming, in part, that he had not received Mother’s motion for default. The trial court denied his request after finding that the motion for default was mailed to Father’s address on file with the court and that Father had not asserted just cause as to why the final judgment should be set aside. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2008 conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting the Petitioner’s confession, and (3) the habeas corpus court violated his due process rights by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Wayne Utz, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to a term of imprisonment of nine years and six months to be served at one hundred percent.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that “the sentence in this case is excessive and contrary to the law.”  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Richardson, appeals the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences upon remand for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.