APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Misty Ann Miller, appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion to modify the sentences imposed against her pursuant to a negotiated plea deal.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding no new post-sentencing developments exist to justify a modification of her sentences.  After our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Wesley Howard Luthringer (“the Defendant”) was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide by a Bedford County jury.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-four years for each count to be served consecutively as a Range I standard offender.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to find him guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively.  After a thorough review of the record and case law, we affirm.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellants appeal from separate orders denying two motions for recusal filed in this case. After thoroughly reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court to deny the recusal motions. 

The Defendant, Richard W. Wilburn, was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions to one count of initiating the methamphetamine manufacturing process and three counts of driving on a revoked license, second offense or more.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying enhancement factor 10—the Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high—to increase his sentence for initiating the manufacturing methamphetamine process because, he asserts, there was no proof that anyone was endangered by his actions.  He also submits that the trial court erred by denying any form of alternative sentencing based upon his need for drug treatment.  Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision.  Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Roxann Lee Cruse, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for her Dyer County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of a Schedule III narcotic. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A purchaser of property entered into an installment contract and signed a promissory note specifying the day on which monthly payments were to be made. The purchaser began making payments on different days of the months and the seller accepted these payments over a course of years. Over seven years after the contract was executed, the seller sought to declare the contract null and void because the purchaser failed to tender his payment on the day specified in the note. The trial court awarded the seller relief and granted it possession of the property. The purchaser appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. We conclude the parties modified the terms of the promissory note through their course of conduct and that the purchaser did not breach the contract.

In this drug forfeiture case, we have concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owner failed to filed a petition for judicial review within the sixty-day time period required under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b).  We, therefore, vacate the trial court’s decision.

This is the second appeal in this case involving a long-running battle between foster parents and the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). In 2014, DCS removed the three-year-old child at issue from her foster home of three years. In the context of this already pending termination and adoption proceeding, the chancery court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that there was insufficient evidence to justify removal and that DCS had taken steps adverse to the child’s best interest. The chancery court ordered DCS to return the child to her foster home. On extraordinary appeal, this Court determined that a trial court cannot direct the placement of a foster child within DCS legal custody, but we recognized that the trial court could remove legal custody from DCS and place custody directly with the foster parents if warranted. One week prior to the hearing on remand, DCS participated in a surrender proceeding under a separate docket number and contemporaneously obtained an order of full guardianship over the child. DCS then moved to dismiss as moot the termination, adoption, and custody petitions pending in this case because DCS, as guardian, refused to consent to an adoption by the child’s former foster parents. The child’s current foster mother attempted to intervene. After a two-day trial, the trial court dismissed the former foster parents’ petitions as moot and granted the adoption to the current foster mother, as DCS in its role as guardian would only consent to an adoption by her. The child’s guardian ad litem appeals. The former foster parents and DCS raise additional issues. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Purchasers of real estate brought suit against the seller as well as the real estate agent and agency that assisted the buyers, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of duty to disclose adverse facts related to the purchased property, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The buyers argued that the defendants misrepresented the age and history of the home and did not disclose that it had a mold problem. Upon motion for summary judgment, the agent and the agency were dismissed as defendants. The trial court subsequently denied the buyers' motion to reconsider the summary judgment order. The buyers appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a suit filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for the wrongful death of Tammy Hale. The claimant, Ms. Hale’s father, titled his cause of action as one for “negligent care, custody, and control of persons” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E). The claimant alleged that the State was responsible for the actions of an inmate whose release was not conditioned upon participation in community supervision for life as required by section 39-13-524. The State sought dismissal, alleging that the claim was really one for “negligent deprivation of statutory rights” based upon the failure to adhere to section 39-13-524, which does not confer a private right of action. Following a hearing, the Claims Commission, William O. Shults, Commissioner, agreed and dismissed the claim. The claimant appeals. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal limited to the issue of whether the orders of an Indian court regarding matters pending in India is entitled to full faith and credit, such that this state’s trial court lacks jurisdiction over custody of the minor child pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The mother, an Indian citizen but permanent resident of the United States, filed an action in India seeking the return of her minor son. She contends that her son, a citizen of the United States, is being detained illegally in India by her husband and his family. The Indian court ruled that the child should remain with the paternal grandparents in India at this time. The mother, thereafter, filed an action for divorce in Shelby County. After a hearing, the state trial court ordered, inter alia, that the father, also an Indian citizen but permanent resident of the United States, return the child to Tennessee within seven days. Upon the trial court’s denial of the father’s request for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9, the father sought a Rule 10 extraordinary appeal of the trial court’s ruling. We find that the appeal was improvidently granted. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue presented and dismiss the appeal.

This is a breach of contract action in which the lessor filed suit against the lessee for non-payment of rent, utilities, and repairs pursuant to the terms of a lease agreement for two units in a commercial building. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of lessor. The lessee appeals. We affirm.

This case concerns modification of a parenting plan. Following her divorce in Tennessee, Mother moved with her child to Maryland. Father initially opposed the move, but an agreed order entered after the move adopted an amended permanent parenting plan, which named Mother the primary residential parent. The amended permanent parenting plan granted Father parenting time over the summer, during certain holidays, and when either Father traveled to Maryland or Mother traveled to Tennessee. After experiencing difficulties exercising parenting time and growing concern over Mother’s care of the child, Father filed a petition requesting to be named primary residential parent. The trial court denied the request. Although it found a material change in circumstances based on the child’s serious mental health issues, the court determined that it was in the best interest of the child to remain with Mother. Father appeals arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) finding it was in the child’s best interest for Mother to remain the primary residential parent; (2) not finding Mother in contempt; and (3) awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We affirm the decision of the trial court.  

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, to two minor children, on the grounds of: (1) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(22)(C); and (2) abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).  Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father willfully failed to provide support for the children, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support.  The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

Mother has appealed the trial court’s decisions regarding parenting time, criminal contempt, child support, and the child’s surname. We have determined that the trial court erred in finding Mother in criminal contempt as to one of the three incidents at issue, in setting temporary child support, in failing to order Father to pay child support by wage assignment, and in ordering the child’s surname to be changed to Father’s surname. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to six children and a father’s parental rights to three of those children. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that DCS did not prove abandonment by an incarcerated parent by clear and convincing evidence. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support four grounds for termination, namely, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse, and that termination is in the best interest of the children, we affirm.

This is an administrative appeal in which Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Human Services to suspend services he received pursuant to the state’s vocational rehabilitation program. The Division of Appeals and Hearings upheld the Department’s decision to suspend Petitioner’s services and this decision was affirmed by the Department’s commissioner. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review with the Shelby County Chancery Court. The court upheld the Department’s actions and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed; we affirm.

This appeal concerns a dispute between a father and his adult son over the transfer of real property. In 1997, the father constructed a house on a portion of his two-acre tract of land for his son. Several years later, the son agreed to purchase the house. Subsequently, a disagreement led the parties to discover identical errors in the legal descriptions in the warranty deed executed by the father transferring the property to the son and the deed of trust securing the son’s purchase money loan. The trial court, upon its finding of mutual mistake, reformed the incorrect legal descriptions in the deeds, but the court also granted the father a right to use a shed and garden on the son’s land. We affirm the trial court’s reformation of the legal descriptions in the deeds. However, because we conclude that the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the parties intended the deeds to include the father’s right of use, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the interest.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that his sentences for first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder were illegal because the trial court constructively amended the corresponding indictments by instructing the jury on “alternative theories for felony murder.” The trial court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. Biological grandparents of a child at issue in a termination of parental rights action sought to intervene in the termination proceeding. The child had lived in the grandparents' home with them and the child's parents. The Department of Children's Services removed the child from that home and later sought to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents. The grandparents filed a motion to intervene. The trial court denied their motion, but granted their request for an interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, we also granted their request for interlocutory review. We affirm the decision of the trial court and now remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Father appeals the order entered on the motion of the Mother of four children awarding her sole decision-making authority regarding the children’s religious upbringing and designating that the children attend her church, contending, among other things, that the mandate that the children attend Mother’s church violates his and the children’s freedom of religious expression, as protected by the Federal and Tennessee Constitutions. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mother sole authority regarding the children’s religious upbringing and modify the order to remove that portion specifying the church that the children are to attend.   

This custody dispute involves the child born to Jonathan D. Grigsby (Father) and Alexandra Alvis-Crawford (Mother). In July 2014, the parties were residing together when Mother moved out of the house with the child and refused to let Father see or talk to him. Shortly thereafter, Mother had medical issues and was admitted to the hospital where she remained until September 2014. During this time, the child lived in the home of the maternal grandparents of the child. Because the maternal grandparents refused to allow Father to see or speak with the child, he filed a petition seeking an ex parte order for immediate custody of his minor child. Based on Father’s petition, the trial court entered an order finding that the grandparents were unlawfully keeping the child from Father. The trial court gave Father immediate temporary custody of the child. The trial court did not make a permanent custody determination at that time. In December 2014, Mother filed a petition for custody. In January 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s amended emergency petition and Mother’s petition. The trial court found that it is in the best interest of the child to stay with Father. Accordingly, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appeals. We affirm.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals contending the trial court erred in classifying Husband’s interest in his family’s business as his separate property and by failing to classify the appreciation in value of this asset as marital property. Wife contends she should have been awarded more than one-half of the marital estate, given that she is in poor health, unable to work and Husband has separate assets of significant value. She contends the award of alimony in futuro is insufficient and the trial court erred by requiring her to pay her attorney’s fees and expenses. Husband contends the trial court erred by failing to award him certain items of personal property that are of sentimental value. We affirm the classification of Husband’s interest in his family business as his separate property. We modify the division of the marital property by increasing Wife’s share of the cash proceeds from the sale of the home, the adjoining land, cattle, and farm equipment from fifty (50%) percent to fifty-five (55%) percent. As for the specific items of tangible personal property Husband seeks to recover, we remand this issue to the trial court to make specific findings of fact and enter judgment accordingly. As for alimony in futuro, we have determined that Husband has the ability to pay more, and Wife has a need that is greater than what was awarded; therefore, we modify the award of alimony in futuro by increasing the amount to be paid monthly. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision denying Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial. As for the attorney’s fees and expenses Wife incurred on appeal, we conclude that she should be awarded the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in this appeal and remand for the trial court to make the award it deems appropriate in its discretion. 

The petitioner, James Floyd Thomas, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2014 Bedford County Circuit Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, for which he received an effective sentence of 18 years.  Because the petitioner failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court’s order is affirmed.

Pro se Petitioner, Rocky White, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court‟s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Because the sentences in this action have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.